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It was the best of times, it was the worst of times, it was the age of
wisdom, it was the age offoolishness, it was the epoch ofbelief it was
the epoch of incredulity, it was the season ofLight, it was the season
of Darkness, it was the spring of hope, it was the winter of despair,
we had everything before us, we had nothing before us, we were all
going direct to Heaven, we were all going direct the other way-in
short, the period was so far like the present period, that some of its
noisiestauthoritiesinsistedon its being received,for good orfor evil,
in the superlative degree of comparison only.
- Charles Dickens1
I. INTRODUCTION

It was the year of Our Lord two-thousand and four. The international
intellectual property regime was in a deepening crisis. While developed
countries were pushing for the establishment of bilateral and regional trade
and investment agreements, less developed countries2 responded by pursuing
development agendas at the World Trade Organization ("WTO"), the World
Intellectual Property Organization ("WIPO"), and other international fora that

1. CHARLES DICKENS, A TALE OF Two CTES 5 (1859) (Richard Maxwell ed., Penguin Books

2000).
2. The Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights distinguishes between
developing and least developed countries. Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property
Rights [hereinafter TRIPs Agreement], Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade
Organization, Annex IC, Legal Instruments-Results of the Uruguay Round, 33 LL.M. 1197 (1994)
[hereinafter Marrakesh Agreement]. This Article uses "less developed countries" to denote both developing
and least developed countries. When referring to the TRIPs Agreement, this Article returns to the terms
"developing countries" and "least developed countries."
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govern public health, human rights, biological diversity, food and agriculture,
and information and communications.'
From the standpoint of less developed countries, the recent developments
in the international intellectual property regime are both exciting and
worrisome. On the one hand, they reflect a growing momentum these
countries have not experienced in decades-since perhaps the establishment
of the New International Economic Order in the mid-1970s. 4 The
developments therefore have provided an unprecedented opportunity for
countries to recalibrate the balance in the international intellectual property
system. On the other hand, the developments are remarkably similar to those
that took place in the wake of the old-and admittedly failed-Development
Agenda, which less developed countries advanced in the 1960s and 1970s.5
These similarities have raised concerns about whether the present
Development Agenda will follow the path of its ill-fated predecessor.
This Article brings together these two Development Agendas-or, to be
more precise, two sets of development agendas-to evaluate the potential
success of the present Development Agenda. Drawing on lessons from the
earlier agenda, this Article provides insights into whether and how the present
agenda can be made more successful and effective. For comparison purposes,
the Article refers to the present agenda throughout as the "New Agenda" and
uses the term the "Old Agenda" to denote the agenda advanced in the 1960s
and 1970s. The word "old" is used here not to indicate the obsolescence of
the earlier agenda, which remains highly relevant today. Rather, the term is
used to remind readers that the present agenda, despite its broad coverage and
widespread support, represents an ongoing struggle by less developed
countries to develop an innovation system that responds to their needs,
concerns, and local conditions.
Part II traces the development of the Old Agenda. In particular, it
discusses (1) the drafting of the Protocol Regarding Developing Countries 6
("Stockholm Protocol") to the Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary
and Artistic Works ("Berne Convention"),7 (2) the formation of WIPO as a
specialized agency of the United Nations, (3) the establishment of the draft
International Code of Conduct on the Transfer of Technology ("International

3. See PeterK. Yu, Currentsand Crosscurrentsin the InternationalIntellectualPropertyRegime,
38 LoY. L.A. L. REv. 323, 381-92 (2004) (discussing the demands for diversification by less developed
countries).
4. See discussion infra Part U.C.
5. See discussion infra Part H.
6. Protocol Regarding Developing Countries to the Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary
and Artistic Works, Sept. 9, 1886, revised at Stockholm July 14, 1967.
7. Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, Sept. 9, 1886, revised at
ParisJuly 24, 1971, 25 U.S.T. 1341, 828 U.N.T.S. 221 [hereinafter Berne Convention].
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Code of Conduct" or "Code"),8 and (4) the revision of the Paris Convention
for the Protection of Industrial Property ("Paris Convention").9
Part m takes stock of the New Agenda. This Part covers not only
developments in the WTO and WIPO, but also those in the other fora that
govern human rights, public health, biological diversity, food and agriculture,
and information and communications. Although the length of this Article
does not allow me to provide more detailed discussions of these vastly diverse
fora, this Part illustrates how intellectual property issues have been
transformed from a narrow, technical domestic issue to one that is multifaceted and central to the international policy agenda. This Part further
suggests that the increased fragmentation of international law, the continuous
blurring of boundaries between the different issue areas, and the growing
complexity of the international intellectual property regime have provided less
developed countries with both promises and challenges.
Part IV concludes with six brief observations concerning the similarities
and differences between the Old and New Development Agendas. This Part
begins by focusing on the various players, fora, and issues involved in the two
agendas. It then discusses the changing political environment surrounding the
development of the New Agenda, the growing public awareness of intellectual
property issues in the past decade, and the emergence of new ideas, concepts,
and rhetorical frames that have been used to boost the New Agenda. This Part
suggests that the significant differences between the Old and New Agendas
may provide hope for greater economic, social, cultural, and technological
development in the less developed world. It nevertheless cautions that, if this
hope is to be realized, less developed countries and their supporters need to
take the New Agenda seriously and mobilize before they lose their
momentum.

II. THE OLD DEVELOPMENT AGENDA
In the 1960s and 1970s, less developed countries repeatedly expressed
serious concern about the inappropriateness of the international intellectual
property system for their own economic, social, cultural, and technological
development. Although the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights1 ° ("TRIPs Agreement") had yet to be established and
there were no salient public health crises, like the HIV/AIDS pandemic in

8. Draft International Code of Conduct on the Transfer ofTechnology, United Nations Conference
on Trade and Development U.N. Doc. TD/CODE TOT/33 (1981).
9. Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property, Mar. 20, 1883, revised at Stockholm
July 14, 1967, 21 U.S.T. 1538, 828 U.N.T.S. 305 [hereinafter Paris Convention].
10. TRIPs Agreement, supra note 2.
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Africa," these countries were gravely troubled by the high international
intellectual property standards set by the colonial powers.
Even worse, because of past colonization, virtually all of these standards
were developed without much of the participation of less developed
countries. 12 Through colonial acts, the standards were transplanted directly
from the metropolitan states to the colonial territories,
even though these
territories had not signed the international conventions. 3 These standards not

11. There were, nevertheless, serious problems concerning access to medicines in many less
developed countries. See, e.g., Srividhya Ragavan, Of the Inequals of the Uruguay Round, 10 MARQ.
INTELL. PROP. L. REV. 273, 280 (2006) (noting a severe lack of access to medicines and a high rate of
epidemic diseases in India).
12. As the Resource Book on TRIPS and Development suggested in the TRIPs context:
The Paris and Berne Conventions have been in force for more than a century and a great
deal of state practice under these conventions has accumulated.... [However], a number
of WTO Members were not parties to the Paris and Berne Conventions for much of the
historical evolution of these treaties. A number of developing and least-developed WTO
Members were subject to foreign rule for a good part of the period during which the Paris
and Berne Conventions were evolving. The developing and least-developed Members might
argue in favour of being allowed to develop their own state practice before the practices of
developed Members are used to interpret TRIPS.
UNCTAD-ICTSD, RESOURCE BOOK ON TRIPS AND DEVELOPMENT 51 (2005); see also R.P. ANAND, NEW

STATES AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 20 (1972) ("[Hlaving lost their international personality, the Asian states
could not play any active role in the development of international law during the most creative period of
its history in the latter part of the nineteenth and the beginning of the present century.").
13. See Ruth L. Gana (Okediji), The Myth of Development,The ProgressofRights: Human Rights
to Intellectual Propertyand Development, 18 LAw & POL'Y 315, 329 (1996) ("As colonies, developing
countries were not signatories to the early international intellectual property treaties although the treaty
provisions often extended to them through the colonial administration."); see also ULF ANDERFELT,
INTERNATIONAL PATENT-LEGISLATION AND DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 119 (197 1) ("The faculty to extend
Union territory and, in certain cases, full membership status to colonies and other dependencies has been
used particularly by France, and to a limited extent by Great Britain, Germany and Holland."). As Professor
Okediji explained:
Intellectual property law was not merely an incidental part of the colonial legal apparatus,
but a central technique in the commercial superiority sought by European powers in their
interactions with each other in regions beyond Europe. Granted, intellectual property
systems in Europe prior to the seventeenth century were neither fully developed nor had
intellectual property protection become a systematic policy designed primarily for
encouraging domestic innovation. Whatever protections existed, however, would be exerted
against other Europeans in colonial territories in the process of empire building. The [early
period of European contact through trade with non-European peoples] thus was
characterized predominantly by the extension of intellectual property laws to the colonies
for purposes associated generally with the overarching colonial strategies of assimilation,
incorporation and control. It was also characterized by efforts to secure national economic
interests against other European countries in colonial territories.
Ruth L. Okediji, The InternationalRelationsof IntellectualProperty: Narrativesof Developing Country
Participationin the GlobalIntellectualPropertySystem, 7 SING. J. INT'L & CoMP. L. 315, 324-25 (2003)
[hereinafter Okediji, InternationalRelations].
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only ignored their local conditions, but also hampered access to the
information, knowledge, and technology needed for competitiveness, internal
growth, and development.
Once these countries joined the international community following their
declaration of independence, they "became more assertive of their rights and
aware of their international obligations." 4 As shown by the problems created
by state succession to treaties, these countries were torn between affirming
and denouncing international obligations into which their former colonial
rulers had entered on their behalves.15
As newly independent states, these countries were "keen to establish their
membership of international society by joining various multilateral
agreements and international organizations."' 6 Such membership would
provide these countries with highly desirable opportunities to exercise their
newfound independence and sovereignty. As Georges Abi-Saab wrote many
decades ago, "[f]or the newly independent states, sovereignty is the hard won
prize of their long struggle for emancipation. It is the legal epitome of the fact
that they are masters in their own house."' 7
Unfortunately, for these new comers, the extant standards were too high
and did not take into account the specific economic conditions and
technological backwardness of these countries. The adoption of these
standards, therefore, would likely impede efforts to catch up with other
developed countries. As Sam Ricketson and Jane Ginsburg explained the
different objectives underlying the development of the Berne Convention:
The Convention is essentially concerned with the private interests of
authors, and with raising the level of protection that is accorded to
them. Such questions are not usually of great significance to
developing countries. These are at varying stages of economic
development, with the consequences that the standard of living of
their populations is generally much lower than that found in the
developed countries. Economic development, even where this means
no more than the attainment of a basic level of self-sufficiency, is
therefore an overriding goal for these countries. Ways of achieving

14. Pedro Roffe & Gina Vea, The WIPO Development Agenda in an Historical and Political
Context, in THE DEVELOPMENTAGENDA: GLOBAL INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND DEVELOPING COUNTRIES
79, 80 (Neil Weinstock Netanel ed., 2009) [hereafter DEVELOPMENT AGENDA].

15. See generally Peter K. Yu, Successionby Estoppel:Hong Kong's Succession to the ICCPR, 27
PEPP. L. REV. 53, 80-93 (2000) (discussing state succession to treaties).
16. CHRISTOPHER MAY, THE WoRLD INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY ORGANIZATION: RESURGENCE AND
THE DEVELOPMENT AGENDA 22 (2007).

17. Georges M. Abi-Saab, The Newly Independent States and the Rules of InternationalLaw, 8
HOWARD LJ. 95, 103 (1962).
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this object are through the promotion of literacy and through technical
and vocational training, and these programmes, in turn, necessitate
ready access to a wide range of educational and informational
materials. The authors and publisher/providers of many of these
works, however, will usually be resident in one of the developed
countries, and the works themselves will generally be subject to
copyright protection both in that country, as well as under Berne.
This naturally causes problems for a developing nation, which is
generally deficient in the foreign currency that is needed to buy stocks
of these works, or to purchase authorization to reproduce, translate,
or otherwise utilize them for their purposes. 8
Against this background, less developed countries advanced the Old
Development Agenda in the 1960s. To help us better understand this Agenda,
this Part focuses on (1) the drafting of the Stockholm Protocol, (2) the
formation of WlPO as a specialized agency of the United Nations, (3) the
establishment of the International Code of Conduct, and (4) the revision of the
Paris Convention. Although these four developments are discussed in
separate sections, they took place concurrently and were interdependent. They
are therefore more correctly seen as part of a larger development agenda-in
this case, the Old Development Agenda.
A. Stockholm Protocol
When the Berne Convention was revised in Brussels in 1948, only India
and Pakistan participated as fully independent nations. 9 While other less
developed countries were previously subject to the Berne provisions, the
Convention applied to them only by virtue of their status "as dependent
territories. '
Once they became independent, they therefore began to
question the extant international copyright relationship---in particular, whether
they should continue as members of the Berne Convention in their own right
or whether they should withdraw from the Union.2 While India, Pakistan, the

18. SAM RICKETSON & JANE C. GINSBURG, INTERNATIONAL COPYRIGHT AND NEIGHBORING RIGHTS:
THE BERNE CONVENTION AND BEYOND 881-82 (2d ed. 2005); see Charles F. Johnson, The Originsof the
Stockholm Protocol, 18 BULL. COPYRIGHT Soc'Y USA 91, 93 (1970) ("[Ilt should be pointed out that one
of the long-range aims of all these developing countries was to educate, as quickly as possible, the masses
of their illiterate peoples. Moreover, most of them realized that the quickest way to accomplish this end
was through the use of copyright materials, primary textbooks, from the more advanced countries.").
19. See RICKErSON &GINSBURG, supra note 18, at 884-85.

20. Id. at 885; see Berne Convention, supranote 7, art. 19 (stipulating that "[tihe provisions of this
Convention shall not preclude the making of a claim to the benefit of any greater protection which may be
granted by legislation in a country of the Union").
21.

See RiCKETSON & GINSBURG, supra note 18, at 885.
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Philippines, and many former French and Belgian African colonies elected to
remain bound by the Convention, Indonesia decided to withdraw from the
Union.22
Notwithstanding their new Berne memberships, many less developed
members, along with those that had chosen to remain outside the Union,
questioned whether those copyright standards that were set up primarily for
the developed world would be appropriate for them in light of their limited
economic development and technological backwardness. To further explore
this question, the African Study Conference on Copyright was convened in
Brazzaville in August 1963.23 Jointly organized by the United International
Bureau for the Protection of Intellectual Property ("BIRPI," an acronym for
its French name, Bureaux Internationaux Re4unis pour la Protection de la
Proprit6Intellectuelle) and the United Nations Educational, Scientific and
Cultural Organization ("UNESCO"), this conference sought "to assist the new
African states to formulate appropriate principles for the drafting of their own
copyright laws. 24
Participating in the conference were twenty-three African countries,
some non-African countries, and a number of nongovernmental international
organizations. 25 Although "[p]art of the seminar was purely educational and
informational, 26 the African delegates "expressed the view that the major
conventions needed to be reexamined in light of the specific needs of the
African continent. '27 At the end of the conference, the participants adopted
three specific recommendations: (1) the reduction of the copyright term
stipulated in article 7 of the Berne Convention; (2) the modification of article
20 to facilitate the development of bilateral agreements that would allow
parties to derogate from their international obligations; and (3) special
provisions for the protection of African folklore and for promoting free
educational use of copyrighted works.28 The participants further proposed the
development, with the assistance of UNESCO and WIPO, of a model
copyright law suitable for conditions in Africa.29
All of these recommendations were badly needed by less developed
countries. Up until the Brazzaville Conference, "the preparatory work for the
Berne revision had taken no account of the[ir] problems .... and had been

22. Id.
23. Fora discussion ofthe Brazzaville Conference, see generally Johnson, supranote 18, at 103-08.
24. RICKETSON & GINSBURG, supra note 18, at 888.
25. See id. The list of these countries is available at Johnson, supra note 18, at 104 n.43.
26. RICKETSON & GINSBURG, supra note 18, at 888.

27. Id. (quoting Johnson, supra note 18, at 107).
28. Nd6ntNdiaye, The Berne Convention and Developing Countries,I I COLuM.-VLAJ.L. &ARTS
47, 47-48 (1986).
29. RICKETSON & GINSBURG, supra note 18, at 889.
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essentially concerned with the question of raising the level of protection
offered by that Convention."3 Although the original Berne Convention
included less developed members, such as Haiti and Tunisia,3 1 "the process of
decolonization brought into existence a large number of new independent
states, notably in Africa and Asia., 3 2 The growing number of these states, in
turn, had magnified the problem of having high copyright standards in the less
developed world.
Four months after the Brazzaville Conference, the governing bodies of
the Berne Union and the newly-created Universal Copyright Convention
("U.C.C.") adopted a similar resolution in ajoint session in New Delhi.33 The
resolution "stress[ed] the need to allow compulsory licenses for educational
During the session, the Indian delegation
and translation purposes."'
proposed a feasibility study on the introduction of compulsory reproduction
licenses for educational purposes and of translation licenses that were similar
to those found in the U.C.C 5 Pursuant to this proposal, the governing bodies
invited the secretariats to prepare the study and "gave their general support to
the work of the recent Brazzaville Conference, in particular the proposal for
a draft model law for African countries."3 6 This proposal eventually led to the
development of the Tunis Model Law on Copyright,37 which has significant
influences on the copyright laws of many African countries.38
In the following year, an expert study group "recommended the text of
a new article on developing countries to be added to the Berne Convention."39
Generally sympathetic to the plight of less developed countries, the group
emphasized that "exceptional measures for the benefit of developing countries

30. Id.
31. See id. at 883 ("Of the initial signatories of the Berne Act, two can be fairly regarded as falling
within the category of what are today called developing countries.").
32. Id. at 885.
33. Ndiaye, supranote 28, at 48. For a discussion of the joint session, see generally Johnson, supra
note 18, at 116-18.
34. Ndiaye, supranote 28, at 48.
35. See RICKETSON & GINSBURG, supra note 18, at 889.
36. Id. at 889-90.
37. Tunis Model Law on Copyright (1976), reprintedin 12 COPYRIGHT 165 (1976); see Paul Kuruk,
ProtectingFolklore UnderModernIntellectual PropertyRegimes:A Reappraisalof the Tensions Between
Individualand Communal Rights in Africa and the UnitedStates, 48 AM. U. L. REV. 769,813-17 (1999)
(discussing the Tunis Model Law on Copyright); Monika Domnann, Lost in Tradition?Reconsidering
History of Folkloreand Its Legal ProtectionSince 1800, in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND TRADITIONAL
CULTURAL EXPRESSIONS INADIGITAL ENVIRONMENT 3, 11 (Christoph Beat Graber & Mira Burri-Nenova
eds., 2008) [hereinafter INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND TRADITIONAL CULTURAL EXPRESSIONS] (tracing
the protection of folklore to the Brazzavile Conference).
38. See Kuruk, supra note 37, at 814-15.
39. Barbara A. Ringer, The Role of the United States in InternationalCopyright-Past,Present,
and Future,56 GEO. L.J. 1050, 1066 (1968) [hereinafter Ringer, Role of the United States].
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were in principle justified."' The experts also noted "the advantages to
authors if developing countries were induced to draft their domestic copyright
legislation on the pattern of the Berne Convention."'"
These recommendations, to some extent, reflected the dilemma
confronting many developed Berne members. On the one hand, they "saw the
potential for encouraging these 'new' states to join and by doing so expand the
realm of governance for intellectual property, which would potentially benefit
the export oriented companies in their own national intellectual propertyrelated sectors."42 The developed Berne members therefore were willing to
offer concessions as "sweeteners" to entice these countries to join the Union.43
On the other hand, these members were reluctant to adopt those changes to the
Berne Convention that would be needed if they were to attract newly
independent states." Because these countries had fought hard to raise the
international copyright standards over the past eighty years, these changes
would be major setbacks and were deemed highly undesirable. 5
To complicate matters, the Berne Convention faced significant
competition from the U.C.C., which UNESCO adopted in 1952 to provide an
alternative to entice the United States and other American countries tojoin the
international copyright family.' Under the U.C.C., member states were
allowed to grant compulsory licenses for translation purposes4 7 and to retain
formalities in their copyright systems. 48 The Convention also counted among
its members the United States, which did not join the Berne Union until
1989."9 In short, the U.C.C. presented an attractive alternative, especially for
those countries that "wished to obtain protection for their works abroad but

40. Id.
41. Id.
42. MAY, supra note 16, at 22.
43. Cf. Gana, supra note 13, at 330 ("Accommodation led to special terms of accession to
international treaties by developing countries. These 'sweeteners' became the distinguishing feature of
international treaty making between developed and developing countries affecting every area of
international commitment including intellectual property treaties." (footnote omitted)).
44. See RicKETSON & GINSBURG, supra note 18, at 885 (recounting that there was "a general view
that the future growth of the Union would be restricted unless some specific concessions were made in
favour of developing countries, both inside and outside the Union").
45. These revision conferences were held in Berlin in 1908, in Rome in 1928, and in Brussels in
1948. See id. at 92-120 (discussing the Berne revision conferences in Berlin, Rome, and Brussels).
46. See id. at 1177-83; Yu, Currents and Crosscurrents, supra note 3, at 342.
47. Universal Copyright Convention art. V(2), Sept. 6, 1952, 6 U.S.T. 2731, 216 U.N.T.S. 132
[hereinafter U.C.C.]; see Ringer, Role of the United States, supra note 39, at 1060-62 (summarizing the
U.C.C. provisions). For a collection of essays discussing the U.C.C., see UNIVERSAL COPYRIGHT
CONVENTION ANALYZED (Theodore R. Kupferman & Mathew Foner eds., 1955).
48. U.C.C., supra note 47, art. I.
49. See Beme Convention Implementation Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-568, 102 Stat. 2853
(codified in scattered sections of 17 U.S.C.); see also RICKETSON & GtNSBURG, supra note 18, at 168-69.
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felt unable or unwilling to accord to foreign works the high level of protection
required by the Berne Convention."5
Such competition had raised concerns among BIRPI and the developed
Beme members that the newly independent states might either join the U.C.C.
or establish their own separate union.5 Indeed, as Barbara Ringer, the former
U.S. Register of Copyrights, recalled, "[t]here was obviously a fear that...
Berne would become a moribund old gentlemen's club., 52 This fear was
understandably justified. By the time the Intellectual Property Conference of
Stockholm ("Stockholm Conference") was held in 1967, the U.C.C. already
had attracted twenty-six less developed country members, with its total
membership lagging behind the Berne Convention by only two.53 While "the
former French African colonies and some of the former British Asian
Dominions had preferred Berne .... the UCC had attracted the Central and
South American countries and a number of former British dependent
territories."54
The only major barrier that would prevent countries from migrating from
Berne to the U.C.C. was the Berne safeguard clause, which prohibited Berne
members that have withdrawn from the Union from benefiting from the
U.C.C. in countries that were members of both the U.C.C. and the Berne
Convention.5 5 Although this clause helped deter defection, it did not affect
those countries that had yet to join the Union, including many less developed
countries in Africa, Asia, and the Americas.56
50. RICKETSON & GINSBURG, supra note 18, at 886; see also Ringer,Role ofthe United States, supra
note 39, at 1061 (describing the U.C.C. as "a new 'common denominator' convention that was intended to
establish a minimum level of international copyright relations throughout the world, without weakening or
supplanting the Berne Convention"). But see RICKErsON & GINSBURG, supra note 18, at 889 (noting the
interest of African states to join the Berne Convention in light of the fact that the Convention, "in view of its
longer history, was seen as the more prestigious instrument"); Ringer, Role of the UnitedStates, supranote 39,
at 1068 (stating that "the Berne Union has the prestige and traditions that the U.C.C. lacks").
51. See Ringer, Role of the United States, supra note 39, at 1075 (noting the declaration of the
Indian Registrar of Copyrights that "a country like India would have no alternative but to denounce both
Beme and the U.C.C. and 'to strike out on its own or, if possible, sponsor or join a separate Union with
other countries similarly placed" if the Stockholm Protocol was blocked).
52. id. at 1066; see also Eugene M. Braderman, InternationalCopyright-A World View, 17 BULL.
COPYRIGHT Soc'Y USA 147, 147 (noting the "fear that there would be a mass exodus of developing
countries from Berne and into the UCC").
53. RiCKETSON & GINSBURG, supra note 18, at 886. These countries included Argentina, Brazil,
Cambodia, Chile, Costa Rica, Cuba, Ecuador, Ghana, Guatemala, Haiti, India, Kenya, Laos, Lebanon,
Liberia, Malawi, Mexico, Nicaragua, Nigeria, Pakistan, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Venezuela, Yugoslavia,
and Zambia. Id. at 886 n.17.
54. Id. at 886.
55. See U.C.C., supra note 47, art. XVII & app. decl.
56. At the time of the Stockholm Conference, the Berne Convention had twenty-eight less developed
country members, while the U.C.C. had twenty-six. RICKETSON & GINSBURG, supra note 18, at 886. Only
seven of these countries had memberships in both Conventions. See id.
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In June 1967, the Stockholm Conference was convened to provide a
forum for revising substantive provisions of the Berne Convention, along with
one provision of the Paris Convention (which would be amended to
accommodate inventors' certificates in Socialist countries). The Conference
also sought "to effectuate the structural and administrative reform of the Paris
and Berne Unions as well as of the then existing five special agreements under
the Paris Union."5 8 By revamping the BIRPI's structure, this conference
helped pave the way for the organization to join the United Nations as a
specialized agency.59
Although only two less developed countries participated in the Brussels
Revision Conference in 1948, these countries accounted for slightly more than
forty percent of the Berne membership by the time the Stockholm Conference
was held.' During the Conference, they unsurprisingly expressed their deep
dissatisfaction with the high copyright standards in the Convention, arguing
that those standards "did not take sufficient account of their particular
needs."61 As the leader of the less developed world, India expressed its
concerns about "the high prices and frequent unavailability of [copyright]
works from the developed countries" and strongly advocated the need for
special and differential treatment that would "allow for the freer circulation
of. . .works in developing countries." 62 Taking its lead, less developed
countries threatened to make drastic changes to their international copyright
arrangements, unless major concessions were made to accommodate their
economic, social, cultural, and technological needs.6 3

57. See ARPAD BOGSCH, BRIEF HISTORY OF THE FIRST TWENTY FIVE YEARS OF THE WORLD
IarE.cruAL PROPERTY ORGANIZATION 18-21 (1992). These certificates "acknowledged an economic

remuneration to the inventor but reserved the actual use and commercial exploitation of the invention for
the state." Pedro Roffe & Taffere Tesfachew, The UnfinishedAgenda, in INTERNATIONAL TECHNOLOGY
TRANSFER: THE ORIGINS AND AFrERMATH OF THE UNITED NATIONS NEGOTIATIONS ON A DRAFr CODE OF

CONDUcr 381, 387 (Surendra J. Patel etal. eds., 2001) [hereinafter INTERNATIONAL TECHNOLOGY
TRANSFER].
58. BOGSCH, supra note 57, at 24.
59. See discussion infra Part ll.B.
60. See RICKETSON & GINSBURG, supra note 18, at 885 (noting that "by the time of the Stockholm

Conference, twenty-four members of the Union (with a total membership of fifty-seven) could be regarded
as developing countries within the terms of appropriate UN resolutions on the subject" (footnotes omitted));
see also MAY, supra note 16, at 22 ("As more and more new states emerged during the post-1945 period
of accelerated decolonization, the membership profile of the BIRPI started to shift from being dominated
by industrialized and developed states.").
61. RICKETSON & GINSBURG, supra note 18, at 885.
62. Id. at 887.
63. See Ringer,Role of the UnitedStates, supranote 39, at 1065; see also RICKETSON & GINSBURG,
supra note 18, at 899 (noting that "African and Asian countries took a similar approach to that of India,
with general support of socialist countries").
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To some extent, less developed countries perceived the demanded
arrangements as a means to promote literacy and provide training and
vocational assistance. 6' Their colonial backgrounds also led them to view
these arrangements as moral obligations on the part of the former colonial
powers.65 Nevertheless, to reassure developed countries that the proposed
concessions would not weaken the Union, India
argu[ed] that [the concessions] were necessary at this stage in order
to enable the developing countries to attain the high standards of
protection required by the Convention. [Because] a person 'making
a long jump took steps backward to enable him to make a greater leap
forward[,]' ... 'any temporary lowering of the standards of the
Convention would eventually be more than compensated for' .66
The Stockholm Conference eventually led to the development of a
special protocol for less developed countries. This protocol, if adopted, would
allow less developed countries to make reservations to the Berne Convention
in the areas of copyright duration and reproduction, translation, and
broadcasting licenses. 67 Because the protocol was not drafted as an
amendment to the Berne Convention, it neither affected the protections in
developed countries nor reduced the high standards of protection within the
Union. Rather, it provided less developed countries with "interim measures
that would be 6abandoned by countries when they reached higher levels of
development. 1
Although the Stockholm Protocol was as best a compromise as less
developed countries could elicit from their more developed neighbors, many
less developed countries were disappointed that "not enough had been
achieved" in the Conference and that the Protocol "was only a halfway step
in the right direction."'69 Meanwhile, the European and Latin American
members expressed their dissatisfaction with the protocol. Among these

64. See RICKETSON & GINSBURG, supra note 18, at 899.
65. See, e.g., id. ("Underlying [the position of these countries] was the view that their lack of
development was largely due to their colonial past, and that the obligation of the developed states to assist
them was in the nature of a moral debt."); ANAND, supra note 12, at 98 (noting the "moral obligation of the
Western Powers to help the countries which they colonized and exploited").
66. RICKETSON & GINSBURG, supra note 18, at 899 (footnotes omitted).
67. See Ruth L. Okediji, Sustainable Access to Copyrighted Digital Information Works in
Developing Countries [hereinafter Okediji, Sustainable Access], in INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC GOODS AND
TRANSFER OF TECHNOLOGY UNDER A GLOBALIZED INTEUFCMAL PROPERTY REGIME 142,157 (Keith E.

Maskus & Jerome H. Reichman eds., 2005) [hereinafter INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC GOODS]. For a detailed
analysis of the Stockholm Protocol, see generally Dorothy M. Schrader, Analysis of the ProtocolRegarding
Developing Countries, 17 BULL. COPYRIGHT SOc'Y USA 160 (1970).
68. RICKETSON & GINSBURG, supra note 18, at 895.

69. Id. at 913.
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critics, "the British delegation took the strongest stance, arguing that the
Protocol appeared to be a way of giving economic assistance to developing
nations at the expense of authors and that it was an inappropriate way of
achieving this objective."70 Such a position reflected the view of the British
publishing industries and author groups, which "argued [before the Stockholm
Conference] that emphasis should be placed on other forms of economic
assistance to developing countries, or alternatively that the present proposals
be pursued in the forum of the UCC rather than the Berne Union."'" Although
Britain was highly critical of the protocol, it abstained from voting in the end,
partly out of the "fears of offending the developing nations, particularly those
with large markets for English-language books such as India and Pakistan. 72
Joining Britain in abstentions were Mexico and Uruguay, which "had
made clear their opposition to the Protocol throughout the Conference. 73
Along with Argentina, they argued that "no intellectual or artistic progress
would be possible if the protection of authors was weakened."74 Their
positions, to some extent, reflected their beliefs in strong protection of authors
as enshrined in the American Declaration on the Rights and Duties of Man.
Adopted shortly after the Second World War, Article 13 of the Declaration
stipulated that "[e]very person.., has the right to the protection of his moral
and material interests as regards his inventions
or any literary, scientific or
76
artistic works of which he is the author.,
In retrospect, less developed country members were able to successfully
develop the protocol because they were sufficiently mobilized before the
Stockholm Conference-something worth contrasting with their more
tentative and reactionary response during the TRIPs negotiations.77 In the
words of Register Ringer, "the developing countries were well organized and
prepared to fight" from the outset.7" Five months before the Stockholm

70. Id. at 899.
71. Id. at 897. Not all interest groups were unsympathetic to the interests of less developed
countries. The European Broadcasting Union, for example, "suggested that special concession should also
be made in relation to broadcasting rights in those countries." Id. at 889. Nevertheless, as Charles Johnson
pointed out, it "was probably the only non-governmental international organization that did not view the
principles embodied in the new Article 25bis [which later became the protocol] with a degree of skepticism
or alarm." Johnson, supra note 18, at 125.
72. RICKETSON & GINSBuRG, supra note 18, at 913.
73. Id.
74. Id. at 899.
75. Organization of American States, American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man, May
2, 1948, OEAISer. L./V.IH.23, doc. 21 rev. 6, available at http://wwwl.umn.edulhumanrtsloasinstrl
zoas2dec.htm.
76. Id. art. 13.
77. See Yu, Currents and Crosscurrents, supra note 3, at 363.
78. Ringer, Role of the United States, supra note 39, at 1070.
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Conference, they gathered together to strengthen their position at the East
Asian Seminar on Copyright in New Delhi.7 9 Among the participants were
"delegates from fourteen Asian states, including a number of important
countries that were not members of either international convention, such as
Indonesia, Malaysia, Korea, and Iran. '80 At the end of the seminar, the
participants "adopted a resolution recommending specific changes in the
protocol that would substantially lower the standards of protection required
under it."8 ' This resolution became "the basis for a proposal which was to be
developing Asian and African nations at the Stockholm
made by ten
82
Revision.,
In contrast, developed countries "were in disarray" before the Stockholm
Conference.83 Despite their eagerness to widen the base of the Berne Union
and their concern over potential defection or abandonment, developed
countries remained reluctant "to put forward an affirmative program as an
alternative to [the program advanced in the run-up to the Stockholm
Conference]." Indeed, "the comments of governments on [the] recommendations [on the program of the Stockholm Conference] were relatively sparse
and desultory" even though the program was made available almost a year in
advance.85 As Register Ringer recalled:
Despite expressions of alarm at the trend they observed, the
prevailing attitudes among the representatives of the developed Berne
members seemed to be apathetic resignation and futility. They

79. See id. at 1067. For a discussion of the seminar, see Johnson, supra note 18, at 158-63.
80. RICKETSON & GINSBURG, supra note 18, at 897. "Of the 19 East Asian States which were
invited, only four declined. Four other states had delegated observers." Johnson, supra note 18, at 158
(footnote omitted).
81. Ringer, Role of the United States, supranote 39, at 1067.
82. RICKETSON & GINSBURG, supra note 18, at 898.
83. Ringer, Role of the United States, supranote 39, at 1067.
84. Id.; see also RICKErSON & GINSBURG, supra note 18, at 896 ("By the end of March 1967, only
eighteen governments had forwarded their responses to BIRPI, and of these only eleven dealt with the issues
raised by the Protocol.").
85. Ringer, Role of the United States, supra note 39, at 1067. As Professors Ricketson and
Ginsburg recounted:
The programme for the Stockholm Conference was published in May 1966, but member
states were slow in registering their observations on its provisions. By the end of March
1967, only eighteen governments had forwarded their responses to BIRPI, and of these only
eleven dealt with the issues raised by the Protocol. These governmental submissions have
been described as "less than profound," revealing that most of the developed nations had not
formulated any coherent attitude to the claims of their developing neighbours.
RICKETSON & GINSBURG, supra note 18, at 896-97 (noting that, except for Britain and France, "the
comments from other developed nations were generally favourable, containing at least lip-service
recognition of the problems of developing countries" (footnotes omitted)).
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exhibited a notable lack of leadership and of affirmative programs, in
contrast to the developing countries' representatives, who, under the
leadership of the Indian delegation, proposed a detailed program for
which they fought effectively and tenaciously.86
Notwithstanding the initial success of less developed countries and the
early momentum they had built, these countries soon found out painfully that
the protocol they worked hard to develop in the Stockholm Conference would
not come into force. Their failure was due in part to four significant concerns
developed countries had:
[1] the lack of any real guarantee that authors would be paid in cases
of use for 'teaching, scholarship and research' and the problems that
might arise with respect to the transmittal of compensation in the case
of the other reservations; [2] the provisions allowing export of copies
to other developing countries; [3] the inadequate definition of a
developing country; and [4] the lack of any direct incentive to
developing countries to improve the level of protection beyond that
offered by the Protocol.8 7
To make matters worse, the United States had stated that "the Protocol, if
adopted, would pose a near insurmountable barrier to that country's desired
accession to the Convention. 88 Although the country was outside the Berne
Union at that time, its position remained highly influential.
When the Permanent Committee of the Berne Union met in December
1967-the first formal opportunity to review the Stockholm Act and the new
protocol----"[t]he reluctance of the developed nations to commit themselves to
the Protocol became clear ....although only the UK was prepared to state
unreservedly that it would not ratify it."' 89 Other countries with major
producers of copyrighted works, such as France, Italy, and Spain, soon took
the lead from Britain and refused to ratify the new Act.9" While France
initially "'welcomed' the adoption of the Protocol as a suitable solution," the
country "adopt[ed] a more critical view of the Protocol [over the next year or
so] and was ultimately to refrain from ratifying it."'"

86. Ringer, Role of the United States,supranote 39, at 1066; accordJohnson, supranote 18, at 142
("As a group.... [the sketchy comments of governments on the Protocol] do indicate a lack of leadership
and a concerted program among the developed countries, in contrast with the unity and determination
shown by the developing countries of Africa and Asia.").
87. RICKETSON & GINSBURG, supra note 18, at 913-14.

88.
89.
90.
91.

Id.at 914.
Id. at 916.
See Ndiaye, supranote 28, at 51.
RicKETSON & GINSBURG, supra note 18, at 913.
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As opposition and non-action continued, the less developed world had no
choice but to accept the fact that the Stockholm Protocol was "a dying if not
dead duck."92 Only Senegal, Pakistan, and Romania "ratified the Stockholm
Protocol in full," while Canada, Denmark, Finland, West Germany, Israel,
Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, and the United Kingdom "positively signaled
their rejection of the Revision."93 To prevent what some commentators have
called the "crisis in international copyright,"94 the United States brokered a
meeting in Washington, D.C. that resulted in a package deal involving
amendments to both the Berne Convention and the U.C.C. 95 The package deal

was highly successful, and the Berne members gathered again in Paris in
197 1-this time, "in an atmosphere of cooperation and good will that was as
gratifying as it was unusual." 96 In lieu of the much-criticized protocol, these
countries adopted an optional appendix that has "less far-reaching
provisions. 9 7 To prevent less developed countries from picking the U.C.C.
over the Berne Union, the U.C.C. was also simultaneously amended so that
both conventions offered similar treatment to these countries. As Professors
Ricketson and Ginsburg summarized:
From the point of view of the developed countries, this [appendix]
was something they could 'live with'; from that of the developing
countries, it represented a reluctant admission that this was the most
they were likely to be able to obtain.... The immediate result [of the
Paris Revision Conference] was that all the major protagonists for
concessions at the Stockholm Conference, chose to stay in the Berne
Convention.98
Although the Berne members quickly ratified the new Paris Act
(including the appendix), which has been subsequently incorporated by
reference into the TRIPs Agreement and the WIPO Copyright Treaty, 99 the

92. Barbara A. Ringer, Recent Developments in InternationalCopyright: The ParisMeetings of
February, 1969, 16 BuLL. COPYRIGHT Soc'Y USA 223, 224 (1969) [hereinafter Ringer, Recent
Developments]; accord Braderman, supra note 52, at 157 (noting that "[tihe Stockholm Protocol now
appeared to be a dead issue").
93. Okediji, Sustainable Access, supra note 67, at 157; see id. at 157 nn.54-55.
94. Howard D. Sacks, Crisis in InternationalCopyright: The Protocol Regarding Developing
Countries, 1969 J. Bus. L. 26; see Braderman, supra note 52, at 157-58 (alluding to the "crisis in international copyright"); see also Ringer, Role of the United States, supra note 39, at 1070 (stating that the
Stockholm Conference "was probably the worst experience in the history of international copyright
conventions").
95. See RCKETSON & GINSBURG, supra note 18, at 920-22.
96. Ringer, Recent Developments, supra note 92, at 224.
97. BOGSCH, supra note 57, at 25.
98. RCKETSON & GINSBURG, supra note 18, at 956 (footnotes omitted).
99. TRIPs Agreement, supranote 2, art. 9(1); WIPO Copyright Treaty art. 1, adoptedDec. 20, 1996,
S. TREATY Doc. No. 105-17, at 1 (1997) [hereinafter WCT]; see also RUTH L. OKEDm, TlE INTER-
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appendix was more effective in theory than in practice. With its length
exceeding that of the original Berne Act,"°° the approved appendix is complex,
lengthy, and burdensome.' 0 ' As Ruth Okediji cautioned us, "[t]he transaction
costs involved in fulfilling [its] requirements are not insignificant, and the
waiting period by itself materially reduces the value of the copyrighted
material to consumers.' ' 2
Consider, for example, the conditions under which one has to satisfy
before a compulsory license is issued for "teaching, scholarship, and research"
purposes.0 3 Article II, which governs translation licenses, requires a waiting
period of three years after the work's first publication if the work is not
available in the requested language." Although the waiting period can be
reduced to one year under specified conditions, that period cannot be reduced
if the work has been published in English, French, or Spanish' 5-the
languages "spoken in the vast majority of the colonial territories in Africa,

NATIONAL COPYRIGHT SYSTEM: LIMITATIONS, EXCEPTIONS AND PUBLIC INTEREST CONSIDERATIONS FOR

DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 16 (2006), available at http://www.unctad.org/en/docs/iteipc20061Oen.pdf
[hereinafter OKEDUI, INTERNATIONAL COPYRIGHT SYSTEM] (stating the Berne Convention "remains the

only bulk access mechanism tool in international copyright law"); RICKETSON & GINSBURG, supranote 18,
at 960-63 (discussing the incorporation of the Berne Appendix in the TRIPs Agreement and the WIPO
Copyright Treaty).
100. See RICKETSON & GINSBURG, supra note 18, at 957 (noting that the Appendix includes "an
extremely detailed set of provisions, which exceeds the original Berne Act in length").
101. As Nddnd Ndiaye observed:
The provisions of the Appendix enable the developing countries neither to "make the
application of the Convention easier" nor to meet their needs with regard to education.
Indeed, it is certainly easier to understand and to apply the substantive provisions (Articles
1 to 20) than to implement the mechanisms provided for in the Appendix.
Ndiaye, supra note 28, at 55.
102. OKEDUI, INTERNATIONAL COPYRIGHT SYSTEM, supra note 99, at 16.
103. It is important to remember that these purposes are narrowly defined. As Professors Ricketson
and Ginsburg pointed out:
[A] proposal by the Sri Lankan delegation which sought to expand the purposes for which
these licenses might be granted to the 'promotion of culture' was withdrawn after objections
by the British and French delegations that this represented a fundamental change to the
'package deal' that had been agreed to as the basis for the ... revision[].
RICKETSON & GINSBURG, supranote 18, at 935.
104. Berne Convention, supra note 7, app. art. 11(2).
105. Id. app. art. 1(3). As Professors Ricketson and Ginsburg explained:
The exclusion of translations from English, French, and Spanish significantly limits the
scope for relaxation of time periods, and must be regarded as a considerable concession in
favourof authors and publishers in those languages. Furthermore, the requirement that there
must be the 'unanimous agreement' of all the developed countries in which the language
translated is in general use imposes a considerable practical limitation. For instance, in the
case of translations from German, the agreement of Germany, Austria, Switzerland, and
Liechtenstein will be required, as each of these states is a member of the Union.
RICKETSON & GINSBURG, supranote 18, at 932.
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Asia and the Americas."'" To provide reasonable notice, Article II further
imposes an additional"grace period" of six to nine months. °7 With respect
to reproduction licenses, Article LI extends the waiting period from three
years to seven years for fiction, poetry, art, and music and five years for other
non-scientific works.'0 8 As Professor Okediji reminded us, "[flor most
scientific works, waiting three years means that there is a risk of the
information becoming less relevant."' 9
Even worse, the appendix "do[es] not address the most pressing need for
developing countries: bulk access to creative works available at reasonable
prices and translated into local languages."" 0 Premised on traditional printing
technologies, the appendix did not allow less developed countries to take
advantage of new "online modes of delivery which might well be attractive to
developing countries with large and widespread populations.""' From the
standpoint of development, the appendix was therefore "a dismal failure";" 2
"its provisions do
not seem to have been taken up by the countries for which
'" 13
intended."
was
it
"As of 2004, only thirteen ... countries had expressed an interest to

WIPO, though Singapore apparently expressed an interest and then didn't

106. Okediji, Sustainable Access, supra note 67, at163.
107. Berne Convention, supranote 7, app. art. 1(4).
108. Id. app. art. I1(3).
109. OKEDtI, INTERNATIONAL COPYRIGHT SYSTEM, supra note 99, at 15.
110. Id.
at6.
111. RICKETSON & GINSBURG,supra note 18, at925; see also Okediji, Sustainable Access, supra
note 67, at 185 (suggesting that "[limitations on access to digital informational works ...should be offset
by a proportional increase in access to print works").
112. RUTm L. OKEDuI, FOSTERING ACCESS TO EDUCATION, RESEARCH AND DISSEMINATION OF
KNOWLEDGETHROUGH COPYRIGHT 9 (2004), availableathttp://www.iprsonline.org/unctadictsd/bellagio/
docs/Okideiji_Bellagio4.pdf [hereinafter OKEDuI, FOSTERING ACCESS TO EDUCATION]. But see RICKETSON
& GINSBURG, supra note 18, at958:
The Appendix... can be seen as an incentive to authors and publishers inthe developed
countries to co-operate inthe making of voluntary licensing arrangements: the compulsory
licenses remain inthe background both as areminder of the needs of developing countries and
as athreat
to be brought into operation ifthere isareluctance to provide access. The fact
that,
to date, so few developing countries have invoked the Appendix may be an indication that
authors and publishers inthe developed countries have been farmore willing to license their
works than was previously the case. Alternative explanations,that
need to be properly tested
ineach instance, are (i) that the social
and economic problems of some of these countries are
so intense that concern about copyright matters isnot going tobe ahigh priority,
as distinct
from overcoming famine,drought, floods, earthquakes, or civil
war;,or (ii) that the advent of
digital technologies and communications may now render the provisions of the Appendix
unnecessary to meet the developmental needs of these countries, even though such uses may,
inprinciple, come within the scope of its
provisions and may therefore pose a different
set
of
challenges for authors and rights
owners from developed countries.
113. RICKETSON & GINSBURG,supra note 18, at925.
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renew its notification."' 4 "[O]f those countries that have made the necessary
declarations, very few actually seem to have implemented such licensing
schemes in their domestic laws.""' 5 It is therefore no surprise that Professor6
Okediji and other commentators have called for a reform of the Appendix,'
although they conceded that such reform is likely to7be very difficult in light
of the unanimous vote needed for the amendment.' '
B. WIPO
In addition to developing the Stockholm Protocol, the Stockholm
Conference resulted in the creation of WIPO. Formally established in 1970,
the organization replaced BIRPI, an organization formed as a result of the
1893 merger of the two secretariats that administered the Berne and Paris
Conventions.1 8 That merger "mov[ed] control of the organization from the
Swiss, who had been exclusively responsible for funding BIRPI, to a more
formal governing body that included a structure where delegates from member
countries would meet regularly."'" 9
The idea of forming an international intellectual property organization
dates back to the 1962 meeting of the Permanent Bureaux of the Berne and
Paris Unions. ° The reasons were twofold. First, as Stephen Ladas

114. OKEDIJI, INTERNATIONAL COPYRIGHT SYSTEM, supranote 99, at 15-16 (footnote omitted). As
Professors Ricketson and Ginsburg stated:
As of Dec 2004, the following countries had made declarations ...with respect to...
[Articles] i1and III: Bangladesh, Cuba, Jordan, Mongolia, Oman, Philippines, Sudan, Syrian
Arab Republic, United Arab Emirates, and Vietnam, while Thailand had made a declaration
with respect to Article 1I....
Cyprus and Slovenia have made reservations with respect to
translations. Previous declarations... had been made by Algeria, Bahrain, Democratic
People's Republic of Korea, and Singapore, but these have not been renewed.
RICKETSON & GINSBURG, supra note 18, at 957 n.447 (citations omitted).
115. RICKETSON & GINSBURG, supra note 18, at 957.
116. See OKEDuI, FOSTERING AccESS TO EDUCATION, supranote 112, at 10 ("At the very least, the
time barriers and other features that have rendered the Appendix a failure must be positively addressed.
Otherwise, the Appendix simply remains a dull sword for advancing development interests."); see also id.
at 11-12 (calling for "more specific adaptation of the Appendix to the digital environment" and the
development of "countervailing principles that preclude countries from negotiating around access rules").
117. See Berne Convention, supra note 7, art. 27(3) (stipulating that the revision of the Appendix
"shall require the unanimity of the votes cast"); see also Alan Story, Burn Berne: Why the Leading
InternationalCopyright Convention Must Be Repealed, 40 HOUS. L. REv. 763 (2003) (advocating the
repeal of the Berne Convention).
118. See BOGScH, supra note 57, at 21-22 (discussing the history of BIRPI).
119. Debora J. Halbert, The World Intellectual PropertyOrganization:Past, Presentand Future,
54 J. COPYRIGHT SOC'Y U.S.A. 253,258-59 (2007) (footnote omitted); accordMAY, supranote 16, at 23
("One of the key changes ...was the assumption of responsibility for the budget, program and activities
of the organization by its members, removing this responsibility from the Swiss government which up until
this time had effectively controlled the organization.").
120. MAY, supra note 16, at 23; accordSIsULE F. MUSuNGu & GRAHAM DuTFIED, MULTILATERAL
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explained, the proposal to establish such an organisation "was advocated as
intended to head off any attempt by outsiders, such as the United Nations
Economic and Social Council ["ECOSOC"] or the United Nations Conference
on Trade and Development ["UNCTAD"], to deal with the subject of
intellectual property and eventually to form a Specialized Agency of the
United Nations in this field."'' Second, such a change would "transform
[BIRPI] from a developed country club into an organisation with a multilateral
character that could attract developing countries including the newly
independent ones."'' 22 The formation of WIPO therefore would have the same
effect of the Stockholm Protocol: by accommodating the needs of less
developed countries, it would widen the base of both the Berne
and Paris
24
Unions. 23 As of April 2009, WIPO has 184 member states.
Although WIPO did not become a U.N. specialized agency immediately
following the Stockholm Conference, "the draft of the WIPO Convention and
the drafts for the revision of the then existing seven treaties, presented by
BIRPI to the Stockholm Conference, were proposed with [that] objective in
mind.' 25 In December 1974, WIPO finally became a U.N. specialized
agency. As Arpfd Bogsch, the former WIPO director general, 126 pointed out,
the U.N. status brought to WlPO three apparent benefits:

AGREEMENTS AND A TRIPS-PLUS WORLD: THE WORLD INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY ORGANISATION (WIPO)

4 (Quaker United Nations Office, TRIPS Issues Paper No. 3, 2003), available at http://www.quno.org/
geneva/pdf/economic/Issues/Multilateral-Agreements-in-TRIPS-plus-English.pdf.
121. STEVEN P. LADAS, PATENTS, TRADEMARKS, AND RELATED RIGHTS: NATIONAL AND
INTERNATIONAL PROTECTION 92 (1975).
122. MUSUNGU & DUTFIELD, supra note 120, at 4.
123. See ANDERFELT, supra note 13, at 260 ("From the beginning it was realized that the most crucial
provision of the Convention for the new organization would be the one concerning membership, for only
an organization open to all interested countries, it was thought, whether Union members or not, could obtain
a status as a Specialized agency of the United Nations."); MICHAEL P. RYAN, KNOWLEDGE DIPLOMACY:
GLOBAL COMPETITION AND THE PoLrIcs OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 126 (1998) ('"he 1974 Agreement
to join the UN system turned the organization from a rich man's club of industrialized countries into a
potentially universal membership, international governmental organization of developing countries that
needed considerable educational services.").
124. World Intellectual Prop. Org. [WIPO] , MemberStates, http://www.wipo.intlmemberslen/ (last
visited Apr. 13, 2009).
125. BOGScH, supra note 57, at 26.
126. Dr. Bogsch is one of the longest serving director generals of an international governmental
organization. As Michael Ryan pointed out:
The WIPO story of institution-building leadership by one person is matched in the history
of international governmental organizations only at GATT and at the International Labor
Organization. Eric Wyndham White at the GATT and David Morse at the International
Labor Organization each served as director general for some twenty years beginning in 1948
and were instrumental in institution building.
RYAN, supranote 123, at 126-27 & n.2.
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(i) the fact that dealing with intellectual property was the prerogative
and the task of WIPO would receive worldwide recognition, (ii)
WILPO would have more or less the same members as the United
Nations, and in particular, many developing countries would join
WlPO (only very few of them belonged to BIRPI), (iii) the
governments of Member States would be liberated from having to
deal with the fixing of salaries, other working conditions and pensions
of the staff, since salaries and pensions would automatically follow
the so-called "common system" of the United Nations and its
specialized agencies.27
In short, the U.N. status "would enable the internal administration of the
organization to benefit from the economies of scale available inside the
[United Nations]. ' 28
Given these multiple benefits, one commentator has questioned whether
"the transformation of BIRPI/WlPO into a UN agency was not just another
strategy of those IP experts defending private interests in order to legitimize
and continue almost a century's work of strengthening IP protection under the
'
Commentacloak of a credible and supposedly neutral UN organization."129
tors have also tied the popularization of the term "intellectual property" to the
founding of WIPO, 3 ° although it is worth pointing out that the this term does
not "propertize" intellectual creations, but rather "intellectualizes" 3 property
-something critics of intellectual property rights often overlook.' '
Notwithstanding the benefits mentioned by Dr. Bogsch, "some of the
industrialized countries [initially] feared that the developing countries would
become the great majority of the membership and would try to weaken, rather
than to strengthen, the international protection of intellectual property."' 32 For
example,

127. BOGSCH, supra note 57, at 28.
128. MAY, supra note 16, at 24.
129. Andra Koury Menescal, Changing WIPO's Ways? The 2004 Development Agenda in
HistoricalPerspective, 8 J. WORLD INTELL. PROP. 761, 787 (2005).
130. See, e.g., WHIJAM CORNISH, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY: OMNIPRESENT, DISTRACTING,

IRRELEVANT? 2 (2004) ("As an umbrella term, [intellectual property] became common in the 1960s with
the setting up of the UN organ, the World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO to its supplicants and
its revilers)."); Mark A. Lemley, Romantic Authorshipand the Rhetoric ofProperty,75 TfX. L. REv. 873,
895-96 n.123 (1997) (reviewing JAMES BOYLE, SHAMANS, SOFTWARE, AND SPLEENS: LAW AND THE
CONSTRUCTION OFTHE INFORMATION SOCIETY (1996)) ("The modem use of the term 'intellectual property'
as a common descriptor of the field probably traces to the foundation of the World Intellectual Property
Organization (WIPO) by the United Nations.").
131. See Peter K. Yu, Intellectual Propertyand the Information Ecosystem, 2005 MICH. ST. L. REv.
1, 4 (2005) [hereinafter Yu, Information Ecosystem]; see also Stewart E. Sterk, IntellectualizingProperty:
The Tenuous ConnectionsBetween Land and Copyright, 83 WASH. U. L.Q. 417 (2005).
132. BOGSCH, supra note 57, at 28.
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Borgsch's desire to link up with the UN... prompted the WIPO to

agree to be listed as co-author on the 1974 United Nations Conference
on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) report The Role of the Patent
System in the Transfer of Technology to Developing Countries,
despite the report's thrust being widely divergent from the WIPO's
position on the role of patents in technological transfer.'33
Developed countries "were worried that these new developing country members
might question and undermine the key promotional aspects of... WIPO's
activities."'" They also feared that the creation of the new organization "would
jeopardize the independence and autonomy of the [Paris and Berne] Unions and
would introduce international politics in an international legal system that had
been signally successful and effective for nearly eighty years."' 35
In light of these concerns, during the Stockholm Conference, "both
France and Italy spoke against the creation of WIPO, but [did not oppose its
creation] given that the majority of member states approved of the new organization."' 136 Their concerns were prescient, however. Less than a decade after
WIPO's formation, the "one country, one vote" system was partly blamed for
the shifting of the negotiating forum on international intellectual property
matters away from WIPO to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
("GATT"), a trade-based forum which eventually became the WTO."'
Although WIPO's newfound U.N. status brought to the organization
many benefits, it also complicates matters by duplicating activities that were
already conducted under the United Nations' auspices. For example, WIPO's
activities partially overlapped with those of UNESCO and UNCTAD. As the
administrator of the U.C.C., UNESCO's importance in the copyright area
speaks for itself.'3 8 In fact, the organization "started off as a potentially

133. MAY, supra note 16, at 24. As AndrOa Menescal described:

This report justified the changes in developing countries' IP legislation regarding, for
example, "stricter provisions for compulsory licensing and revocation as remedies for nonuse" and the "strong provisions against abuses in patent licensing agreements" as "a shift
from primary concern with the protection of private interests of the patent holder (mostly
a foreigner in the case of developing countries), towards safeguarding the general public
interest and economic needs of the country concerned." Based on these findings, the report
recommended a revision of the existing international patent system with the purpose "of
making patent laws and practices capable of effectively complementing other instruments
of policy for national development."
Menescal, supra note 129, at 774 (footnotes omitted).
134. MAY, supra note 16, at 24.
135. LADAS, supra note 121, at 92.
136. Halbert, supra note 119, at 259.
137. See Yu, Currentsand Crosscurrents,supranote 3, at 357-58.
138. See PETER DRAHOS & JOHN BRAITHWAITrE, INFORMATION FEUDALISM: WHO OWNS THE
KNOWLEDGE ECONOMY? 112 (2002) ("UNESCO had been useful to the US in sponsoring the development
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important forum for defending and promoting developing countries' interests
in the copyright area-ensuring that copyright standards were consistent with
the needs of educational and scientific users of information."' 39 It is therefore
no surprise that, "during the Stockholm Conference, UNESCO registered
concern regarding the potential competition between the two organizations.
UNESCO saw itself as the body best able to interpret culture and copyright
issues. WIPO, for its part, sought to be the definitive body for interpreting
intellectual property disputes."'"
Nevertheless, with the United States' withdrawal from the organization
in 1984, UNESCO's importance has greatly decreased.' 14 Its standard-setting
role in the copyright area declined further following the United States'
accession to the Berne Convention and the ultimate incorporation of the
Convention into the TRIPs Agreement.'42 While the Berne membership has
now increased to 164, the U.C.C. has not added many new members since the
Paris Revision Conference. 143 As of April 2009, it has only 65 members-half
of the total number of Berne members.'" In recent years, however, UNESCO
has become active again in such areas as the protection of traditional cultural
expressions and intangible cultural heritage. 4 5 It remains to be seen whether
such protection will help UNESCO regain an active role in international
copyright developments.

of the Universal Copyright Convention (UCC) in the 1940s, a convention the US had wanted. UNESCO
served as the UCC's secretariat when the UCC came into effect in September 1955." (footnote omitted)).
139. MUSUNGU & DUTFIELD, supra note 120, at 19-20.
140. Halbert, supra note 119, at 261 (footnote omitted).
141. See DRAHOS & BRArrHwArrE, supra note 138, at 112 (discussing the United States' withdrawal
from UNESCO).
142. See Halbert,supra note 119, at 261 (noting that UNESCO's concerns regarding the potential
competition between the organization and WIPO "became irrelevant once the U.S. joined Berne in 1989
and the Soviet Union collapsed in the early 1990s rendering the UNESCO treaty virtually obsolete and
providing WIPO with additional interpretive power as the sole remaining organization dedicated to IP
issues, at least for the brief period before TRIPs entered the international scene"); Okediji, International
Relations,supra note 13, at 328 (noting that "the mandatory obligation within TRIPS to ratify the Paris text
of the Berne Convention eliminated the UCC as an option for developing countries").
143. WIPO, ContractingParties,httpJwww.wipo.intttreaties/en/ShowResults.jsp?ang=en&treatyid=15 (last visited Feb. 13, 2009).
144. UNESCO, Universal Copyright Convention as Revised on 24 July 1971, with Appendix
Declaration Relating to Article XVII and Resolution Concerning Article X1. Paris, 24 July 1971,
http:l/erc.unesco.org/cp/convention.asp?KO=- 15241 &language=E (last visited Apr. 13, 2009).
145. See, e.g., Convention for the Safeguarding of the Intangible Cultural Heritage, Oct. 17, 2003,
U.N. Doc. MISC/2003/CLT/CH/14, available at http://unesdoc.unesco.org/images/0013l001325
132540e.pdf [hereinafter 2003 UNESCO Convention]; Convention on the Protection and Promotion of the
Diversity of Cultural Expressions, Oct. 20, 2005, U.N. Doc. CLT-2005/CONVENTION DIVERSrIECULT REV., availableat http'J/unesdoc.unesco.orgimagesl0014/001429/142919e.pdf.
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Compared to UNESCO, UNCTAD was generally not considered a
predominant forum for intellectual property negotiations, due to its prodevelopment stance and its focus away from technical intellectual property
issues. Nonetheless, it has played significant roles in intellectual property
matters as they relate to development and the transfer of technology. As
Sisule Musungu and Graham Dutfield pointed out:
Since its inception and up to the period leading to the creation of the
WTO, UNCTAD had served as an important forum for developing
countries to develop strategies to gain access to developed country
markets and to develop analytical work which demonstrated the
serious negative consequences for technology development and
related objectives that arose from the existing intellectual property
regimes. More than any other organisation in the UN system,
UNCTAD had a legitimate claim to jurisdiction over the development
of a trade-related agreement covering intellectual property. Indeed,
it is because of these competences that the Agreement between the
UN and WIPO specifically mentions the responsibilities and
competence of UNCTAD. Moreover, at the time when the agreement
between WIPO and the UN was being prepared, WIPO was
undertaking a joint study with UNCTAD on the role of the patent
system in the transfer of technology to developing countries."4
To reduce the overlap between WIPO and the two other U.N. agencies,
article 2 of the Agreement between the United Nations and the World
Intellectual Property Organization ("WIPO Agreement") provides:
[WIPO] recognizes the responsibilities for co-ordination of the
General Assembly and of the Economic and Social Council under the
Charter of the United Nations. Accordingly, the Organization agrees
to co-operate in whatever measures may be necessary to make coordination of the policies and activities of the United Nations and
those of the organs and agencies within the United Nations system
fully effective. The Organization agrees further to participate in the
work of any United Nations bodies which have been established or
may be established for the purpose of facilitating such co-operation

146. MUSUNGU & DurFiELD, supra note 120, at 19 (footnotes omitted); see also JOHN BRAn'HWAIrE
& PETER DRAHOS, GLOBAL BUSINESS REGULATION 566 (2000) ("Probably no organization other than...
UNCTAD... would have had a greater claim to develop a trade-related agreement for intellectual property.
... Through its work on the Code of Conduct on Transfer of Technology it had done more analytical work
on the trade implications of intellectual property rights than any other UN organization.").
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and co-ordination, in particular through membership in the Administrative Committee on Co-ordination. 47
Although this Agreement "obliges WIPO to take into consideration the
recommendations of the United Nations (whether coming from the General
Assembly or the Economic and Social Council... ),""' the United Nations,
thus far, has yet to adopt any recommendation that explicitly deals with
intellectual property matters.'49 Indeed, as Sisule Musungu and Graham
Dutfield have lamented, "ECOSOC's inter-agency review mechanism is very
weak and is incapable, in particular, of ensuring that the activities of the
specialised agencies are compatible with the aims of the UN."' 5 °
In the technology transfer area, article 10 of the WIPO Agreement
provides:
The Organization agrees to co-operate within the field of its
competence with the United Nations and its organs, particularly the
United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, the United
Nations Development Programme and the United Nations Industrial
Development Organization, as well as the agencies within the United
Nations system, in promoting and facilitating the transfer of
technology to developing countries in such a manner as to assist these
countries in attaining their objectives in the fields of science and
" '
technology and trade and development.15
Article 1 further states that the organization is charged with "promoting
creative intellectual activity and for facilitating the transfer of technology
related to industrial property to the developing countries in order to accelerate
economic, social and cultural development."' 52 Taking note of this founding
mission, less developed countries and their supporters increasingly demand
WIPO to pay special attention to their development needs and to "share the
UN's focus on global developmental issues rather than a more technical focus
on the governance and protection of IPRs."' 53 As Argentina and Brazil noted

147. Agreement Between the United Nations and the World Intellectual Property Organization art.
2, entered into effect Dec. 17, 1974, available at http://www.wipo.intlexport/sites/www/treaties/en/
agreement/pdf/un-wipo-agreement.pdf [hereinafter UN-WIPO Agreement].
148. BOGSCH, supranote 57, at 83; see also MAY, supranote 16, at 25 (stating that "as a specialized
agency of the UN, the WIPO was, and is, required to work in accordance with the UN's overall
developmental mission").
149. Cf. BOGSCH, supra note 57, at 120 (noting that the United Nations did not adopt any
recommendations that explicitly dealt with intellectual property from 1974 to 1992).
150. MUSUNGU & DUTFIELD, supra note 120, at 20.
151. UN-WIPO Agreement, supra note 147, art. 10.
152. Id. art. 1.
153. MAY, supra note 16, at 4.
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in their proposal for the establishment of a WIPO Development Agenda
("WIPO Development Agenda Proposal"):
As a member of the United Nations system, it is incumbent upon
... WIPO ... to be fully guided by the broad development goals that
the UN has set for itself, in particular in the Millennium Development
Goals. Development concerns should be fully incorporated into all
WIPO activities. WIPO's role, therefore, is not to be limited to the
promotion of intellectual property protection.
WIPO is accordingly already mandated to take into account the
broader development-related commitments and resolutions of the UN
system as a whole. However, one could also consider the possibility
of amending the WIPO Convention (1967) to ensure that the
"development dimension" is unequivocally determined to constitute
an essential element of the Organization's work program. We
therefore call upon WIPO General Assembly to take immediate action
of a "Development Agenda" in the
in providing for the incorporation
54
Organization's work program.1
This proposal makes great sense. As Professor Halbert reminded us,
"WIPO was born into the controversy of how intellectual property would
impact the developing world."' 5 5 Moreover, in recent years, the United
Nations has introduced a number of documents that are relevant to intellectual
property protection, such as the outline and development of the Millennium
Development Goals.' 56 In addition, the ECOSOC has also paid greater
attention to intellectual property matters. As U.N. Secretary-General Ban Kimoon noted in the opening session of ECOSOC in April 2007, "[t]he rules of
intellectual property rights need to be reformed, so as to strengthen technothat the poor have better access to new
logical progress and to ensure
7
technologies and products."'1

154. WIPO, Proposalby Argentinaand Brazilforthe Establishmentof a DevelopmentAgenda for
WIPO, WO/GA/3 1/11 (Aug. 27, 2004), availableathttp://www.wipo.int/documentslen/document/govbody/
wogb.ga/pdf/woga_3 1-1 .pdf.
155. Halbert, supra note 119, at 262.
156. Information about the Millennium Development Goals is available at http://www.un.org/
millenniumgoalsL. See Philip Alston, Ships Passing in the Night: The Current State of the Human Rights
and DevelopmentDebateSeen Through the Lens of the Millennium Development Goals, 27 HuM. RTS. Q.
755, 767-70 (2005) (discussing extension of human rights to private actors in context of Millennium
Development Goals); Geoff Tansey, Introduction:Legal Fictions and Public Health, in NEGOTIATING
HEALTH: INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND ACCESS TO MEDICINES 1, 2 (Pedro Roffe et al. eds., 2006)

[hereinafter NEGOTIATING HEALTH] (discussing the health-related focus of the Millennium Goals).
157. UNCTAD, THE LEAST DEVELOPED COUNTRIES REPORT 2007: KNOWLEDGE, TECHNOLOGICAL
LEARNING AND INNOVATION FOR DEVELOPMENT ix-x (2007) [hereinafter LEAST DEVELOPED COUNTRIES

REPORT], availableat http://www.unctad.org/Templates/Download.asp?docid=8674&lang=l1&intltemlD
=4314.
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The growing demand for a pro-development reorientation of WIPO is
somewhat ironic. It was only a couple of decades ago when multinational
corporations, industry groups, and their supporting developed countries
heavily criticized WIPO for weakening the high international standards for
intellectual property protection. As Barry MacTaggart, the former president
of Pfizer International Inc., wrote in a New York Times opinion piece in 1982:
And now, the United Nations, through its World Intellectual Property
Organization, is trying to grab high-technology inventions for underdeveloped countries ....
What's more, the revisions to the Paris
treaty being considered by delegates to the United Nations organization would confer international legitimacy on the abrogation of
patents. The principle the World Intellectual Property Organization
seeks to introduce would enable a nation to deny the inventor the protection of a patent or, worse still, prevent him from exercising his own
invention if the product is not made from scratch in that nation.' 58
Today, by contrast, multinational corporations, industry groups, and
developed countries have generally embraced WIIPO as a forum for
heightening the standards of intellectual property protection-for example,
through the introduction of the draft Substantive Patent Law Treaty
("SPLT"), 159 assistance in addressing Internet domain name disputes," 6 or
efforts to promote awareness of intellectual property rights in less developed
countries. 161 It is therefore no surprise that developed countries, in particular
the United States, have been actively dissuading WIPO from returning to its
development roots. As reported in the first session of the Intersessional
Intergovernmental Meeting on a Development Agenda for WIPO:
The [U.S.] Delegation observed that intellectual property was only a
part of the solution, and other infrastructure must also be put in place
for development. Development, in general, was the domain of other

158. Barry MacTaggart, Stealingfrom the Mind, N.Y. TIMEs, July 9, 1982, at A23; seealso DRAHOS
& BRArwAITE, supra note 138, at 61 (discussing MacTaggart's opinion piece).
159. For a recent critique of the proposed Substantive Patent Law Treaty, see Jerome H. Reichman
& Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, Harmonization Without Consensus: Critical Reflections on Drafting a

Substantive PatentLaw Treaty, 57 DuKE L.J. 85 (2007).
160. See 'IPO, THE MANAGEMENTOF INTERNETNAMES AND ADDRESSES: INTELECtUALPROPERTY
ISSUES: FINAL REPORT OF THE WIPO INTERNET DOMAIN NAME PROCESS (1999), available at
http://www.wipo.int/export/sitestwww/amc/en/docstreport-final I.pdf [hereinafter WIPO INTERNET DOMAIN
NAME PROCESS REPORT].
161. See MAY, supranote 16, at 61-66 (discussing WIPO's technical assistance and capacity-building efforts); see also Ellen 't Hoen, TRIPS, PharmaceuticalPatents,and Access to EssentialMedicines:
A Long Way from Seattle to Doha, 3 Clii. J. INT'L L. 27,45 (2002) (noting that "lilt will require a 'culture
change' at WIPO and WTO to adjust the type of technical assistance to developing countries' needs").
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UN Agencies, not WIPO. The Delegation stated that WIPO must
continue to focus on promoting intellectual property protection. It did
not believe that the UN needed another development agency as it
already had several such agencies, exclusively devoted to, and with
specific competence in development, such as UNCTAD and the
UNDP. The Delegation further stated that the United States of
America strongly believed that WIPO's current legal framework and
its administrative structure provided ample room to address
intellectual property related development issues.162
According to developed countries, "WIPO does not have the resources to
support wider developmental objectives, and in any case it lacks the expertise
in development that would be required to fulfill such demands."' 63
C. InternationalCode of Conduct
Following the Stockholm Conference, countries pushed eagerly for the
establishment of an International Code of Conduct on the Transfer of Technology. The development of this Code came at a time when less developed
countries had gained unprecedented momentum in their negotiations with
developed countries following the oil crisis and OPEC's success in the early
1970s."6 "[DIrafted on the assumption that transfer of technology to
developing countries is desirable and that the transfer process will increase the
prosperity of developing countries, 16 5 the Code sought "to eliminate those
clauses in transfer of technology contracts which are harmful to the economic
development of developing countries" as well as other restrictive foreign
investment practices.' 66 Examples of these detrimental practices included:
(1) grant-back provisions; (2) challenges to validity; (3) exclusive
dealing; (4) restrictions on research; (5) restrictions on use of

162. WIPO, Inter-sessionalIntergovernmentalMeeting on a DevelopmentAgendaforWIPO: Report
of the First Session, IIM//6 (Aug. 18, 2005), available at http://www.wipo.int/edocs/mdocs/mdocs/
en/iim_1/iiml_6.doc.
163. MAY, supra note 16, at 83.
164. See SUSAN K. SELL, POWER AND IDEAS: NORTH-SOurH POLMCS OF INTELLECrUAL PROPERTY

AND ANTrrRusT 79 (1998) [hereinafter SELL, POWER AND IDEAS] ("[Tihe OPEC actions of 1973 created
the opportunity for the developing countries' demands to be heard at the multilateral level. The
industrialized counties were reluctant to negotiate over the NIEO but felt they had to because of the pressure
of commodity power during a period of slow economic growth.").
165. Ton J.M. Zuijdwijk, The UNCTAD Code of Conduct on the Transferof Technology, 24 MCGILL

L.J. 562, 564 (1978).
166. Id. at 563; accordid. ("The Code was drafted as a response to a variety of complaints expressed
by developing countries with respect to transfer of technology transactions. Their dissatisfaction stems

from the fact that often, in transfer of technology contracts, restrictive clauses which are detrimental to
developing countries are inserted.").
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personnel; (6) price-fixing; (7) restrictions on adaptations; (8)
exclusive sales or representation agreements; (9) tying arrangements;
(10) export restrictions; (11) patent-pool or cross-licensing
agreements; (12) restrictions on publicity; (13) payments and other
obligations after expiration of industrial property rights; and (14)
restrictions after expirations of arrangements. 67
Less developed countries were also frustrated by the fact that "transfer of
technology contracts often ... involve[d] packaged transfer of previously
developed technology, unsuitable to the[ir] needs."' 6 8
Although the drafting of the Code did not begin until the mid-1970s,
commentators traced its historical origins to the debate on transfer of
technology in the mid-1960s-around the time when UNCTAD was
established. As Professor Sell recounted the origin of the technology transfer
debate:
In 1963 the United Nations held a Conference on the Application of
Science and Technology for Development in Geneva. This
conference affirmed the developing countries' belief that the United
Nations could help them in their quest for greater access to
technology.... [T]he conference's most important outcome was the
conviction that the United Nations had a central role to play "to
facilitate the transfer of science and technology to developing
countries and to help developing countries overcome obstacles in
their access to necessary knowledge and its effective application."' 69
To follow up on the Conference, ECOSOC set up an Advisory Committee
for the Application of Science and Technology for Development the following
year. 7 ° UNCTAD was established in the same year in response to heavy
pressure from the less developed world. 7 ' As Ton Zuijdwijk recounted:
At [UNCTAD's first session], the Conference recommended that
"[c]ompetent international bodies... should explore possibilities for

167. SELL, POWER AND IDEAS, supra note 164, at 93; see also UNCTAD, THE ROLE OF THE PATENT
SYSTEM IN THE TRANSFER OF TECHNOLOGY TO DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 54-63 (1974) (discussing the

abuses in patent licensing agreements and regulatory practices).
168. Countess Pease Jefferies, A PreliminaryEvaluation of the ProposedText, in INTERNATIONAL
TECHNOLOGY TRANsFER, supra note 57, at 17, 20; accord Zuijdwijk, supra note 165, at 563 ("[Tlhe
technology acquired by a developing country is frequently not suitable to its needs; often such technology
and the form in which it is obtained are not conducive to the development of local technological
capabilities.").
169. SELL, POWER AND IDEAS, supra note 164, at 67.
170. Id.
171. Id.
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adaptation of legislation concerning the transfer of industrial
technology to developing countries, including the possibility of
concluding appropriate international agreements in this field." The
idea was raised again in 1972 at UNCTAD 111 in Santiago, Chile
when the Conference requested a joint study by the UNCTAD and
WIPO Secretariats of "possible bases for new international legislation
regulating the transfer of technology from developed to developing
countries of patented and non-patented technology." The idea
became more pronounced when, in 1973, the Trade and Development
Board of UNCTAD requested the Intergovernmental Group on
Transfer of Technology (the predecessor of the UNCTAD Transfer
of Technology Committee) "to study the possibility and feasibility of
an international code of conduct in the field of transfer of
technology."... In the summer of 1974, the concept of a Code was
boosted by the General Assembly in its important Programme of
Action on the Establishmentof a New InternationalEconomic Order
in which the Assembly specifically decided that "[aill efforts should
be made: [t]o formulate an international code of conduct for the
transfer of technology corresponding
to needs and conditions
' 17 2
prevalent in developing countries."
In the meantime, the Group of 77 was also very active in expressing their
growing concern about the lack of transfer of technology. For example, the
Charter of Algiers, which was adopted in a Group of 77 ministerial meeting
in 1967, "emphasized the importance of acquiring technology from the North"
and "stated that 'developed countries should encourage the transfer of
knowledge and technology to developing countries by permitting the use of
industrial patents on the best possible terms and eliminate restrictions on the
granting of licenses and the use of patents and trademarks."" 73 The
subsequent Lima Declaration "stated that the international community should
promote the massive transfer of operative technology to developing countries
on favorable terms to contribute to their industrialization."' 74 The Manila
Declaration also "addressed the issues of technology transfer, strengthening
the technological capacity of developing countries .... and called for a code
of conduct for the7 5transfer of technology and the revision of the international
patents system."'
To put these abstract ideas into practice,

172.
173.
174.
175.

Zuijdwijk, supra note 165, at 564-65 (footnotes omitted).
SELL, POWER AND IDEAS, supra note 164, at 68 (footnote omitted).
Id.
Id.
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a number of developing countries introduced legislative measures to
increase state intervention in the screening and control of technology
transactions [and to reduce their dependence on foreign suppliers]....
In the late 1960s and early 1970s Argentina, Brazil, India, Mexico,
and the Andean Pact countries each enacted laws that codified their
dissatisfaction76 with market principles governing technology
transactions.
To some extent, the International Code of Conduct can be seen as an effort to
translate these nation-based measures into international norms. According to
Professor Sell, "the more immediate impetus for a ... code came from key
developing countries'177experiments in national and regional legislation in
technology transfer."'

'The earliest formulation of [the Code] was undertaken in April 1974 by
a group of experts under the auspices of the Pugwash Conferences on Science
and World Affairs,"' 78 a nongovernmental forum that brought together
"scientists from East and West to discuss possible scientific solutions to the
problems of nuclear weapons and disarmament."' 179 The draft Pugwash Code
"was important because it became the basis of the Group of 77's first proposal
in the UNCTAD negotiations [that Professor Zuijdwijk mentioned earlier]."t80
"[B]y convening, under the auspices of a reputable organization, an international group of experts including high-level scientists, which was hosted by
a prominent Swiss academic institute," the Pugwash exercise also strengthened the credibility of the less developed countries' demands.' 8 ' Indeed, the

176. Id. at 69 (footnote omitted); see also id. at 81-86 (discussing the key national and regional
legislation in technology transfer in the less developed world); Jefferies, supra note 168, at 27-33
(discussing attempts by less developed countries to regulate transfer of technology).
177. SELL, POWER AND IDEAS, supra note 164, at 81.
178. Dennis Thompson, An Overview of the Draft Code, in INTERNATIONAL TECHNOLOGY
TRANSFER, supra note 57, at 51, 52. The Pugwash Code is available at INTERNATIONAL TECHNOLOGY
TRANSFER, supra note 57, at 407-15.
179. Geoffrey Oldham, The PugwashCode, in INTERNATIONAL TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER, supranote
57, at 193, 194. As Susan Sell described further:
The first conference was held in 1955, where Bertrand Russell and Albert Einstein presented
a manifesto for peace. The Pugwash group has been prominently involved in urging the
development of nuclear-testing agreements between the former Soviet Union and the United
States, and has been active in the disarmament movement.
SELL, POWER AND IDEAS, supra note 164, at 241 n.17.

180. SELL, POWER AND IDEAS, supra note 164, at 87.
181. Essamn E. Galal, The Developing Countries' Questfora Code, in INTERNATIONALTECHNOLOGY
TRANSFER, supranote 57, at 199, 200; see also Oldham, supra note 179, at 195 ("The fact that a group of
individuals, all of whom had a great deal of experience in dealing with or studying the problems of
technology transfer, had been able to agree on a draft Code, meant that the Group B position that a code
was an intractable problem was negated.").
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Pugwash Conference "provided a long-awaited opportunity for interaction
between North/South experienced practitioners of international technology
18 2
transfer and knowledgeable scholars and political and economic experts."'
"In the fall of 1977, the General Assembly decided 'to convene a United
Nations conference to negotiate and to take all decisions necessary for the
adoption of an international code of conduct on the transfer of technology."183
The Assembly also decided that this Conference would meet under the
auspices of UNCTAD.'" From the standpoint of international intellectual
property norm-setting, the use of UNCTAD as a forum for negotiating this
International Code of Conduct is interesting. Although the Code no doubt
would affect the protection of intellectual property rights, the negotiation of
the Code was held outside WIPO-a U.N. agency specialized for handling
intellectual property matters.
Despite the high hopes of less developed countries, the Code was
troubled from the very beginning. Although the Code was intended to apply
to all international transactions involving technology transfer, what constituted
such transactions remained highly controversial.' 85 While less developed
countries "[took] the position that transactions within the same country may
be of an international character if one of the parties is a company controlled
by a foreign corporation," developed countries considered such transactions
purely domestic and that the Code would not be applicable to situations in
which technology has crossed national boundaries.1 86 Their position was
understandable. From the outset, many of these countries were hostile to the
project and "saw the code as an interventionist instrument, the aim of which
was to endorse bureaucratic structures that would hinder the transfer process
instead of facilitating it."' 87
As Susan Sell summarized, the most hotly contested issues included "(1)
whether the character of the code should be binding or voluntary; (2) chapter
1 of the code (definition and scope of application); (3) chapter 4 of the code
(restrictive business practices); and (4) chapter 9 of the code (applicable law
and the settlement of disputes)."' 88 In light of these inherent problems, the
negotiation of the Code was proceeding very slowly. Although progress had

182.
183.
184.
185.
186.
187.

Galal, supra note 181, at 200.
Zuijdwijk, supranote 165, at 564 (footnote omitted).
Id.
Id. at 568.
Id.
Pedro Roffe, Controlof Anti-Competitive Practicesin ContractualLicenses Under the TRIPs

Agreement, in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND INTERNATIONAL TRADE: THE TRIPS AGREEMENT 261,266

(Carlos M. Correa & Abdulqawi A. Yusuf eds., 1998).
188. SELL, POWER AND IDEAS, supra note 164, at 89. For a detailed discussion of the draft
International Code of Conduct, see id. at 90-96; Thompson, supra note 178.
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been made, negotiation was eventually forestalled by the debt crises in Latin
America in the late 1980s.' The stalled discussions were further weakened
by the arrival of the Reagan Administration in the United States, which
introduced a new and radically different antitrust policy. 9 0 As Professor Sell
recounted:
The eventual failure of the conference to agree upon a satisfactory
code was due to three factors: changes in U.S. leadership;
bureaucratic factors (the group system in UNCTAD and a loss of faith
in the organization); and changes in the world economic situation (a
precipitous drop in foreign investment, the Third World debt crisis,
and subsequent pressure to sacrifice ideological concerns for a more
highly competitive environment, which led Third World policymakers
to more aggressively seek foreign investment more aggressively rather
than strictly control it) ....
While the failure of the conference was due to changes in U.S.
leadership and bureaucratic factors, this third factor-the economic
slump of the late 1970s and early 1980s-was the most important. It
was the strongest shock to the optimism of the Group of 77's member
states. Not only did it take the wind out [of] their sails, but it led
them to abandon the whole ship.' 9'

189. As Professor Sell described:
The pressing economic problems faced by developing countries forced them to sacrifice
many of the ideological premises that had fueled the effort to get an international code of
conduct for the transfer of technology. The activist developing countries' legislation, which
had inspired numerous provisions in the draft code, was called into question by the
countries' own lawmakers and subsequently amended to reflect new economic realities.
These trends, which became evident in the early eighties, led most developing countries to
lose interest in the code effort.
SELL, POWER AND IDEAS, supra note 164, at 105; see also Chantal Thomas, Transferof Technology in the
ContemporaryInternationalOrder,22 FORDHAM INT'LL.J. 2096,2108 (1999) ("With the onset of the debt
crisis in the early 1980s .... whatever momentum remained in the[] efforts [to complete the International
Code of Conduct] dwindled along with the NIEO movement more generally.").
190. As Professor Sell recounted:
After the third session a mood of disillusionment and frustration set in. In retrospect, several
key Group of 77 delegates felt that they should have agreed to the Code as it stood in 1980,
at the end of the third session and before the Reagan administration came to power in the
United States. Many Group of 77 delegates, as well as UNCTAD personnel, noted a
dramatic change in the tenor of the negotiations beginning in 1981.
SELL, POWER AND IDEAS, supra note 164, at 97.
191. Id. at 98, 106; see also Harms Ullrich, Competition, Intellectual PropertyRights and Transfer
of Technology, in INTERNATIONAL TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER, supra note 57, at 363, 363-64. As Harms
Ullrich explained:
The reason for this failure are manifold: divergences from the antitrust law concepts of
major industrialized nations as regards restrictive exploitation of intellectual property;
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Thus, by the time the TRIPs Agreement was being developed in the mid1980s, the support for the Code had largely disappeared. The negotiation
stopped in 1985 and has not resumed since.1 92 UNCTAD, in the process, "was
[also] marginalized ... and has not recovered its influence on the global
governance of intellectual property since." 193 As Professor Okediji wrote, the
failed negotiations over the International Code of Conduct "was an
epiphenomenon linked to much deeper unresolved challenges of how legal
doctrines of sovereignty and equality could logically find meaning in a global
market in which the productive capacity of most developing countries was
viewed as being dependent on economic and political support from the
developed world."' 94
Even if the negotiation of the Code were to be resurrected today, it
remains unclear whether the Code would still be relevant or effective. As
UNCTAD stated in its evaluation report shortly before the completion of the
TRIPs Agreement:
Recent technological advances in such fields as informatics, telecommunications, biotechnology and new materials have greatly
contributed to... changes [in the technology area]. They have had
a profound impact on almost all sectors of industrial activity and have

general trends to liberalize not only markets but also antitrust as a form of market regulation;
the decline of the bargaining position of developing countries; the shift of technology
transfer to other mechanisms than licensing; and a complete change in perception of
intellectual property.
Id.
192. As Professor Sell stated:
Beginning in October 1978, negotiators met in six sessions, the last of which was held in
Geneva in May 1985.... There was considerable progress on several difficult issues during
the first three sessions, but after 1981 the mood of the conference quickly became one of
disillusionment and frustration. The last three sessions were characterized by heightened
ideological rhetoric, a hardening of positions on both sides, and stonewalling tactics....
By the sixth session in May 1985, positions on both sides had been hardened to the point
of no return. Not only was Group B thoroughly intransigent, but the Group of 77 consensus
had vanished.
SELL, POWER AND IDEAs, supra note 164, at 89, 98; see also Galal, supranote 181, at 204-08 (discussing
the breakdown of the 1983 Code Conference).
193. MAY, supra note 16, at 81; accord BRAHwArrE & DRAHOs, supra note 146, at 68 (noting that
"[tihe international organization which has been most marginalized by the shift of the intellectual property
forum to WTO has been UNCTAD"); MUSUNGU & DUTFID, supra note 120, at 19 (noting that
"UNCTAD has lost its pre-eminence on matters of trade, intellectual property and development and rarely
participates in WIPO negotiations such as the SPLT negotiations as an observer").
194. Ruth L. Okediji, History Lessons for the WIPO Development Agenda, in DEVELOPMENT
AGENDA, supra note 14, at 137, 151 [hereinafter Okediji, History Lessons].
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deeply influenced the development of technology, as well as its
application to the production of goods and services.' 95
Because the International Code of Conduct was drafted in the 1970s and
1980s with a worldview informed by the New International Economic Order
("NIEO"), the Code may not sit well with today's highly globalized business
environment. Offering "a sweeping critique of global inequality,"'9 6 NIEO
sought to bring about fundamental changes in the international economic
system by redistributing power, wealth, and resources from the developed
North to the less developed South. 97 According to one commentator, NIEO
"constituted the most important international law initiative taken by the
developing world in attempting to remedy colonial inequities."' 98
Moreover, as Pedro Roffe and Taffere Tesfachew observed:
During the 1960s and 1970s, much of the debate on industrial and
technological development concentrated on the question of technology transfer and, in particular, on the terms and conditions of
acquiring technology. Technology was generally assumed to be like
any other product and the process of technology transfer to be
effected the same as any other transaction between a seller and a
buyer. The 'tacit' elements of the transfer and the fact that local
learning of new skills may be necessary to complete the transaction
were not given much consideration.'99
Today, however, increased globalization and the continuous liberation of trade
and foreign direct investment regimes have shifted the focus from "discussion
on intellectual property... to how to make such systems efficient and useful
instruments for encouraging innovation and diffusion of technical

195. UNCTAD Secretariat, The Statusof the Negotiations:A 1990 Evaluation,in INTERNATIONAL
TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER, supra note 57, at 139, 139.
196. SELL, POWER AND IDEAS, supra note 164, at 28.

197. See Declaration on the Establishment of a New International Economic Order, G.A. Res. 3201,
at 527, U.N. GAOR, 6th Special Sess., Supp. No. 1, U.N. Doc. A/9559 (1974), reprinted in 13 LL.M. 715
(1974). As Chantal Thomas explained:
The NIEO documents sought to order the international economy according to both the
substantive principle of economic redistribution to "level" the international economic
playing field and the institutional principle of international cooperation to achieve these
ends. The norm of "special and differential treatment for developing countries" was central
to the NIEO framework. This principle provided that industrialized actors were required to
accord developing-country actors treatment more favorable than they would accord other
industrialized actors, in order to aid the process of industrialization.
Thomas, supranote 189, at 2106.
198.

ANTONY ANGHIE, IMPERIALISM, SOVEREIGNTY AND THE MAKING OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 313

(2005).
199. Roffe & Tesfachew, supra note 57, at 381.
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knowledge. ''2 1 In fact, to many less developed countries, "what matters most
was [no longer] the transfer of technology per se but what happens to the
technology once it has been transferred"-for example, whether the
transferred technology can be exploited
or adapted without heavy restrictions
21
by intellectual property rights.
The type of technical knowledge many countries need today is also much
more complex than what they needed in the past. As Rubens Ricupero and
Gamani Corea, two former UCTAD Secretary-Generals, explained:
There are two relevant categories of knowledge that are essential for
economic progress and competitiveness. The first consists of
knowledge embodied in machines and equipment which makes it
possible to control sophisticated processes for producing goods and
services and marketing them at a profit. The other category, to some
extent still elusive, consists of tacit knowledge, that is, knowledge
embodied in the organizational routines and collective expertise or
skills of specific production, management, research and development
and marketing. It is the first type of knowledge that people generally
have in mind when discussing today's knowledge-intensive economy
and the transfer and diffusion of technology. However, as knowledge
becomes a more decisive factor, and a more critical commodity, its
acquisition and diffusion will require that the two aspects of
knowledge be considered as an integral part of knowledge transfer.
This makes the process of technology transfer more than ever a
continuous and uninterrupted learning process. °2
Finally, the mindsets of many less developed countries--especially those
in the middle-income group-have changed significantly today. Although
these countries are deeply dissatisfied with the high intellectual property
standards required by the TRIPs Agreement and the TRIPs-plus bilateral and
regional trade agreements, they begin to see the benefits of using the

200. Roffe, supra note 187, at 261-62 (footnotes omitted).
201. Roffe & Tesfachew, supra note 57, at 382.
202. RubensRicupero&GamaniCorea, PrefacetolNTrRNATlONALTECHNOLOGYTRANSFER, supra
note 57, at xx; see also COMM'N ON INTELLECTUAL PROP. RIGHTS, INTEGRATING INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
RIGHTS AND DEVELOPMENT POLICY: REPORT OF THE COMMISSION ON INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS

24-25 (2003) [hereinafter IPR COMMISSION REPORT] ("The effective transfer of technology also often
requires the transfer of 'tacit' knowledge, which cannot be easily codified.... This is why even the bestdesigned programmes to foster national capacity for research which are funded by donors have not always
been successful."); LEAST DEVELOPED COUNTRIES REPORT, supra note 157, at 4 (underscoring the need
to conceptualize knowledge in light of "the fundamentally dynamic character and plural aspects shaping
knowledge production and generation, as knowledge is perceived as socially disembodied and universally
transferable" and "the components and processes that shape the production and generation of knowledge").
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intellectual property system to promote their indigenous industries.2 °3 Such
mindsets therefore contrast interestingly with the mindsets they had in the
1960s and 1970s, when they were primarily concerned about "access to
technology generated in developed countries and its transfer to developing
countries. ' 2° Indeed, in light of recent developments, Peter Drahos has
questioned whether "India and Brazil are prepared to provide
20 5 the general
leadership on intellectual property issues that they once did.,
Notwithstanding the questionable relevance of the International Code of
Conduct in today's business environment, the Code has three main legacies.
First, "such negotiations gave an opportunity to identify problems and
obstacles facing the transfer of technology to developing countries and to
build up a consensus on a number of issues, thus resulting in a large degree of
agreement. ' ,201 Such consensus is particularly important to less developed
countries in the run-up to the negotiation of the TRIPs Agreement. The timing
of the drafting of the Code cannot be better.
Even today, the development of a dialogue among less developed
countries would be highly beneficial. 2 7 The negotiation process would help
these countries define their interests 2°8 while at the same time "provid[ing] a
...
platform
' ' °9 for collective learning

tion.

2

[and] a focal point [for] ...

coopera-

After all, less developed countries' participation in international

203. See Peter K. Yu, Intellectual Property, Economic Development, and the China Puzzle, in
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY, TRADE AND DEVELOPMENT: STRATEGIES TO OPTIMIZE ECONOMIC
DEVELOPMENT IN A TRIPS PLUS ERA 173, 193-202 (Daniel J. Gervais ed., 2007) (discussing how China
began to see how stronger intellectual property protection can benefit its economy and industries); see also
Peter K. Yu, InternationalEnclosure, the Regime Complex,and IntellectualPropertySchizophrenia,2007
MICH. ST. L. REV. 1,25-27 [hereinafter Yu, InternationalEnclosure](discussing how countries may prefer
to offer stronger protection to their fast-growing industries while reducing protection in other areas that
would lead to drainage of foreign reserves).
204. As Rubens Ricupero and Gamani Corea recalled:
[U]ntil about the mid- 1960s, the developing world, with the exception of a few countries,
did not show much interest in the problems of modem science and technology. Even when
there was interest, the problem was articulated mainly in terms of access to technology
generated in developed countries and its transfer to developing countries.
Ricupero & Corea, supra note 202, at xix.
205. Peter Drahos, Developing Countriesand InternationalIntellectualPropertyStandards-Setting,
5 J. WORLD INTELL. PROP. 765, 765 (2002).
206. Roffe, supra note 187, at 266.
207. See Peter K. Yu, Access to Medicines, BRICS Alliances, and Collective Action, 34 AM. J.L. &
MED. 345, 384-87 (2008) [hereinafter Yu, Access to Medicines]; Peter K. Yu, Building Intellectual
PropertyCoalitionsfor Development, in IMPLEMENTING WlPO'S DEVELOPMENT AGENDA (Jeremy de Beer
ed., forthcoming 2009) [hereinafter IMPLEMENTING WIPO's DEVELOPMENT AGENDA].
208. See BRAITHWAITE & DRAHOS, supra note 146, at 528.
209. Jean F. Freymond, The Role of Third Partiesas Facilitators,in INTERNATIONAL TECHNOLOGY
TRANSFER, supra note 57, at 237, 238.
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affairs remain limited, and these countries continue to suffer from policy
incoherence and coordination problems.2 10
Second, the negotiation process "influenced the adoption of policies in
developing countries ' 2 1 and has a major residual effect on the TRIPs
Agreement. As Abdulqawi Yusuf reminded us, some of the provisions in the
draft text advanced by less developed countries 212 during the TRIPs
negotiations "were either directly based on or inspired by those of the Draft
International Code of Conduct on the Transfer of Technology. 2 13 Those
provisions are now enshrined in the text of the TRIPs Agreement. For
example, article 8(2) of the TRIPs Agreement, which lays out the principles
of the Agreement, states that "[aippropriate measures... may be needed to
prevent the abuse of intellectual property rights by right holders or the resort
to practices which unreasonably restrain trade or adversely affect the
international transfer of technology. 214 Article 3 1(k) exempts members from
their obligations under article 31 when the unauthorized use "is permitted to
remedy a practice determined after judicial or administrative process to be
anti-competitive., 215 Article 3 1(k) further stipulates that "[t]he need to correct
anti-competitive practices may be taken into account in determining the

210. As Peter Drahos observed:
Key factors that explain the negotiating failures of developing countries are a lack of trust
amongst developing country groups, a myopic focus on single issues rather than the game
in aggregate, insufficient political support from the capitals for negotiators, inadequate
technical analyses of issues, a failure of co-ordination across and within bilateral and
multilateral fora and, finally, a lack of boldness of vision.
Peter Drahos, Access to Knowledge: Time for a Treaty?, BRIDGES, Apr. 2005, at 15, 15, available at
http://www.iprsonline.org/ictsd/docs/DrahosAccessKnowledge-reatyB RIDGES9-4.pdf; accordSISULE
F. MUSUNGU, RETHINKING INNOVATION, DEVELOPMENT AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY INTHE UN: WIPO

AND BEYOND 21 (Quaker United Nations Office, TRIPS Issues Paper No. 5, 2005), available at
http://www.quno.org/geneva/pdf/economic/Issues/TRIPS53.pdf (noting the "disconnected participation by
developing countries in international affairs" and the "lack of coordination and coherence within and
between developing countries"); see also CAROLYN DEERE, THE IMPLEMENTATION GAME: THE TRIPS
AGREEMENT AND THE GLOBAL POLITICS OF INTEULECTUAL PROPERTY REFORM IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES
314 (2009) ("Developing country diplomats working on IP issues in Geneva frequently expressed frustration
with IP reforms underway at home that sacrificed TRIPS flexibilities.").
211. Roffe, supra note 187, at 267.

212. Negotiating Group on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Including Trade
in Counterfeit Goods [TRIPs Negotiating Group], CommunicationfromArgentina, Brazil, Chile, China,
Colombia, Cuba, Egypt, India, Nigeria,Peru, Tanzaniaand Uruguay, MTN.GNG/NGI l/W/7 I (May 14,

1990).
213. Abdulqawi A. Yusuf, TRIPS: Background, Principles and General Provisions, in
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND INTERNATIONAL TRADE: THE TRIPS AGREEMENT 3, 10 n.18 (Carlos M.

Correa & Abdulqawi A. Yusuf eds., 2d ed. 2008).
214. TRIPs Agreement, supra note 2, art. 8(2).
215. Id. art. 31(k).
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amount of remuneration in [cases of unauthorized use] ."216 Finally, article 40
permits WTO member states to take appropriate measures to curb "an abuse
of intellectual property rights having an adverse effect on competition in the
relevant market."2 7
Thus, even though the International Code of Conduct did not enter into
force, some of its provisions have found its way to the TRIPs Agreement. As
Pedro Roffe pointed out, the inclusion of the Code's language in the
Agreement is particularly important, because "the issue of restrictive practices
was, in a way, peripheral to the concerns of the TRIPs Agreement., 21 8 With
the built-in protection against anti-competitive practices, the TRIPs
Agreement can now be viewed as "an important step forward in the quest for
internationally agreed principles to control anti-competitive practices in
transfer of technology transactions, leaving scope for further evolution of law
in this area., 219 While less developed countries have yet to take advantage of
these provisions, it remains important that the provisions exist in the TRIPs
Agreement and are available to these countries should need arise.
Finally, the drafting of the International Code of Conduct provides a
wealth of materials that will become handy for those researchers exploring the
interface between intellectual property protection and competition or antitrust
policies. Indeed, commentators have increasingly called for the use of
competition law as a counterbalancing mechanism. 220 Shortly after the

216. Id.
217. Id. art. 40(2).
218. Roffe, supra note 187, at 279.
219. Id. at 296.
220. As John Braithwaite and Peter Drahos explained:
A great attraction of competition law is that it recruits business to do the consumer
movement's work. In the US, private actions by injured business competitors have been
encouraged by the prospect of obtaining enormous damages; for example, there were dozens
of private actions against AT&T before it was dismantled. Anti-competitive practices
usually have business as well as consumer victims; the business victims normally have more
resources and incentive to launch court cases against monopolistic practices. When
business players unite to check the predatory practices of one or more of their own kind they
create positive externalities for citizens. Sometimes these externalities have a global reach.
Competition law is a way of constituting these externalities. For example, the best chance
of checking Microsoft's domination of the rules for the electronic superhighway is antitrust
suits funded by other computing industry firms. At the level of lobbying for structural
change, a good framework of competition law, as existed in the Anglo-Saxon countries
during the 1980s, allowed the International Telecommunications Users Group to challenge
the monopoly of the major telecommunications provider in one country after another. The
result is that consumers in many nations now have much cheaper telephone services.
INTUG was not a consumer group in the sense of a group of household consumers; it was
a coalition of big business users of telecommunications services led by companies like
American Express.
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introduction of the TRIPs Agreement, Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann noted that
both developed and less developed countries "will need more systematic rules
on the protection of competition among trade-related intellectual property
rights and on the prevention of their anticompetitive abuse. '22' Likewise,
Jerome Reichman proposes to use "competition law to curb the abuse of
market power" as a pro-competitive strategy for implementing the TRIPs
Agreement in less developed countries.222 Most recently, Jonathan Berger
discussed how less developed countries can use competition policy to
"increas[e] access to a sustainable supply of affordable essential
medicines. 22 3 Recommendation No. 7 of the WIPO Development Agenda
further calls for WIPO to "[piromote measures that will help countries deal
with intellectual property-related anti-competitive practices. '"224
D. Paris Convention
While less developed countries were working on the International Code
of Conduct, they made parallel demands for a revision of the Paris
Convention. Like the demand for the revision of the Berne Convention and
the development of the International Code of Conduct, their concerns about
the inappropriateness of the international patent system date back to the early
1960s. In November 1961, "Brazil and many other developing nations
demanded for the first time-within the UN system-rules on the protection
of intellectual property . . . favourable to their economic development,
BRArriWAITE & DRAHOS, supra note 146, at 621 (citation omitted). For discussion of issues at the
intersection of intellectual property protection and competition policy, see CARLOS M. CORREA,
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND COMPETTON LAW EXPLORING SOME ISSUES OF RELEVANCE TO

DEVELOPING COUNTRIES (ICTSD Programme on IPRs and Sustainable Development, Issue Paper No. 21,
2007), available at http://www.iprsonine.org/resourcesldocs/coreaOcto7.pdf.
221. Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann, InternationalCompetition Rules for Governments andfor Private
Business: A "Trade Law Approach"for Linking Trade and CompetitionRules in the WTO, 72 CHI.-KENT.
L. REV. 545, 563 (1996).
222. See J.H. Reichman, FromFreeRiders to FairFollowers:Global Competition Underthe TRIPS
Agreement, 29 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 11, 52-58 (1997); see also John T. Cross & Peter K. Yu,
Competition Law and CopyrightMisuse, 56 DRAKE L. REV. 427, 428 (2008) (noting that, in response to
the market abuses by copyright holders that stifle competition and innovation, "courts, litigants,
policymakers, and commentators have increasingly embraced competition law, the doctrines of copyright
misuse and unclean hands, and tort law concepts as counter-balancing tools").
223. Jonathan Berger, Advancing Public Health by Other Means: Using Competition Policy, in
NEGOTIATING HEALTH, supranote 156, at 181, 182.

224. WIPO, The 45 Adopted Recommendations Under the WIPO Development Agenda 7,
http://www.wipo.int/ip-development/en/agenda/recommendations.html (last visited July 6, 2008)
[hereinafter WIPO, 45 Adopted Recommendations]; see also IPR COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 202,
at 149 ("Developed countries and international institutions that provide assistance for the development of
IPR regimes in developing countries should provide such assistance in concert with the development of
appropriate competition policies and institutions.").
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including proper controls against abuse, thereby putting 'development' issues
'
and 'public interest concerns' on the international IP agenda."225
Titled The Role of Patents in the Transfer of Technology to UnderDeveloped Countries, this proposal was tabled against a background of
dissatisfaction of the international patent system in Brazil, z"6 which has been
a member of the Paris Convention since its inception. A few months earlier,
the Brazilian Parliament established a special "inquiry commission," the
Comissdo Parlamentar de Inqu~rito, "to analyze the domestic abuses of patent
monopolies by multinational pharmaceutical corporations. The Commission
made reference to the abuses regarding the non-working of patents by
foreigners, the restrictive practices in licensing agreements, the payment of
high royalties, including royalties for expired patents, and the high cost of
medicines." 27 To many developed countries, the Brazilian proposal provided
"a threat to existing international conventions on patents and also to the
hitherto unchallenged position of the Paris Union. 22 8 Nevertheless, "the
General Assembly passed a resolution requesting that the Secretary General
prepare a report on the effects of patents on the economies of underdeveloped
countries. '229 This report was published later as The Role of Patentsand the
Transfer of Technology to Developing Countries.30
Like Brazil, India was also deeply dissatisfied with the international
patent system. Shortly after gaining independence in 1947, India established
the Patents Enquiry Committee, also known as the Tek Chand Committee, to
review the adequacy of the Indian patent system in promoting industrialization.23 ' Finding that the extant system "enabled multinational companies to
gain patent rights beyond the scope of their inventions," the Committee
"recommended incorporating compulsory licensing provisions to minimize the

225. Menescal, supra note 129, at 761-62.
226. See id. at 765.
227. Id. at 764.
228. ANDERFELT, supra note 13, at 173. As Ulf Anderfelt explained:
The criticism of [Brazil's proposal], as voiced by several delegations, emphasized three
things: that abuses to which the patent system might give rise ought to be remedied through
national legislation; that the existing machinery of the Paris Union was highly sufficient to
deal with any questions concerning its field of activity and that countries not yet members
ought to accede to it; and that particularly for developing countries unpatented or
unpatentable technology was of greater importance than patented inventions.
Id.
229. Roffe & Vea, supra note 14, at 95. The resolution was reprinted in PrincipalDecisionsby the
InternationalCommunity Regarding the PatentSystem, WoRLD DEv., Sept. 1974, at 37, 37.
230. id. at 96.
231. See Ragavan, supra note 11, at 279.
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potential for abuse of monopolies. 232 Its recommendations were subsequently
incorporated into the patent law when the law was amended in 1950.233
A decade later, the government appointed Justice Rajagopala Ayyangar
to head a committee that sought "to promote law reforms to improve local
industrialization in critical areas like food and drugs. ' 234 Taking into account
the limited economic development within the country, the Ayyangar
Committee unsurprisingly articulated the need for differential treatment for
food, medicine, chemical inventions, and educational materials; the prohibition of product patents (as compared to process patents) in pharmaceuticals
and agricultural chemicals; and the provision of compulsory licensing and the
local working requirement.235 This report eventually paved the way for the
establishment of the 1970 Patent Act, under which India did not provide
patent protection for pharmaceutical products until 2005.236
In sum, Brazil and India were both vocal about the need to reform the
international patent system, and both of them had provided major leadership
since the 1960s. One of the major changes they pushed for was the revision
of the Paris Convention, which India had demanded as early as June 1974.37
Such a demand for revision makes a lot of sense. As Carolyn Deere
recounted:
In the 1970s, nationals of developing countries held only around 1 per
80 per cent of patents
cent of the world's 3.5 million patents ....
granted worldwide at that time were owned by major corporations
from five industrialized countries. Further, over 80 per cent of the
patents in force in developing countries were held by foreigners and
registered on the basis of research conducted elsewhere.23 8

232. Id.
233. Id.
234. Id. at 281.
235. See id. at 281-89 (discussing the Ayyangar Committee Report).
236. See Peter K. Yu, The InternationalEnclosure Movement, 82 IND. L.J. 827, 863 (2007).
237. As Professor Sell wrote:
In 1974, India sought improvements in the existing [Paris C]onvention before it would
consider joining. India felt that developing countries lacked sufficient leverage in the Paris
Convention and that developing countries needed special provisions to grant them effective
bargaining power. The Indian delegation felt that the Paris Convention needed a stronger
emphasis on states' rights vis-t-vis patentees.
SELL, POWER AND IDEAS, supra note 164, at 114; see Roffe & Vea, supra note 14, at 99 ("Ibe idea of a

possible revision of the Paris Convention was first advanced in June 1974 when the Director General of
WIPO was instructed to create and convene an Ad Hoc Group of Governmental Experts.").
238. DEERE, supra note 210, at 43.
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UNCTAD further "estimated that 90 to 95 percent of patents granted in
developing countries were not exploited, or properly worked. 239
Based on these statistics, it is therefore no surprise that UNCTAD
"advanced more assertive conclusions on the need for the revision of
international conventions" in its 1974 report on the role of the international
patent system in transferring technology to less developed countries. 24° This
report, on which WIPO was reluctantly listed as the co-author, contrasts
interestingly with the 1964 report. That earlier report took "the view that
international conventions, namely the Paris Convention, were not in need of
reform for purposes of addressing the special problems of developing
countries. ' 4 '
In December 1977, a group of WIPO experts, who took into account the
new UNCTAD report, adopted a declaration that "served as the guiding
instrument for the Diplomatic Conference on the revision of the Paris
Convention. 24 2 That declaration implied the "need to consider cases in which
exceptions and corrections to the principle of national treatment and
preferential treatment toward developing countries should be allowed. ' 243 On
the basis of this recommendation, "WIPO established in 1976 the Preparatory
Intergovernmental Committee on the Revision of the Paris Convention. '
Although the Paris Convention was revised in Lisbon in 1958, its
membership in the less developed world had substantially increased since that
revision conference. As Pedro Roffe and Gina Vea recounted: "[m]any
African countries adhered to the Paris Convention after independence. More
than half of the current African membership joined the Paris Convention

239.

SELL, POWER AND IDEAS, supra note 164, at 121.

240. DEERE, supra note 210, at 45. As the report stated:
The set of practices of the international patent system and its specific impact on the
developing countries ... require a revision of the current patent laws and administrative
practices of the developing countries. The purpose of any such revision will have to be that
ofmaking patent laws and practices capable of effectively complementing other instruments
of policy for national development. Of particular relevance in this connexion are, among
others, the following aspects: treatment of nationals and foreigners; independence of patents;
rights conferred by a patent; policies concerning the subject of patentability; duration of
patent grants; adequate and effective provisions to prevent and correct the abuses resulting
from the exercise of the rights conferred by the patent; using patent fees as a flexible
instrument of patent policy; introduction of inventors' certificates, utility models and other
relevant means for promoting national scientific and technological capabilities.
1974 IJNCTAD REPORT, supra note 167, at 64.
241. Roffe & Vea, supra note 14, at 96. Instead, the report found that "[c]apcity-building effort at
the domestic level was the major issue, not the reform of the international system." Id.
242. Id. at 99.
243. Id.
244. Id. at99-101.
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'
during the 1960s and 1970s."245
During that time, less developed countries
had also undertaken "a wave of legal reforms" in their intellectual property
systems, including "the strengthening of the working requirement and the
expansion of measures to prevent so-called patent abuses and promote the
transfer of the technology." 2' The proposed Paris revision therefore sought
to consolidate these reforms. As Pedro Roffe and Taffere Tesfachew
summarized:

The key aspects of the revision process of the Paris Convention...
were mainly: to place on an equal footing the treatment of patents and
inventors' certificates; the review of Article 5A on compulsory
licensing; the recognition of preferential arrangements for developing
countries; the introduction of changes to Article 5quaterdealing with
the importation of products manufactured by a process patented in the
importing country.24 7
With respect to Article 5A of the Paris Convention, less developed
countries sought the following amendments:
[T]he importation of patented products should not be equivalent to
exploitation of the patent; non-voluntary licenses could, under certain
circumstances, have an exclusive character; and developing countries
should enjoy a sort of preferential treatment to reduce the time-limits
provided for in the Convention for the granting of non-voluntary
licenses as well as for the revocation of the patent without the prior
granting of a non-voluntary licence.248
As Pedro Roffe and Gina Vea pointed out, the proposed amendments to
Article 5A "were an attempt to fundamentally reshape the Convention by
revisiting the notions of local working, remedies to abuses, and the
relationship between compulsory licenses and forfeiture or revocation of
patents. 249
It was the most radical attempt to revise the Convention in its entire
history.

In addition, less developed countries "sought either to delete [Article
5quater] from the convention or at least be exempted from it." 25° That
provision provided protection to imported products manufactured under a
process patent, thus reducing the chance that the patent in the invention will

245.
246.
247.
248.
249.

Id. at 84.
Roffe & Vea, supra note 14, at 92.
Roffe & Tesfachew, supranote 57, at 387 (footnote omitted).
Id. at 388.
Roffe & Vea, supra note 14, at 101.

250.

SEL., POWER AND IDEAS, supranote 164, at 119.
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be properly and sufficiently worked in these countries. 5' An exemption from
Article 5quater therefore would allow the country to "withhold protection
from the owner of the process patent if that product was manufactured
abroad. 2 52 Finally, the countries demanded the inclusion into the Convention
of "provisions authorizing national laws to take corrective measures in three
cases, namely, those in which patent rights are abused; the patented invention
was not, or was not sufficiently, worked in the2 country
where the patent was
53
granted; and the public interest was involved.q
Although less developed countries sought to lower the levels of
protection in the Paris Convention, the United States "went into the Paris
Diplomatic Conference in 1980 hoping to obtain higher standards of
protection. Instead it found itself having to defend the existing Paris Convention standards. 2 54 It is understandable why the United States vehemently
opposed the demands by less developed countries during the Paris revision
conference. Other developed countries also "suspected that developing
countries' governments were using patents as a scapegoat for more difficult
problems internal to their economies. ' '255
The United States' opposition eventually led to the famous stalemate
between developed and less developed countries over the Nairobi text of the
Convention.256 The negotiations broke down after a first consultative meeting
in Geneva in June 1985.257 As Peter Drahos and John Braithwaite recounted:
[T]here was little hope of achieving consensus [in WIPO] between the
numerous states of the South, which were intellectual property
importers, and a few wealthy states, which were intellectual property
exporters, especially in the 1970s and 1980s when developing
countries were claiming that much technological knowledge was in
fact the common heritage of mankind.258

251. Article 5quaterprovides:
When a product is imported into a country of the Union where there exists a patent
protecting a process of manufacture of the said product, the patentee shall have all the rights,
with regard to the imported product, that are accorded to him by the legislation of the
country of importation, on the basis of the process patent, with respect to products
manufactured in that country.
Paris Convention, supra note 9, art. 5quater.
252. SELL, POWER AND IDEAS, supra note 164, at 120.
253. Id.
254. DRAHOS & BRArrHwArrE, supra note 138, at I11.
255. MAY, supra note 16, at 31.
256. See SELL, POWER AND IDEAS, supra note 164, at 123-30.

257. Id. at 130.
258. DRAHOS & BRArrHWArrE, supra note 138, at 112.
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To make matters worse, "in the middle of the Paris Convention revision
process, there emerged an event that sidetracked the general revision. In June
1983, the Director General proposed a new complementary treaty to the Paris
Convention that would" later be widened to cover a wide variety of
substantive patent issues, such as "the unity of invention, the first-to-file
versus the first-to-invent criteria, the minimum duration of rights, enforcement
issues, exclusion of certain fields of technology from patentability, and the
rights and obligations of patentees. 259
In response to the stalemate caused by the Nairobi text, developed
countries, led by the United States and influenced by multinational
corporations, abandoned the intellectual property-based forum for the
GATT/WTO with a goal to develop new substantive intellectual property
norms that are enforceable through a dispute settlement process. 26° Although
less developed countries initially stayed together to fight the developed
countries' effort to enlarge the negotiation mandate beyond border control
measures and the protection against counterfeiting, they eventually succumbed
to the developed countries' aggressive tactics 261 and their own economic
crises.262
After negotiations for close to a decade, countries in both the developed
and less developed worlds finally agreed to the Marrakesh Agreement
Establishing the World Trade Organization,26 3 which included in its annex an
intellectual property-related multilateral agreement known as the TRIPs
Agreement. Entering into effect on January 1, 1995, the Agreement has
adversely impacted many less developed countries, and these impacts have
precipitated the establishment of the New Development Agenda.
II. THE NEW DEVELOPMENT AGENDA

When scholars and policymakers discuss the New Agenda, they tend to
focus on the WIPO Development Agenda. Given WIPO's technical expertise,
the importance of that agenda speaks for itself. It is also understandable why

259. Roffe & Vea, supra note 14, at 105.
260. See Yu, Currents and Crosscurrents,supra note 3, at 357-58 (discussing the shifting of
negotiations in the intellectual property area by developed countries from WIPO to the WTO); see also Lars
Anell, Forewordto DANIEL GERVAIS, THE TRIPS AGREEMENT: DRAFTING HISTORY AND ANALYSIS vii, vii
(2d ed. 2003) (noting that "[iun some quarters, there was a reluctance to give WIPO an active role in the
[TRIPs] negotiations").
261. See SUSAN K. SELL, PRIVATE POWER, PUBLIC LAW: THE GLOBALIZATION OF INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY RIGHTS 109-10 (2003) [hereinafter SELL, PRIVATE POWER]; JAYASHREE WATAL, INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY RIGHTS INTHE WTO AND DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 19(2001); Yu, Currentsand Crosscurrents,
supra note 3, at 412-13.
262. See Yu, Access to Medicines, supra note 207, at 365.
263. Marrakesh Agreement, supra note 2.
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less developed countries and their supporters have placed high hopes on the
success of that agenda. Nevertheless, the WIPO Development Agenda is only
one of the many development agendas that have been established in the past
few years. The first recent development agenda was actually established not
at WIPO, but at the WTO during the Doha Development Round of Trade
Negotiations ("Doha Round"). This Part therefore begins by discussing the
Doha Development Agenda. It then examines the WIPO Development Agenda
as well as the many additional "development agendas" that have been
established in other international fora.
By showing that pro-development initiatives extend beyond the areas of
intellectual property and international trade, this Part explores the interfaces
between intellectual property protection and other important economic, social,
and cultural goals. This Part also shows the adverse spillover effects of
increased intellectual property protection and the problems posed by the onesize-fits-all--or more precisely, super-size-fits-all M --- approach taken by the
TRIPs Agreement.
Bringing all of these fora together is important; it allows us to see how
each international regime handles intellectual property matters. As Laurence
Helfer observed, "[tihe responses in each regime [other than WIPO and the
WTO] differed, . . . [and their responses ranged] from acceptance
(biodiversity) to tolerance (PGRs) to skepticism (public health) to antagonism
(human rights). '26 5 By exploring the activities conducted in these myriad fora,
this Part highlights the growing opportunities for less developed countries to
recalibrate the balance in the international intellectual property system.
A. Doha Development Agenda
The Doha Development Agenda was the first development agenda
established in the post-TRIPs era. The Doha Round was launched in part as
a response to the need for greater multilateral negotiations in the wake of the
September 11 tragedies and the growing need for cooperation between the
United States and other less developed countries. 2" Of notable importance in

264. See James Boyle, A Manifesto on WIPO and the Future of Intellectual Property,2004 DuKE
L. &TECH. REV. 9 (2004) ("One size fits all. And it is 'extra large."'); Shamnad Basheer& Annalisa Primi,
The WIPO Development Agenda: Factoringin the "Technologically Proficient" Developing Countries,
in IMPLEMENTING WIPO's DEVELOPMENT AGENDA, supra note 207 (alluding to "a one-size, especially a
supersize, model of global IP law").
265. Laurence R. Helfer, Regime Shifting:The TRIPSAgreement andNew Dynamics of International
Intellectual PropertyLawmaking, 29 YALE J. INT'L L. 1, 28 (2004) [hereinafter Heifer, Regime Shifting].
266. See, e.g., Louise Amoore et al., Series Preface to AMRITA NARLKAR, INTERNATIONAL TRADE
AND DEVELOPING COUNTRIES: BARGAINING COALITIONS IN THEGATT& WTO xiii (2003) (noting that the

launch of the Doha Round was "assisted to a large degree by the conciliatory international political climate
that followed the September 2001 terrorist attacks in New York and Washington").
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the intellectual property area was the adoption of the Doha Ministerial
Declaration ("Ministerial Declaration") 267 and the Declaration on the TRIPS
Agreement and Public Health ("Doha Declaration").268
Paragraph 19 of the Ministerial Declaration concerned the work program
conducted by the TRIPs Council, including "the review of Article 27.3(b) [of
the TRIPs Agreement], the review of the implementation of the TRIPS
Agreement under Article 7 1.1 and the work foreseen pursuant to paragraph 12
of this declaration," which focused on implementation-related issues and
concerns. 269 This paragraph further stated that "[i]n undertaking [its work],
the TRIPS Council shall be guided by the objectives and principles set out in
Articles 7 and 8 of the TRIPS Agreement and shall take fully into account the
development dimension. ' '270
Compared to the Ministerial Declaration, the Doha Declaration focused
more specifically on the interplay between intellectual property protection and
the protection of public health. The first two paragraphs of the Declaration
explicitly "recognize[d] the gravity of the public health problems afflicting
many developing and least-developed countries, especially those resulting
from HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis, malaria and other epidemics... [and] the need
for the [TRIPs Agreement] to be part of the wider national and international
action to address these problems. 27' Paragraph 4 declared that member states
"agree that the TRIPS Agreement does not and should not prevent members
from taking measures to protect public health" and that "the Agreement can
and should be interpreted and implemented in a manner supportive of WTO
Members' right to protect public health and, in particular, to promote access
to medicines for all. 272
Paragraph 5 then underscored the various "flexibilities" reserved to all
WTO member states under the TRIPs Agreement.2 73 As Frederick Abbott

267. Word Trade Org. [WTO], Ministerial Declaration of 14 November 2001, WT/MIN(01)/DEC/1,
41 LL.M. 746 (2002) [hereinafter Ministerial Declaration].
268. WTO, Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health, WT/MIN(0I)/DEC/2, 41 LL.M.
755 (2002) [hereinafter Doha Declaration].
269. Ministerial Declaration, supra note 267, 1 19.
270. Id.
271. Doha Declaration, supra note 268, 1 1-2.
272. Id. 4.
273. Id. 5. These flexibilities include the following:
a)
In applying the customary rules ofinterpretation of public international law, each
provision of the TRIPS Agreement shall be read in the light of the object and
purpose of the Agreement as expressed, in particular, in its objectives and
principles.
b)
Each Member has the right to grant compulsory licences and the freedom to
determine the grounds upon which such licences are granted.
c)
Each Member has the right to determine what constitutes a national emergency
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pointed out, less developed countries have the following flexibilities in the
public health area:
The TRIPS Agreement ...does not . . . restrict the authority of
governments to regulate prices. It... permits [compulsory or government use licenses] to be granted. It permits governments to authorize
parallel importation. The TRIPS Agreement does not specify that
new-use patents must be granted. It allows patents to be used for
regulatory approval purposes, and it does not require the extension of
patent terms to offset regulatory approval periods. The TRIPS
Agreement provides a limited form of protection for submissions of
regulatory data; but this protection does not prevent a generic
producer from making use of publicly available information to
generate bioequivalence test data. The TRIPS Agreement provides
substantial discretion for the application of competition laws." 4
The most important of all, Paragraph 6 of the Doha Declaration
"recognized that WTO Members with insufficient or no manufacturing
capacities in the pharmaceutical sector could face difficulties in making
effective use of compulsory licensing under the TRIPS Agreement."27' 5
Pursuant to this paragraph, the TRIPs Council adopted the Decision on the
Implementation of Paragraph 6 of the Doha Declaration on the TRIPS
Agreement and Public Health on August 30,2003.276 Shortly before the Sixth
WTO Ministerial Conference in Hong Kong, this decision was formalized as
the proposed article 31 bis of the TRIPs Agreement.27 7 If ratified by two-thirds
of the WTO membership by December 2009 (a two-year extension from the
earlier December 2007 deadline), the proposed amendment would allow

d)

or other circumstances of extreme urgency, it being understood that public health
crises, including those relating to HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis, malaria and other
epidemics, can represent a national emergency or other circumstances of extreme
urgency.
The effect of the provisions in the TRIPS Agreement that are relevant to the
exhaustion of intellectual property rights is to leave each Member free to
establish its own regime for such exhaustion without challenge, subject to the
MFN and national treatment provisions of Articles 3 and 4.

Id.
274. Frederick M. Abbott, The Cycle of Action and Reaction: Developments and Trends in
Intellectual Propertyand Health, in NEGOTIATING HEALTH, supranote 156, at 27, 30 (citations omitted).
275. Doha Declaration, supra note 268, 1 6.
276. General Council, Implementation of Paragraph6 of the Doha Declaration on the TRIPS
Agreement and Public Health, WT/IJ540 (Sept. 1, 2003), 43 LL.M. 509 (2004).
277. General Council, Amendment of the TRIPSAgreement, WT/1J641 (Dec. 8, 2005), availableat
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop-etrips-e/ wt164le.htm.
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countries with insufficient or no manufacturing capacity to import generic
versions of on-patent pharmaceuticals.2 78
Although the Doha Round focuses significantly on the lack of access to
medicines in less developed countries, it has considered other issues, such as
growing tension between the TRIPs Agreement and the Convention on

Biological Diversity2 9 and the need for greater protection of traditional
knowledge and cultural expressions. Paragraph 19 of the Ministerial
Declaration, for example, instructed the TRIPs Council "to examine ... the
relationship between the TRIPS Agreement and the Convention on Biological
Diversity [and] the protection of traditional knowledge and folklore. 2 8 ° In the
past few years, proposals have also been advanced to promote the disclosure
in patent applications of traditional knowledge and genetic resources used in
inventions for which intellectual property rights are applied.28 1 These
proposals will be discussed in Part H.C below.
B. WIPO Development Agenda
While developed and less developed countries were in the middle of their
negotiation on the permanent solution to implement Paragraph 6 of the Doha
Declaration, Argentina and Brazil introduced an important proposal to
establish a WIPO Development Agenda during the organization's General
Assembly in October 2004.282 The proposal "call[ed] upon [the] WIPO
General Assembly to take immediate action in providing for the incorporation
of a 'Development Agenda' in the Organization's work program. "283
As noted by the proponents and supporters of this proposal, WIPO has
failed its mission as a U.N. specialized agency to promote the development of
less developed countries. According to Sisule Musungu and Graham Dutfield:
"[tihe main objective of the organisation-the promotion of the protection of

278. Although the initial deadline for ratification was December 1, 2007, the deadline has been
recently extended for another two years. William New, TRIPS Council Extends Health Amendment;
Targets PoorNations' Needs, INTELL. PROP. WATCH, http://www.ip-watch.org/weblog/2007/10/23/wtotrips-council-focuses-on-developing-nations-needs/ (Oct. 23, 2007). As of this writing, slightly over a
quarter of the 153 WTO member states, including the United States, India, Japan, China, and most recently
members of the European Communities, have ratified the proposed amendment. WTO, Members Accepting
Amendment of the TRlPSAgreement, http://www.wto.org/english/tratop-eltripsse/amendment_e.htm (Aug.
2, 2007).
279. Convention on Biological Diversity, opened for signatureJune 5, 1992, 1760 U.N.T.S. 143
[hereinafter CBD].
280. Ministerial Declaration, supranote 267, 19.
281. See discussion infra Part UI.C.3.
282. WIPO, Proposal to Establisha Development Agenda for WIPO: An Elaboration of Issues
Raised in Document WO/GA/31/11, IIM1I/4 (April 6, 2005), available at http://www.wipo.int/edocs/
mdocs/mdocs/en/iim_ 1him_ 1_4.pdf [WIPO Development Agenda Proposal].
283. Id.
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intellectual property-is quite narrow and... has raised concerns about the
ability of the organisation to incorporate development objectives in its
activities." 2 The proposal by Argentina and Brazil therefore aims to reduce
and eventually eliminate the historical "bias against latecomers to the
' It "also seeks to
intellectual property policy field-developing countries."285
position WIPO in a better position to contribute towards tackling the key
challenges of the 21st century and thereby the achievement of the MDGs
[Millennium Development Goals] ."286 As Sisule Musungu put it, "the key
question.., is how innovation, technology, and science (knowledge) can be
harnessed to contribute to the attainment of [these goals]. 287 He and
Professor Dutfield argue that the organization should take up "broad
development objectives and measures to ensure that developing countries
benefit from modem scientific and technological advances in health,
environment, communication, information technology and food and nutrition
among others. 28 8

284. MUSUNGU & DuTFIED, supranote 120, at 18; accordMAY, supranote 16, at 4 ("At the center
of the Development Agenda is a critique of the WIPO that suggests it represents a narrowly focused set of
political economic interests that seek to expand the realm of commodified knowledge and information for
their own commercial advantage."); see also Keith E. Maskus & Jerome H. Reichman, The Globalization
of Private Knowledge Goods and the Privatizationof Global Public Goods, in INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC
GOODS, supra note 67, at 3, 18 (criticizing WIPO for "interpret[ing] its legislative mandate as one of
progressively elevating intellectual property rights throughout the world"). As Sisule Musungu and Graham
Dutfield wrote:
There are perceptions that the Bureau is acting not as the servant of the whole
international community but as an institution with its own agenda. That agenda seems more
closely attuned to the interests and demands of some Member States than to others, and
more to pro-strong intellectual property protection interest groups and practitioner
associations, which are ostensibly observers but sometimes behave and are treated like
Member States, than to the interest of developing countries.
MUSUNGU & DuFmIELD, supra note 120, at 13; see also id. n.70 (recounting that "the delegation of Brazil
questioned whether the International Bureau had the right to refuse to include a proposal by Member States
in a draft treaty simply because the International Bureau did not think that the proposal belonged in that
treaty").
285. MUSUNGU, supra note 210, at 4.
286. Id.
287. Id. at 11.
288. MUSUNGU & DuTFIELD, supra note 120, at 18. As they explained:
[While WIPO has a specialised competence on matters of intellectual property, the intention
was clearly that its mandate should be construed in the context of the development
objectives of the specified UN agencies as well as the broader objectives of achieving
international cooperation in solving problems of an economic, social, cultural, or
humanitarian character, and in promoting and encouraging respect for human rights and
fundamental freedoms.
Even if one disagrees with the broad construction of WIPO's mandate as suggested
above, WIPO would still be obliged to carry out its mandate taking into account
development objectives on the basis of recommendations, studies, outcomes and conclusions
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Similarly, the United Kingdom Commission on Intellectual Property
Rights ("IPR Commission") has called on WIPO to "act to integrate
development objectives into its approach to the promotion of IP protection in
developing countries" and to "give explicit recognition to both the benefits
and costs of IP protection and the corresponding need to adjust domestic
regimes in developing countries to ensure that the costs do not outweigh the
benefits."2 9 Although the Commission recognizes WIPO's role in promoting
intellectual property rights, it states that WIPO "needs to do so in a much
more nuanced way that is fully consistent with the economic and social goals
to which the UN, and the international community are committed." 2 9
To be certain, the proposal for the WIPO Development Agenda was
originally developed as a partial response to the push for the draft SPLT and
growing efforts to harmonize national patent standards.29 1 However, the
WIPO Development Agenda is much broader today and has evolved into a
much larger agenda on pro-development reform of the international
intellectual property system. The issues addressed by the agenda also
implicate activities outside WIPO. Indeed, the WIPO Development Agenda
Proposal explicitly mentioned the Doha Declaration three times in its effort
to underscore the development dimension and social function of intellectual

of UNCTAD, LNDP, UNIDO and UNESCO as well as ECOSOC, the UN General
Assembly and the Security Council.
Id. at 19 (footnote omitted); see also MAY, supra note 16, at 76 ("WIPO must more explicitly adopt the
overall developmental priorities of the UN system."); Graeme W. Austin, The Role of National Courts:
Valuing "Domestic Self-Determination" in InternationalIntellectual PropertyJurisprudence,77 CHI.KENT L. REV. 1155, 1193 (2002) ("ro the extent that intellectual property policies and values can be
identified, it might be more helpful to regard them as aspects of much broader issues of public policy.
Policies that help ensure that populations get fed, enjoy the benefits of literacy, are healthy, have viable
agricultural bases, and can participate in technological and cultural development-these seem to be the
kinds of policies that should have priority in any analysis of the values that intellectual property laws are
meant to serve." (footnote omitted)); Maskus & Reichman, supra note 284, at 11 (noting that "stronger
private rights in information may raise roadblocks against deploying new technologies that could help
improve the provision of environment protection, health care, biological diversity, and basic scientific
research"). Nevertheless, Richard Gold and Jean-Fr&d6ric Morin question whether WIPO can take up these
objectives and measures:
Such a shift is daunting for three reasons: (1)WIPO is not in a position to manage the
cultural change required by the Development Agenda; (2) WIPO's principal strength is in
administering technical IPtreaties rather than in norm development; and (3) WIPO members
have a tendency to say one thing internationally but to do the opposite nationally.
E. Richard Gold & Jean-Fr&6ric Morin, From Agenda to Implementation: Working Outside the WIPO
Box, in IMPLEMENTING WIPO's DEVELOPMENT AGENDA, supra note 207.
289. IPR COMMtssION REPORT, supranote 202, at 159.
290. Id. at 158.
291. See MUSUNGU & DUTFIE_, supra note 120, at 11-15.
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property. 2" One of the recommendations in the now-adopted agenda also
incorporates the language in article 7 of the TRIPs Agreement.2 93
Since the announcement of the establishment of the WIPO Development
Agenda, 111 proposals had been submitted. Some of them (like the proposal
to adopt development-friendly principles and guidelines) were abstract.
Others (such as the proposal to establish a WIPO Standing Committee on IP
and Technology Transfer or the one to establish a specific fee in the Patent
Cooperation Treaty for development purposes), however, were rather specific.
In addition, some proposals-for example, those nineteen recommendations
that WIPO adopted and earmarked for immediate implementation-do not
require a substantial amount of new institutional resources and were ready for
implementation. Meanwhile, other proposals, such as those concerning the
establishment of the Treaty on Access to Knowledge and Technology or a
multilateral agreement concerning publicly funded research, will require
lengthy and complex negotiation. Such negotiation may be even deadlocked
as a result of the significant differences between developed and less developed
countries.
After years of deliberation in the Provisional Committee on Proposals
Related to a WIPO Development Agenda and the Inter-sessional Intergovernmental Meeting on a Development Agenda for WIPO, the WIPO General
Assembly finally adopted the Development Agenda in October 2007.294 This
agenda includes forty-five recommendations that are grouped into six different
thematic clusters: (1) "technical assistance and capacity building"; (2) "normsetting, flexibilities, public policy and public domain"; (3) "technology
transfer, information and communication technologies and access to knowledge"; (4) "assessment, evaluation and impact studies"; (5) "institutional
matters including mandate and governance"; and (6) "other issues., 295 As Neil
Netanel summarized succinctly:

292. See WIPO DevelopmentAgenda Proposal, supra note 282, 1 12,17, 55; see also MAY, supra

note 16, at 77 (discussing the linkage between the WIPO Development Agenda and Doha deliberations).
293. As Recommendation No. 45 states:
To approach intellectual property enforcement in the context of broader societal interests
and especially development-oriented concerns, with a view that "the protection and
enforcement of intellectual property rights should contribute to the promotion of
technological innovation and to the transfer and dissemination of technology, to the mutual

advantage of producers and users of technological knowledge and in a manner conducive
to social and economic welfare, and to a balance of rights and obligations", in accordance
with Article 7 of the TRIPS Agreement.
WIPO, 45 Adopted Recommendations, supra note 224, 145.

294. Press Release, WIPO, Member States Adopt a Development Agenda for WIPO (Oct. 1, 2007),
available at http://www.wipo.intlpressroomlenlarticlesl2007/articleO07 1.html.
295. WIPO, 45 Adopted Recommendations, supranote 224.
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The Development Agenda decisively rejects th[e] IP-centric view. It
posits that strong intellectual property protection does not consistently
promote creative activity, facilitate technology transfer, or accelerate
development. The Development Agenda accordingly places the
benefits of a rich and accessible public domain, national flexibilities
in implementing IP treaty norms, access to knowledge, UN development goals, cubing of IP-related anti-competitive practices, and the
need to balance the costs and benefits of intellectual property
protection firmly within WIPO's central mission.... [F]or the first
time in WIPO's history, it places the need for balance, flexibility, and
a robust public domain on par with promoting IP protection in all
WIPO matters affecting developing countries.296
Crudely classified, the agenda's recommendations cover reforms that go
in two directions. One set of recommendations seeks to enhance the development dimension of WIPO and reform the institution itself. Such reform is
particularly important in light of the institution's "heavy reliance on filing fees
from the Patent Cooperation Treaty, the narrow definition of its mandate, and
the development of training programs that serve this narrow mandate."297 As
the Group of Friends of Development reminded us:
WIPO's existence is not dependent on rightholders, and rightholders
do not "fund" WIPO. WIPO as an international intergovernmental
organization is answerable to its Member States and its existence
depends on its Members only. The global protection systems which
contribute significantly to WIPO's income are systems that have been
created by Member States. Rightholders must not loose [sic] sight of
the central role played by Member States in the establishment of these
services. Consequently, as much as the International Bureau should
strive to provide efficient services as mandated by Members, payment
for those services by rightholders should in no way provide a basis for
anyone to claim that the users of those protection systems have the
right to determine the agenda or priorities of the Organization, or even
the manner in which the incomes of the Organization are to be
allocated under its Programme and Budget. WIPO must remain a
Member-driven Organization, where the role of the Secretariat is
focused on facilitating the work of the Members and implementing
decisions and instructions received from Member States.298

296. Neil Weinstock Netanel, Introduction:The WIPO Development Agenda and Its Development
Policy Context, in DEVELOPMENT AGENDA, supra note 14, at 1, 2.

297. Yu, The InternationalEnclosure Movement, supra note 236, at 871 (footnotes omitted).
298. WIPO Development Agenda Proposal,supra note 282, 1 27.
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This set of reforms is particularly timely in light of the recent allegations of
corruption, nepotism, and misuse of funds within the organization and the
controversy surrounding the age of the outgoing Director General.299
The second set of recommendations focuses on restoring balance in the
international intellectual property system. They "call[] into question whether
economic development and wealth creation are the sole metrics for measuring
development... [and] put an end to WIPO's monolithic 'IP as power tool of
development' approach." 3" Taking advantage of the technical expertise and
institutional legitimacy of WIPO, these recommendations seek to address
development-related problems created by the high intellectual property
standards of the TRIPs Agreement and the continued push for even higher
standards through the TRIPs-plus bilateral and plurilateral trade agreements
and the draft SPLT. The recommendations also underscore the growing
interest among less developed countries in obtaining protection for traditional
knowledge and cultural expressions. In addition, "by purposively directing
scrutiny to the methodology and content of the relationship between other
international law regimes and the activities of WIPO, the Development
Agenda has . . . occasioned reexamination of the unsettled relationship
between IP protection and development goals."' '
In March 2008, the newly created WIPO Committee on Development and
Intellectual Property held its first meeting. Although the meeting focused
primarily on procedural issues and was criticized by civil society organizations for insufficient transparency, member states remained hopeful and found
Four months later, the
the agenda developing in the right direction."
Committee met again. The reaction was cautious, but generally favorable.30 3
Although a controversy recently emerged over the budget allocation concerning the implementation of five items of the WIPO Development Agenda,

299. See Sisule F. Musungu, The Role of WIPO's Leadership in the Implementation of WIPO's
Development Agenda, in IMPLEMENTING WIPO's DEVELOPMENT AGENDA, supranote 207.
300. Netanel, supra note 296, at 4, 14.
301. Okediji, History Lessons, supranote 194, at 137, 140.
302. See William New, "Less Difficult" First WIPO Development Committee Meeting Begins,
INTELL. PROP. WATCH, httpJ/www.ip-watch.org/weblog/2008/03/03/Iess-difficult-first-wipo-developmentcommittee-meeting-begins/ (Mar. 3, 2008); William New, Proponents:Slow Better Than Poorfor WIPO
Development Agenda, INTELL. PROP. WATCH, http:lwww.ip-watch.orgtweblog/2008/03/2 /proponentsslow-better-than-poor-for-wipo-development-agenda/ (Mar. 21, 2008).
303. See William New, WIPO Development Committee Ends FirstYear on Mostly Agreeable Note,
INTELL. PROP. WATCH, http://www.ip-watch.org/weblogl2008/07/12/wipo-development-committee-endsfirst-year-on-mostly-agreeable-note/ (July 12,2008); William New, WIPO DevelopmentCommittee Makes
CarefulProgresson Implementation,INTELL PROP. WATCH, http://www.ip-watch.orgweblog2008/0711 1/
wipo-development-conmittee-makes-careful-progress-on-implementation/ (July 11, 2008).
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the budget was subsequently revised.3" It remains to be seen how effective
the agenda will be, but some commentators have expressed their optimism.30 5
If the agenda succeeds, it is likely to help rejuvenate WIPO. 3" Today,
there is a tendency to focus on the adverse impacts of the TRIPs Agreement
and the activities within the Doha Round or in the TRIPs Council, as
compared to developments at WIPO. However, it is important not to overlook
the potential impact of activities conducted at WIPO, especially when it is
rejuvenated. As Bernt Hugenholtz and Ruth Okediji pointed out in their
comparison of the two organizations:
[T]he WTO is primarily a trade regime. It does not have the primary
responsibility for the development of IP norms qua IPnorms; instead,
IP protection is viewed through its impact on free trade, which
provides a distinct gloss on the interpretation of TRIPS obligations
that often disregards cultural and other relevant criteria central to both
national and international copyright systems. Secondly, the WTO
lacks the important historical context and technical considerations to
evaluate the need for an international instrument on [limitations and
exceptions] and to analyze the nature and scope of what might be
contained in such an instrument. Indeed, the agreements that the
WTO is charged to enforce originate from WIPO and are equally
subject to WIPO' s oversight.3 7
WIPO has several additional advantages. According to Jayashree Watal,
WIPO "can... start discussions on IP subjects more easily than the WTO ...
[and] draw upon experts from both the government and the private sector for
more broad-based discussions."30 8 WIPO also provides unique services for the

304. See William New, New WIPO Director'sRevised Budget on Track to PassageAfter Debate,
INTELL. PROP. WATCH, httpJ/www.ip-watch.org/weblog/2008/12/1 /new-wipo-directors-revised-budget-ontrack-to-passage-after-debate/ (Dec. 11, 2008).
305. See, e.g., Sara Bannerman, The WIPO DevelopmentAgenda Forumand Its ProspectsforTaking
intoAccount Different Levels, in IMPLEMENTING WIPO's DEVELOPMENT AGENDA, supranote 207 (noting
that "one of the most important battles of the Development Agenda at WIPO-the battle over the inclusion
of development in WIPO's mandate-has already been won"). But see MAY, supra note 16, at 80-81
(noting that "many developing countries' representatives see [the development of a Committee on
Development and Intellectual Property] as a mechanism by which the WIPO secretariat and the developed
countries can effectively (again) sideline developmental concerns").
306. See MAY, supra note 16, at 104.
307. P. BERNT HUGENHOLTZ & RuTH L.OKEDUI, CONCEIVING AN INTERNATIONAL INSTRUMENT ON
LIMiTATIONs AND EXCEPTIONS TO COPYRIGHT: FINAL REPORT 39-40 (2008), available at
http-/www.ivir.nl/publicaties/hugenholtz/finalreport2008.pdf; see alsoWATAL, supranote 261, at 5 (noting
that "the highly politicized bargaining during preparations for WTO ministerial conferences have led to
some hesitation in re-opening TRIPS in that forum").
308. WATAL, supra note 261, at 5.
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fast-growing industries of many developed and middle-income developing
countries. As Sisule Musungu and Graham Dutfield pointed out: "[iut is one
thing to move substantive standards to WTO in the form of TRIPS and quite
another to take the PCT or Madrid systems to the WTO or to San Francisco,
for example. There is no other3 9viable alternative ... to the ... services that
WIPO provides for industry.' 0
C. Development Agendas in Other InternationalFora
Apart from the WTO and WIPO, other international fora have played
increasingly important roles in ensuring that intellectual property protection
not hinder economic, social, cultural, and technological development in less
developed countries. Indeed, some of them are much more favorable to less
developed countries than the WTO and WIPO. This section focuses on
developments in regimes in the areas of human rights, public health, biological
diversity, food and agriculture, and information and communications. To
illustrate the continuous proliferation of intellectual property-related fora, the
end of this section also highlights new developments in the World Customs
Organization.
Although this Article, despite its Dickensian length, does not allow for
a more extended treatment of each of these regimes, this section takes stock
of the key developments concerning the many diverse development agendas
established outside the WTO and WIPO. When examining these developments, however, it is important to keep in mind the existence of additional
pro-development efforts that are being undertaken by UNCTAD, the
International Labor Organization, the U.N. Development Programme, U.N.
Industrial Development Organization ("UNIDO") and other U.N. organizations. 0
1. Human Rights
With the growing protection of intellectual property rights and the
deepening of HIV/AIDS crisis, human rights organizations and advocates have
actively explored the human rights implications for intellectual property
protection. As the U.N. Sub-Commission on the Promotion and Protection of
Human Rights stated in its Statement on Intellectual Property Rights and
Human Rights, "the implementation of the TRIPS Agreement does not
adequately reflect the fundamental nature and indivisibility of all human rights
... [and] there are apparent conflicts between the intellectual property rights
regime embodied in the TRIPS Agreement, on the one hand, and international

309. MUSUNGU & DUrFIELD, supra note 120, at 23.

310. For a background on these organizations, see MUSUNGU, supra note 210, at 25-35.
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human rights law, on the other." '' In light of these conflicts, this statement
reminded governments of "the primacy of human rights obligations over
economic policies and agreements,"3' 12 such as the TRIPs Agreement, and
noted the "social function of intellectual property."3" 3 The statement also
requested "[g]overnments and national, regional and international economic
policy forums to take international human rights obligations and3' 14principles
fully into account in international economic policy formulation."
Following this statement, the High Commissioner for Human Rights
offered a critical examination of the TRIPs Agreement.3" 5 The report provided
five observations concerning the potential challenge for developing a human
rights approach to the TRIPs Agreement. First, as the High Commissioner
pointed out:
[T]he overall thrust of the TRIPS Agreement is the promotion of
innovation through the provision of commercial incentives. The
various links with the subject matter of human rights-the promotion
of public health, nutrition, environment and development-are
generally expressed in terms of exceptions to the rule rather than the
guiding principles themselves and are made subject to the provisions
of the Agreement.316
Second, "while the Agreement identifies the need to balance rights with
'
Although
obligations, it gives no guidance on how to achieve this balance."317
the Agreement "sets out in considerable detail the content of intellectual
property rights," such as the requirements for the grant of rights, the duration
of protection, the modes of enforcement, it "only alludes to the responsibilities
of IP holders that should balance those rights in accordance with its own
objectives. . . . [U]nlike the rights it sets out, the Agreement does not
311. IntellectualPropertyRights and Human Rights, Sub-Comm'n on Human Rights Res. 2000f7,

2, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/RES/2000/7 (Aug. 17,2000), availableat http://www.unhchr.ch/Huridocda/
Huridoca.nsf/0/c462b62cf8a07b 13c 12569700046704e?Opendocument.
312. Id. 3.
313. Id. 5.
314. Id. 4.
315. The High Commissioner, Reportofthe High Commissioneron Economic, Social and Cultural
Rights: The Impact of the Agreement on Trade-RelatedAspects ofIntellectual PropertyRights on Human
Rights, delivered to the Sub-Commission on the Promotionand Protectionof Human Rights, U.N. Doc.

E/CN.4/Sub.2/2001/13 (June 27, 2001), available at http://www.unhchr.ch/Huridocda/Huridoca.nsf/
e06a5300f90fa0238025668700518ca4/590516104e92e87bc1256aa8004a819l/$FILEGOI 14345.pdf
[hereinafter High Commissioner'sReport].

316. Id. 122; see also MUSUNGU, supra note 210, at 4-5 ("So far the only widely accepted notion
has been that intellectual property is trade-related, justifying the TRIPS Agreement in the WTO but not the
notion that intellectual property rules are also education-related, health-related, defence-related and
environment-related and so forth.").
317. High Commissioner'sReport, supra note 315, 1 23.
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establish the content of these responsibilities, or how they should be
implemented."3 8
Third, because of the required minimum standards, the TRIPs Agreement
has taken away a high degree of autonomy and a considerable amount of
policy space from each WTO member state. The lack of such autonomy, in
turn, may affect the state's "abilities to promote and protect human rights,
including the right to development."3 9 As the High Commissioner reminded
us, article 2(3) of the Declaration on the Right to Development provides
explicitly that:
States have the right and the duty to formulate appropriate national
development policies that aim at the constant improvement of the
well-being of the entire population and of all individuals, on the basis
of their active, free and meaningful participation in development
and
32
in the fair distribution of the benefits resulting therefrom. 1
Fourth, and related to the third, "the protection contained in the TRIPS
Agreement focuses on forms of protection that have developed in
industrialized countries. '3 2' As a result, less developed countries are required
to offer protection that does not always take into account the local needs,
interests, and conditions. Even worse, such protection may significantly
reduce a country's ability to promote public health or participation in
development.
Fifth, limited attention has been devoted to the protection of "the cultural
heritage and technology of local communities and indigenous peoples" in the
current international intellectual property regime.32 2 There have also been
growing concerns about the use of trade pressure to impose TRIPs-plus
legislation that could result in the development of "IP systems that are
inconsistent with States' responsibilities under human rights law. 323
Notwithstanding these concerns, the High Commissioner recognized the
flexibilities built into the TRIPs Agreement and that "much still depends on
how the TRIPS Agreement is actually implemented. 3 4 While these
flexibilities are important and may help retain the balance in the international
intellectual property system, it is important to remember that taking advantage

318. Id.
319. Id. 124.
320. Declaration on the Right to Development art. 2(3), G.A. Res. 41/128, U.N. GAOR, 41st Sess.,
Supp. No. 53, at 186, U.N. Doc. A/41/53 (1986).
321. High Commissioner's Report, supra note 315,125.
322. Id. 126.
323. Id. 27.
324. Id. 128.
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of these flexibilities requires expertise and resources. As noted in UNCTAD's
most recent Least Developed Countries Report:
Even with its inbuilt flexibilities, the TRIPS Agreement is highly
problematic for LDCs owing to the high transaction costs involved in
complex and burdensome procedural requirements for implementing
and enforcing appropriate national legal provisions. LDCs generally
lack the relevant expertise and the administrative capacity to
implement them.325
A few years after the release of the High Commissioner's Report, the
Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights issued an authoritative
interpretive comment on article 15(1)(c) of the International Covenant on
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights ("ICESCR")-a provision that requires
each state party to the Covenant to "recognize the right of everyone ...[t]o
benefit from the protection of the moral and material interests resulting from
any scientific, literary or artistic production of which he [or she] is the
author.'326 As the Comment stated:
Ultimately, intellectual property is a social product and has a social
function. States parties thus have a duty to prevent unreasonably high
costs for access to essential medicines, plant seeds or other means of
food production, or for schoolbooks and learning materials, from
undermining the rights of large segments of the population to health,
food and education. Moreover, States parties should prevent the use
of scientific and technical progress for purposes contrary to human
rights and dignity, including the rights to life, health and privacy, e.g.
by excluding inventions from patentability whenever their commercialization would jeopardize the full realization of these rights.327

325. LEAST DEVELOPED COUNTRIES REPORT, supra note 157, at 99; accord Rochelle Cooper
Dreyfuss, TRIPS-Round II: Should Users Strike Back?, 71 U. CHi.L. REv. 22, 25 (2004) (noting that
many less developed countries "experience with intellectual property protection [and] sufficient human
capital (in the form of legal talent) to codify wiggles into law").
326. International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights art. 15(1)(c), Dec. 16, 1966,
993 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter ICESCR].
327. Comm. on Econ., Soc. & Cultural Rights, GeneralComment No. 17: The Right ofEveryone to
Benefitfrom the Protectionof the Moral andMaterialInterests Resultingfrom Any Scientific, Literaryor
Artistic Productionof Which He Is the Author (Article 15,Paragraph1 (c), of the Covenant), 135, U.N.
Doc. E/C.12/GC/17 (Jan. 12,2006), availableat http://www.unhchr.ch/tbs/doc.nsf/898586bldc7b4043c
1256a450044f331/03902145edbbe797c125711500584ea8/$FILFJG0640060.pdf [hereinafter General
Comment No. 17].
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According to the interpretative comment, "the private interests of authors
should not be unduly favoured and the public interest in enjoying broad access
to their productions should be given due consideration. 328
Finally, in September 2007, the General Assembly of the United Nations
adopted the Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples,3 29 which has
been under development since the mid-1990s. 330 With respect to the
protection of intangible cultural heritage, the Declaration declares:
Indigenous peoples have the right to maintain, control, protect and
develop their cultural heritage, traditional knowledge and traditional
cultural expressions, as well as the manifestations of their sciences,
technologies and cultures, including human and genetic resources,
seeds, medicines, knowledge of the properties of fauna and flora, oral
traditions, literatures, designs, sports and traditional games and visual
and performing arts. They also have the right to maintain, control,
protect and develop their intellectual property over such cultural
heritage, traditional knowledge, and traditional cultural expressions.33'
This focus on the protection of intangible cultural heritage echoes provisions
in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights,332 the International Covenant
on Civil and Political Rights ("ICCPR"), 33 3 the ICESCR,334 and other international human rights instruments. 335 Although the Declaration does not cover

328. Id.
329. United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, U.N. Doc. A/RES/61/295
(Sept. 13,2007), availableat http://www.un.org/esa/socdev/Unpfii/documents/DRIPSen.pdf [hereinafter
U.N. Declaration].
330. ECOSOC, Sub-Comm'n on Prevention of Discrimination & Prot. of Minorities, Draft United
Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/1993/29 (Aug. 26,
1994), reprinted in 34 I.L.M. 541 (1995).
331. U.N. Declaration, supra note 329, art. 31(1).
332. Universal Declaration of Human Rights art. 27(1), G.A. Res. 217A, U.N. GAOR, 3d Sess., 1st
plen. mtg., U.N. Doc A/810 (Dec. 10, 1948).
333. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights art. 27, Dec. 16, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171
(1976).
334. ICESCR, supra note 326, art. 15(l)(a).
335. Article 15(2) of the International Labor Organization Convention No. 169, for example,
provides:
In cases in which the State retains the ownership of mineral or sub-surface resources or
rights to other resources pertaining to lands, governments shall establish or maintain
procedures through which they shall consult these peoples, with a view to ascertaining
whether and to what degree their interests would be prejudiced, before undertaking or
permitting any programmes for the exploration or exploitation of such resources pertaining
to their lands. The peoples concerned shall wherever possible participate in the benefits of
such activities, and shall receive fair compensation for any damages which they may sustain
as a result of such activities.
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intellectual property rights per se, the protection of indigenous heritage, such
as the protection of traditional knowledge and cultural expressions, is likely
to have major ramifications for the protection of intellectual property rights.
2. Public Health
Although the World Health Organization ("WHO") has a mandate over
public health issues, its interest in intellectual property issues only began with
the arrival of the TRIPs Agreement. In 1996, the World Health Assembly
adopted a resolution on Revised Drug Strategy, which requested the WHO
Director General to "report on the impact of the work of the WTO with
respect to national drug policies and essential drugs and make recommendations for collaboration between WTO and WHO, as appropriate. '336 The
resolution led to the publication of a guide to the public health consequences
of the TRIPs Agreement, which encouraged WTO member states to minimize
the effects of patents on the availability of essential drugs by using the
flexibilities built into the Agreement. 337 Developed countries, however, found
the publication controversial. While they initially opposed granting the WHO
competence in reviewing health-related intellectual property issues, the
European Communities soon changed their position in light of the massive
HIV/AIDS pandemic in Africa.338
In February 2004, the World Health Assembly established the
Commission on Intellectual Property Rights, Innovation and Public Health to
"collect data and proposals from the different actors involved and produce an
analysis of intellectual property rights, innovation, and public health,

Convention (No. 169) Concerning Indigenous and Tribal Peoples in Independent Countries, June 27, 1989,
28 LL.M. 1382 (1989). In addition, as I noted earlier:
[R]eferences to cultural participation and development appear in many international and
human rights instruments, including the U.N. Charter, the UNESCO Constitution, the
Declaration of the Principles of International Cultural Co-operation, the Convention on the
Rights of the Child, the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination
Against Women, and the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial
Discrimination.
Peter K. Yu, Reconceptualizing Intellectual PropertyInterests in a Human Rights Framework,40 U.C.
DAViS L. REv. 1039, 1145-46 (2007) [hereinafter Yu, Reconceptualizing Intellectual PropertyInterests]
(citing Stephen A. Hansen, The Right to Take Part in Cultural Life: Toward Defining Minimum Core
Obligations Related to Article 15(1)(a) of the InternationalCovenant on Economic, Social and Cultural
Rights, in CORE OBLIGATIONS: BUILDING AFRAMEWORK FOR ECONOMIC, SOCIAL AND CULTURAL RIGHTS

279, 282 (Audrey Chapman & Sage Russell eds., 2002)).
336. Helfer, Regime Shifting, supranote 265, at 42-43 (citing Revised Drug Strategy, World Health
Assembly Res. WHA49.14, 2(10) (May 1996)).
337. Id. The guide was published as GERMAN VELASQuEz&PASCALEBOuLEr, GLOBALIZATION AND
ACCESS TO DRUGS: PERSPECTIVES ON THE WTO/TRIPS AGREEMENT (rev. ed. 1999), WHOIDAP/98.9,

http://www.who.intlmedicinesllibrary/dap/who-dap-989-rev/who-dap-98-9rev.pdf.
338. See Heifer, Regime Shifting, supra note 265, at 43.
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including the question of appropriate funding and incentive mechanisms for
the creation of new medicines and other products against diseases that
disproportionately affect developing countries." 339 Following a number of
comments and reports, the Commission released its final report in April 2006.
As stated in the report, the Committee sought to "illuminat[e] how
intellectual property rights might affect public health... [and] to consider
how diseases which disproportionately affect developing countries could best
be addressed, and to seek solutions .,,3' Despite the broad scope of the report,
it sent a strong and important signal to WHO member states that the protection
of intellectual property rights is only a means to an end, but not an end itself.
Such protection therefore needs to be balanced against other important, and
often more important, goals, such as the promotion of public health. 34 In
addition, as Nicoletta Dentico, the health policy advisor of IQsensato, noted:
[The Report] made 60 recommendations requesting that policymakers consider making adjustments to the current R&D system and
developing new mechanisms to stimulate needs-driven medical
innovation. It also recognized that governments have a crucial role to
play with regard to the different interventions across disease
areas-well beyond the most neglected tropical diseases-needed to
promote essential innovation and access to lifesaving medicines.342
The establishment of this Committee in the WHO is significant. At the
very least, it shows "that intellectual property matters, particularly as they
relate to innovation, are not an exclusive preserve of WIPO.'

'343

Indeed,

allowing WHO to take up more responsibility in the intellectual property area,
especially where it intersects with public health, may be beneficial. As Sisule
Musungu pointed out:
Not only will [organizations such as WHO] bring the best science to
bear on the problems of today but they will have a core competence

339. Intellectual Property Rights, Innovation and Public Health, World Health Assembly Res.

WHA56.27,
ea56r27.pdf.

2(2) (May 28, 2003), available at http:llftp.who.int/gb/archive/pdf-files/WHA56/

340. COMM'N ON INTELLECTUAL PROP. RIGHTS, INNOVATION AND PUB. HEALTH, WORLD HEALTH
ORG., PUBLIC HEALTH, INNOVATION AND INTELLEcruAL PROPERTY RIGHTS ix (2006), available at

http://www.who.int/intelectualproperty/documents/thereport/ENPublicHealthReport.pdf.
341. See Press Release, Health Action Int'l Africa, WHO's CIPlHReport Could Change the Lives
of Neglected Patients (Apr. 11, 2006), http://www.haiafrica.org/index.php?option=comcontent&task
=view&id=106&Itemid--60.
342. Nicoletta Dentico, Implementing the WHO GlobalStrategy on PublicHealth, Innovation&IP:
An Opportunity That Should Not Be Squanderedby PoorImplementation, IN Focus (IQsensato), Mar. 12,

2009, httpJ/www.iqsensato.orglwp-contentluploadsl2007/10/in-focus-vol-3-nol.pdf
343. MUSUNGU, supra note 210, at 20.

(footnotes omitted).
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and a legitimacy that WIPO does not as well as better penetration at
the local level. With these research results and information, developing countries will be better placed to take a lead in policy experimentation and innovations to improve the intellectual property
regimes so as to offset the overly protectionist tendencies of the
industrialised countries. The overall result will be to maintain the
supply of global public goods in an emerging transnational system of
innovation. Such processes are also guaranteed to better, though not
necessarily fully, take into account the public interest in the
innovation, development and intellectual property debates and
processes. 3"
Although there have been limited developments in the public health
regime thus far, and the WHO did not attain much global attention until the
outbreak of the SARS (severe acute respiratory syndrome) epidemic in spring
2003,345 the organization has begun to focus on intellectual property issues.
Nongovernmental organizations ("NGOs") have also utilized the forum,
hoping that the organization will provide greater expertise in the public health
area and the development of a new perspective that is not available in regimes
that focus solely on intellectual property and international trade.34 Although
it remains to be seen how much the WHO Development Agenda can
contribute to the promotion of development dimension of intellectual property
rights, the importance of such a highly specialized and credentialed agency is
not to be ignored.
3. Biological Diversity
As discussed earlier, less developed countries have developed a growing
concern about the interface of the TRIPs Agreement and the Convention on
Biological Diversity ("CBD"). Such interface is important, because many less
developed countries are bound by both agreements. The CBD "was adopted

344. Id. (footnote omitted).
345. As Scott Burris wrote:
[Diuring the SARS outbreak that the notoriously "weak"... WHO...was able to exercise
considerable control over states simply by issuing press releases: lacking formal power to
compel the cooperation of affected states, WHO was able to use its ability to issue travel
warnings to mobilize the considerable influence of travelers and those who decide where to
place factory orders.
Scott Burris, Governance, Microgovernanceand Health, 77 TEMP. L. REv. 335, 339 (2004).
346. Tim Hubbard and James Love proposed a treaty that sought to help revamp the way governments
fund research and development while alleviating concerns by the United States and other major countries
over the free-riding problem. Tim Hubbard & James Love, A New Trade Framework for Global
HealthcareR&D, 2 PLOS BIoLOGY 147 (2004), availableat http://www.pubmedcentral.nih.gov/picrender.
fcgi?artid=340954&blobtype=pdf.
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in 1992 under the auspices of [the United Nations Environment Programme]
when 150 government leaders signed it at the Rio Earth Summit. ' 347 Article
1 states the Convention's objectives as "the conservation of biological
diversity, the sustainable use of its components and the fair and equitable
sharing of the benefits arising out of the utilization of genetic resources."34' 8
As Professor Helfer explained, the origin of the Convention stemmed from the
diverging positions taken by developed and less developed countries. While
"biodiversity-rich but biotechnology-poor developing countries sought
financial benefits and technology transfers as incentives to conserve rather
than exploit the genetic resources within their borders[, b]iodiversity-poor but
biotechnology-rich industrialized states... sought to minimize benefits and
'
transfers while maximizing access to those resources."349
To strike a compromise, the CBD "allow[s] industrialized countries to
support the transfer of proprietary technologies to developing states as a quid
pro quo for access."35 It recognizes the contracting states' "sovereign right
to exploit their own resources pursuant to their own environmental policies,
and the[ir] responsibility to ensure that activities within their jurisdiction or
control do not cause damage to the environment of other States or of areas
beyond the limits of national jurisdiction. 351' Article 8(j) further requires
countries to:
respect, preserve and maintain knowledge, innovations and practices
of indigenous and local communities embodying traditional lifestyles
relevant for the conservation and sustainable use of biological
diversity and promote their wider application with the approval and
involvement of the holders of such knowledge, innovations and
practices and encourage the equitable sharing of the benefits arising
from the utilization of such knowledge, innovations and practices.352
With respect to technologies that are subject to intellectual property
protection, the CBD states that access to and transfer of these technologies to
less developed countries "shall be provided on terms which recognize and are
consistent with the adequate and effective protection of intellectual property
rights."35' 3 Acknowledging the potential influence of these rights on its
implementation, the Convention obligates the contracting parties to "cooperate

347.
348.
349.
350.
351.
352.
353.

MUSuNGu, supra note 210, at 34.
CBD, supra note 279, art. 1.
Heifer, Regime Shifting, supra note 265, at 28.
Id.
CBD, supra note 279, art. 3.
Id. art. 80).
Id. art. 16(2).
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... to ensure that such rights are supportive of and do not run counter to its
objectives. 354
Thus far, 191 countries have joined the CBD,355 making it "perhaps the
most authoritative international instrument yet that recognizes the traditional
knowledge of indigenous and local communities. 356 The United States signed
the CBD but has yet to ratify it, while France, Italy, Switzerland, and the
United Kingdom ratified the Convention subject to interpretive statements.357
As of 2002, more than thirty of the contracting parties-mostly less developed
countries-"had adopted or were considering enacting laws governing third
party access to biodiversity-related resources located within their borders. '"358
Notwithstanding the importance of the CBD, the TRIPs Agreement has
yet to develop an explicit relationship with the Convention, other than to
mention plants, plant varieties, and biological and microbiological processes
in article 27(3)(b). 359 To promote this linkage, the Ministerial Declaration
"instruct[ed] the Council for TRIPS . . . to examine . . . the relationship
between the TRIPS Agreement and the Convention on Biological Diversity
[and] the protection of traditional knowledge and folklore. 3 ' This instruction
echoes the official statement of the Conference of the Parties, which
"[s]tresses the need to ensure consistency in implementing [the two agreements], with a view to promoting increased mutual supportiveness and
integration of biological diversity concerns and the protection of intellectual
property rights. 36' In recent years, the Conference of the Parties, along with

354. Id. art. 16(5).
355. Secretariat of the CBD, List of Parties,http://www.cbd.int/convention/parties/list/ (last visited
Feb. 17, 2009).
356. CHIDI OGUAMANAM, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND INDIGENOUS KNOWLEDGE: INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY, PLANT BIODIVERSITY, AND TRADITIONAL MEDICINE 5 (2006).

357. Heifer, Regime Shifting, supranote 265, at 31-32.
358. Id. at 31 n. 128 (citing MICHEL PEIT ET AL., WHY GOVERNMENTS CAN'T MAKE POLICY: THE
CASE OF PLANT GENETIC RESOURCES IN THE INTERNATIONAL ARENA 49 & 80 n. 1 (2001)).
359. Article 27(3)(b) of the TRIPs Agreement provides:
Members may also exclude from patentability... plants and animals other than microorganisms, and essentially biological processes for the production of plants or animals other
than non-biological and microbiological processes. However, Members shall provide for
the protection of plant varieties either by patents or by an effective sui generis system or by
any combination thereof. The provisions of this subparagraph shall be reviewed four years
after the date of entry into force of the WTO Agreement.
TRIPs Agreement, supra note 2, art. 27(3)(b).
360. Ministerial Declaration, supranote 267, 1 19.
361. The Relationship of the Convention on Biological Diversity with the Commission on
Sustainable Development and Biodiversity-related Conventions, Other International Agreements,
Institutionsand Processesof Relevance, Decision PI/1 5,19, in U.N. Env't Programme, Conference of the
Parties to the Convention on Biological Diversity, Report of the Fourth Meeting of the Conference of the
Parties to the Convention on BiologicalDiversity 128, 130, U.N. Doc. UNEP/CBD/COP/4/27 (June 15,
1998), available at http://www.biodiv.org/doc/meetings/cop/cop-04/officialcop-04-27-en.pdf.
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NGOs, "have expressed concern about the adverse effects of TRIPs on the
intellectual property rules to promote
CBD and have sought to harness
3 62
compliance with the Convention.
To promote consistency between the CBD and the TRIPs Agreement,
less developed countries have advanced a proposal to amend the TRIPs
Agreement by adding a new article 29bis, which, if adopted, would create an
obligation to disclose in patent applications the source of origin of biological
resources and traditional knowledge used in inventions for which intellectual
property rights are applied.3 63 Drawing on the Bonn Guidelines on Access to
Genetic Resources and Fair and Equitable Sharing of the Benefits Arising out
of their Utilization, 36 this proposal parallels Switzerland's recent proposal to
amend the PCT Regulations.65 The proposed article 29bis further requires
patent applicants to disclose their compliance with access and benefit-sharing
requirements under the relevant national laws.366 Although a large number of
less developed countries have supported the proposal,367 the United States and

362. Heifer, Regime Shifting, supra note 265, at 29.
363. See Communication from Brazil, China, Colombia, Cuba, India, Pakistan, Peru, Thailand and
Tanzania, Doha Work Programme-TheOutstandingImplementation Issue on the RelationshipBetween
the TRIPS Agreement and the Convention on BiologicalDiversity, WT/GC/W/564/Rev.2 (July 5, 2006)
[hereinafter Article 29bis Proposal] (requiring patent applicants to "disclose the country providing the
resources and/or associated traditional knowledge, from whom in the providing country they were obtained,
and, as known after reasonable inquiry, the country of origin").
364. As stated in the Bonn Guidelines:
Contracting Parties with users of genetic resources under their jurisdiction should take
appropriate legal, administrative, or policy measures, as appropriate, to support compliance
with prior informed consent of the Contracting Party providing such resources and mutually
agreed terms on which access was granted. These countries could consider... [m]easures
to encourage the disclosure of the country of origin of the genetic resources and of the origin
of traditional knowledge, innovations and practices of indigenous and local communities
in applications for intellectual property rights....
SECRETARIAT OF THE CBD, BONN GUIDELINES ON ACCESS TO GENETIC REsOuRCEs AND FAIR AND
EQUITABLE SHARING OF THE BENEFITS ARISING OUT OF THEIR UTILIZATION 16(d)(2) (2002), availableat
http://www.cbd.int/doc/publications/cbd-bonn-gdls-en.pdf. The Bonn Guidelines were "approved by the
CBD's Conference of Parties ...with a view to help countries that were drafting Access and Benefit
Sharing . . . legislation." BRYAN BACHNER, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS AND CHINA: THE
MODERNIZATION OF TRADITIONAL KNOWLEDGE 22-23 (2009).

365. See WIPO, Working Group on Reform of the Patent Cooperation Treaty, Proposals by
Switzerland Regarding the Declarationof the Source of Genetic Resources and TraditionalKnowledge
in PatentApplications, PC7/R/WG/5/1 I Rev. (Nov. 19, 2003).
366. See Article 29bis Proposal, supra note 363 (requiring patent applications to "provide
information including evidence of compliance with the applicable legal requirements in the providing
country for prior informed consent for access and fair and equitable benefit-sharing arising from the
commercial or other utilization of such resources and/or associated traditional knowledge").
367. See William New, WTO Biodiversity Amendment Backed; EU Seeks 'New Thinking' on GIs,
INTELL. PROP. WATCH, http://www.ip-watch.org/weblog/2007/10/26/wto-biodiversity-amendment-backedeu-seeks-new-thinking-on-gis/ (Oct. 26, 2007) (stating that "[tihe total number of WTO members now
cosponsoring the [article 29bis] proposal appear to be in the majority of the [then-] 151 WTO members").
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Japan strongly oppose it, expressing fear that the additional
requirement
3 68
would destabilize the existing international patent system.
Notwithstanding their opposition, the achievement of this proposal has
at least three benefits. First, it promotes coherence between policies that seek
to implement the CBD and the TRIPs Agreement. Given the limited resources
and technical capacities less developed countries have, such coherence is
particularly important. Second, because the United States has yet to ratify the
CBD, developing a linkage between the TRIPs Agreement and the CBD may
enable the benefits of the CBD to be spread to WTO members that have yet
to join the CBD. Finally, the development of a disclosure requirement would
strengthen the efforts to provide stronger protection of traditional knowledge
at WIPO and other international fora. Such protection would also help
safeguard the protection of the intangible cultural heritage of the more than
100 countries that are now parties to the Convention on the Safeguarding of
Intangible Cultural Heritage.369
Another way to promote consistency between the CBD and the TRIPs
Agreement is through the development of protection for traditional knowledge
and cultural expressions. In September 2000, the Intergovernmental
Committee on Intellectual Property and Genetic Resources, Traditional
Knowledge and Folklore was established by WIPO. 370 Since its inception, the
Committee has sought to address the misappropriation of folklore, traditional
knowledge, and indigenous practices by providing "a forum for international
37 1
policy debate and development of legal mechanisms and practical tools.
Although folklore, traditional knowledge, and indigenous practices "are
not necessarily IP resources in the sense that they are understood in developed
countries, ... they are certainly resources on the basis of which protected
intellectual property can be, and has been, created. '372 If instituted, protection
of these materials would have an impact on a wide variety of policy areas,
including agricultural productivity, biological diversity, cultural patrimony,
food security, environmental sustainability, business ethics, global competition, human rights, international trade, public health, scientific research,

368. See Emanuela Arezzo, Struggling Around the "Natural" Divide: The Protection of Tangible
and Intangible Indigenous Property,25 CARDOZo ARTS & ENT. L.J. 367, 388 (2007) (noting that "U.S.

delegates strongly oppose the introduction ofa further disclosure requirement, asserting that its introduction
would perilously destabilize the patent system by rendering the application mechanism excessively
burdensome and the validity of its protection uncertain").

369. See 2003 UNESCO Convention, supra note 145.
370. See Peter K. Yu, TraditionalKnowledge, Intellectual Property,and Indigenous Culture:An
Introduction, 11 CARDOZO J. INT'L & COMP. L. 239, 240 (2003).

371. WIPO, Traditional Knowledge, Genetic Resources and Traditional Cultural Expressionsi
Folklore, http://www.wipo.int/tk/en/ (ast visited Sept. 6, 2008).
372. IPR COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 202, at 8.
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sustainable development, and wealth distribution. The traditional knowledge
debate to date has been particularly intense, and the international community
has yet to reach a consensus on how to protect indigenous materials, due
partly to the limited understanding of the issue, the complexities involved in
defining the scope of protection and classifying the materials, and the
politically-sensitive nature of indigenous and minority rights.373
4. Food and Agriculture
In addition to the CBD, there has been growing discussion of the needs
to develop standards in the plant genetics resources regime in areas that
intersect with intellectual property protection. On the one hand, there are
strong interests in providing incentives to protect plant breeders and rules that
affect the ownership and transfer of plant genetic resources. For example, the
International Union for the Protection of New Varieties of Plants ("UPOV")
requires each state party to "grant and protect breeders' rights. 374 Adopted
in 1991, the latest act of UPOV significantly affects the farmers' ability to sell
seeds or exchange them with others.375
On the other hand, there are serious concerns about the need for farmers
to reuse seeds. For example, the International Undertaking on Plant Genetic
Resources for Food and Agriculture, which was adopted by the Food and
Agricultural Organization ("FAO") Conference in 1983, declares that "plant
genetic resources are a heritage of mankind and consequently should be
available without restriction. 37 6 Because the 1991 Act of UPOV greatly
curtails the farmers' ability to share seeds with others, there has been growing
discussion of the need to develop farmers' rights.
Farmers' rights, which are defined generally as "rights arising from the
past, present and future contributions of farmers in conserving, improving, and
making available plant genetic resources, particularly those in the centres of
origin/diversity, '37 7 form "a loosely defined concept that seeks to acknowledge
the contributions that traditional farmers have made to the preservation and

373. See generallyPeter K. Yu, CulturalRelics Intellectual Property,and IntangibleHeritage,81
TEMPLE L. REV. (forthcoming 2008).
374. International Convention for the Protection of New Varieties of Plants art. 2, Dec. 2, 1961, 33
U.S.T. 2703, 815 U.N.T.S. 89 (amended Mar. 19, 1991).
375. See id. art. 14(1). Article 15(2), nevertheless, includes an optional exception that "permit[s]
farmers to use for propagating purposes, on their own holdings, the product of the harvest which they have
obtained by planting, on their own holdings, the protected variety." Id. art. 15(2).
376. International Undertaking on Plant Genetic Resources, Report of the Conference of FAO, FAO
Conference, 22d Sess., art. 1, U.N. Doc. C183/REP (1983), available at ftp://ftp.fao.org/ag/cgrfa/iu/
iutextE.pdf [hereinafter International Undertaking].
377. Fanners' Rights, Food & Agric. Org. Resolution 5/89 (Nov. 29, 1989), available at

ftp-//ftp.fao.org/ag/cgrfalRes/C5-89E.pdf.
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improvement of PGRs.""' They serve as "a counterweight to plant breeders'
rights, compensating the upstream input providers who make downstream
innovations possible."3'79 As Kal Raustiala and David Victor explained, "[t]he
underlying idea is to compensate farmers for the incremental, collective
innovations they create through their normal agricultural practices."38
Although Resolution 5/89 of the FAQ Conference recognized farmers'
rights, it vested those rights in "in the International Community, as trustee for
present and future generations of farmers, for the purpose of ensuring full
benefits to farmers, and supporting the continuation of their contributions, as
wel[l] as the attainment of the overall purposes of the International
Undertaking [on Plant Genetic Resources for Food and Agriculture]." 38' This
resolution therefore created tension between the intellectual property and food
and agriculture regimes.
In November 2001, after seven years of contentious negotiation, a new
International Treaty on Plant Genetic Resources for Food and Agriculture was
adopted.382 This new treaty sought to promote "the conservation and
sustainable use of plant genetic resources for food and agriculture and the fair
and equitable sharing of the benefits arising out of their use, in harmony with
the Convention on Biological Diversity, for sustainable agriculture and food
security. 38 3 Closely linked to the CBD, the treaty recognizes:
the enormous contribution that the local and indigenous communities
and farmers of all regions of the world, particularly those in the
centres of origin and crop diversity, have made and will continue to
make for the conservation and development of plant genetic resources
which constitute the basis of food and agriculture production throughout the world.384
The treaty also "recognize[s] the sovereign rights of States over their own
plant genetic resources for food and agriculture, including.., the authority to
determine access to those resources. 385

378. Heifer, Regime Shifting, supra note 265, at 36.
379. Id. at 37.
380. Kal Raustiala & David G. Victor, The Regime Complexfor PlantGenetic Resources, 58 INT'L
ORG. 277, 304 (2004).
381. Farmers'Rights, supra note 377.
382. International Treaty on Plant Genetic Resources for Food and Agriculture, Nov. 3, 2001,
available at http://www.fao.org/ag/cgrfa/itpgr.htm.
383. Id. art. 1.1.
384. Id. art. 9.1.
385. Id. art. 10.1.
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The treaty further requires member states "to establish a multilateral
system, which is efficient, effective, and transparent. 386 As Professor Helfer
explained:
In essence, the multilateral system is a communal seed treasury
composed of thirty-five food and twenty-nine feed crops held both by
states and CGIAR gene banks. In exchange for access to this
common seed pool, private parties that create commercial products
which incorporate PGRs received from the multilateral system must
pay a percentage of their profits into a fund to be administered by the
treaty's Governing Body. The fund will be used to promote
conservation and sustainable use of PGRs, particularly by farmers in
developing countries, whose conservation efforts the treaty expressly
recognizes.387
Although this new treaty struck a compromise by recognizing intellectual
property rights in some plant genetic resources while promoting free access
to other resources, such as raw plant genetic resources and those resided in
international seed banks,388 the continuous push for farmers' rights is likely to
boost the protection of traditional knowledge and cultural expressions. As
Professors Raustiala and Victor observed, the same rationale underscores both
the protection of traditional knowledge and that of farmers' rights.389
5. Information and Communications
With the arrival of the Internet and new communications technologies
and the emergence of the online social community, the developments in the
information and communications area have taken on unprecedented
significance. While WIPO seeks to regain its momentum by developing the

386. Id. art. 10.2.
387. Heifer, Regime Shifting, supranote 265, at 40.
388. As Professor Heifer wrote:
In response to the expansion of intellectual property rights. ... actors in the PGR regime
adopted different rules for each of these three categories. Wild PGRs were made subject to
the sovereignty of the state in which they were located; "worked" PGRs were eligible for
intellectual property protection by private parties, while the seeds and other plant materials
located in international seed banks continued to be treated as the common heritage of
humanity.
Id. at 34-35.
389. As they pointed out: "The farmer's rights movement has gained momentum as a broader group
of indigenous communities-not just farmers--have realized that they could be victims of the same
dividing line between 'raw' and 'worked' knowledge. As this broader coalition organized, it adopted a
more general term: 'traditional knowledge."' Raustiala & Victor, supra note 380, at 304.
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WIPO Internet Treaties 3" and undertaking a consultative process to examine
the Internet domain name system,39' other fora have conducted activities to
address problems and challenges in the global digital environment and the
emerging knowledge economy.
In 2003, the World Summit on the Information Society ("WSIS") was
held in Geneva under the auspices of the International Telecommunication
Union ("ITU"). This summit underscored the concern over a widening digital
divide between developed and less developed countries and the global
importance of access to information and knowledge.39 2 The Geneva phase of
the Summit was followed by a second Tunis phase in November 2005.39'
Although WSIS focuses on more than intellectual property issues, the
concerns raised by the growing protection of intellectual property rights have
been noted explicitly in the summit declaration and its accompanying action
plan.394 Paragraph 42 of the Declaration of Principles from the Geneva
Summit provides:
Intellectual Property protection is important to encourage innovation
and creativity in the Information Society; similarly, the wide
dissemination, diffusion, and sharing of knowledge is important to
encourage innovation and creativity. Facilitating meaningful participation by all in intellectual property issues and knowledge sharing
through full awareness and capacity building is a fundamental part of
an inclusive Information Society.395
These documents were followed by the Tunis Action Plan, which called
for the U.N. Secretary-General to convene the Internet Governance Forum to
promote a "multilateral, multi-stakeholder, democratic and transparent" policy
dialogue on Internet governance.3 96 Since its creation, the forum has met in

390. WCT, supra note 99; WIPO Performances and Phonograms Treaty, adoptedDec. 20, 1996, S.
TREATY Doc. No. 105-17, at 18 (1997).
391. See generally WIPO INTERNET DOMAIN NAME PROCESS REPORT, supra note 160.
392. See World Summit on the Information Society, Dec. 10-12, 2003, Declaration of Principles,
U.N. Doc. WSIS-03/GENEVA/DOC/4-E (Dec. 12, 2003), available at http://www.itu.int/dmspublitus/md/03/wsis/doc/S03-WSIS-DOC-0004!!PDF-E.pdf [WSIS Declaration of Principles]. For a discussion
of the global digital divide, see generally Peter K. Yu, Bridging the Digital Divide: Equality in the
Information Age, 20 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 1 (2002).
393. See World Summit on the Information Society, Nov. 16-18, 2005, Tunis Agenda for the
1)-E (Nov. 18, 2005), available at
Information Society, WSIS-05/TUNIS/DOC/6(Rev.
http://www.itu.int/wsis/docs2/tunisloff/6revl.html [hereinafter Tunis Agenda].
394. WSIS Declaration of Principles, supranote 392; World Summit on the Information Society, Dec.
10-12, 2003, Plan of Action, U.N. Doc. WSIS-03/GENEVA/DOC/5-E (Dec. 12, 2003), available at
http'Jlwww.itu.intdmspub/itu-slmdO3/wsisdoclSO3-WSIS-DOC-0004!!PDF-E.pdf.
395. WSIS Declaration of Principles, supranote 392, 142.
396. Tunis Agenda, supra note 393, 1 72-73.
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Athens, Rio de Janeiro, and Hyderabad, India, with future meetings scheduled
to be held in Sharm El Sheikh, Egypt and Vilnius, Lithuania.397 Although the
benefits of this forum remain to be seen, the forum no doubt has successfully
raised concerns in an emerging policy area and facilitated linkage between the
various established international regimes. It is, indeed, no coincidence that
Recommendation No. 24 of the WIPO Development Agenda "request[s]
WIPO, within its mandate, to expand the scope of its activities aimed at
bridging the digital divide, in accordance with the outcomes of the World
Summit on the Information Society also taking into account the significance
'
of the Digital Solidarity Fund."398
Compared to the other fora, the WSIS process is characterized by a much
heavier participation of civil society organizations. Indeed, their participation
was so heavy that concerns over free speech were raised in the run-up to the
second summit in Tunisia, which is known for problems concerning free
speech and human rights.3 99 The extensive civil society participation was no
surprise. After all, the emergence of the information society has enabled
individuals to communicate with others in a borderless world. The
information revolution therefore has transformed virtually everybody into a
stakeholder in the global information society, thus making Internet governance
especially important. In fact, the growing development in this area may go
hand in hand with a recent development at the non-state level-the Access to
Knowledge Movement.'
As this movement grows, the public interestoriented information and communications policies-such as the preservation
of the public domain, the protection of fair use, and the development of medianeutral policies-are likely to feature even more prominently on the agenda
of the emerging information and communications regime.

397. Information about the past and future Internet Governance Fora is available at
http://www.intgovforum.org/cms/.
398. WIPO, 45 Adopted Recommendations, supra note 224,1 24.
399. See Jonathan Zittrain & John Palfrey, Introduction to AccEss DENIED: THE PRACTICE AND
POLICY OF GLOBAL INTERNET FILTERING 1, 1 (Ronald Deibert et al. eds., 2008) (describing the Tunisian
government's blocking of websites that were "critical of the summit's proceedings or mentioning human
rights" during WSIS); Molly Beutz Land, Protecting Rights Online, 34 YALE J. INT'L L. 1, 19 (2009)
(stating that "[tihe lack of serious attention to the issue of filtering was particularly apparent in the decision
to hold the second phase of WSIS in Tunisia, a country that engages in Internet censorship"); Kieren
McCarthy, EU Attacks Police Tacticsat Tunis Internet Conference, THE GUARDIAN (London), Nov. 16,
2005, at 22 (reporting about the European Union making "a formal complaint to the Tunisian government
on the eve of a world internet summit in Tunis over heavy-handed police tactics").
400. For an excellent discussion of the A2K movement, see generally Amy Kapczynski, The Access
to Knowledge Mobilization and the New Politics of Intellectual Property, 117 YALE L.J. 804 (2008)
[hereinafter Kapczynski, A2K Mobilization].
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6. Summary

Although commentators tend to focus on the development agenda
established at the WTO or WIPO, there are many other equally important
development agendas in other international fora. As international law
becomes more fragmented, and issues areas continue to merge, an increasing
number of fora will emerge to address problems created by intellectual
property protection.
Most recently, the World Customs Organization ("WCO") has caught
widespread attention in the area of intellectual property enforcement. To be
certain, customs and border control is not a new issue area, and its strong
relation to the protection and enforcement of intellectual property rights has
been recognized from the inception of the TRIPs Agreement. The
representatives of the Customs Cooperation Council were among the earliest
observers in meetings of the TRIPs Negotiating Group of the GATT."°1
Nevertheless, the recent active development in the WCO is worrisome.
As one commentator noted, the WCO sought to set "new standards of
intellectual property enforcement through the back door." 2 Even worse, less
developed countries have criticized the WCO secretariat for not providing
sufficient opportunity for participation. In a recent submission to the WCO,
Argentina, Brazil, China, Cuba, Ecuador, and Uruguay expressed their
concern that the SECURE Working Group had "depart[ed] from the memberdriven nature that should guide the process of the... Working Group" that the
group's recent report "was produced without previous consultation to the
Members of the Organization.'
Following these criticisms, the WCO decided to discontinue the working
group and proposed to establish in its place a new committee that has a
stronger focus on technical assistance and capacity building.' While the
WCO's decision reminds us of the importance of focusing on development,
and suggests the potential for advancing pro-development positions through
international participation-or international protest, in this case-the recent

401. TRIPs Negotiating Group, Meeting of the Negotiating Group of 23 September 1987, at 1,
MTN.GNG/NCI 1/2 (Oct. 8, 1987).
402. Viviana Mufioz Tellez, The World Customs Organisation:Setting New Standardsofintellectual
Property Enforcement Through the Back Door?, S. BULL., Apr. 16, 2008, at 6 (2008) (capitalization
omitted).
403. Argentina et al., Document on the "Report of the SECURE Working Group" (SP0269E1) 1-2
(2008), availableathttp://www.ip-watch.org/files/Document%20on%20SECUREwg%20Reportpdf; see
also Mufioz Tellez, supra note 402, at 7 (noting that "only Brazil is actively engaged in the SECURE
Working Group discussions").
404. See William New, World Customs Organizationto Replace ControversialIP StandardsBody;
Doubts Remain, INTEU.ECrUAL PROP. WATCH, http://www.ip-watch.org/weblog/2009/01/08/world-

customs-organization-to-replace-controversial-ip-standards-body-doubts-remain/ (Jan. 8, 2009).
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development at WCO also highlights the continued proliferation of fora and
the potential for greater interactions between otherwise distinct issue areas.
It is for this reason commentators have repeatedly emphasized the importance
of focus on the development of linkages" and regime complexes.4 6 As
Rorden Wilkinson observed, one of the distinguishing features of the
contemporary global governance system "is the way in which varieties of
actors are increasingly combining to manage-and in many cases, micromanage-a growing range of political, economic and social affairs.""
IV. COMPARISON

In a recent article in the Journalof World IntellectualProperty,Andrea
Koury Menescal compared the establishment of the New Development
Agenda to that of the Old Agenda.4 8 Focusing on the draft resolution Brazil
introduced before the United Nations General Assembly in 1961, she
highlights the strong resemblances between the two Development Agendas.
For example, Jirg Engi of the International Association for the Protection of
Intellectual Property ("AIPPI") made the following remarks in 1963:
This may not sound nice but I might just as well tell you that I am of
the opinion that there is a serious countermovement to the present
highly desirable trend towards modernizing and strengthening
industrial property protection of which I spoke a minute before. As
you are aware, a number of attacks on the industrial property system
have in the last few years been made, the whole system having
encountered severe criticism not only in developing countries but also
in highly industrialized countries.
This general movement towards undermining industrial property
rights has been particularly fierce in the pharmaceutical field.., but
what happens now in one particular technical field may soon extend
to other fields.'
These remarks strongly echo the statement made online by the U.S.
Chamber of Commerce:

405. See generally David W. Leebron, Linkages, 96 Am.J. INT'L L. 5 (2002).
406. See Heifer, Regime Shifting, supranote 265, at 16-17; Raustiala & Victor, supranote 380; Yu,
InternationalEnclosure, supra note 203, at 13-21.
407. Rorden Wilkinson, GlobalGovernance:A PreliminaryInterrogation,in GLOBALGOVERNANCE:
CRITICAL PERSPECTvs 1, 2 (Rorden Wilkinson & Steve Hughes eds., 2002) [hereinafter GLOBAL
GOVERNANCE].

408. Menescal, supra note 129.
409. Id. at 761 (quoting AIPPI, ANNuAIRE 1963/1, at 88-89).
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Anti-IP forces are pressing their attacks in the U.S. Congress, in a
growing number of key nations, and in multilateral forums like the
World Trade Organization, the World Health Organization, and the
World Intellectual Property Organization harming both developed and
developing countries and their people....
The U.S. Chamber, as the voice of the broader business
community, has launched a comprehensive campaign to rebuild global
support for fundamental intellectual property rights.41 °
As Andr6a Menescal wrote, the statement uttered by Engi "could easily have
been made by someone dissatisfied with the World Trade Organization's
Doha Declarationof 14 November 2001 ... or with the proposal presented
by Brazil and Argentina... in October 2004 calling for the establishment of
[the WIPO Development Agenda]."41

When one gets deeper into the policy demands made by less developed
countries and the conceptual tools they used, one could find even more
striking similarities between the two sets of development agendas. For
example, the TRIPs-minus intellectual property standards less developed
countries demand today easily reminds one of the active push for special and
differential treatment for less developed countries by Brazil, India, and other
less developed countries decades ago.41 Although the TRIPs Agreement
sought to create minimum standards for the protection and enforcement of
intellectual property rights, its preamble explicitly recognizes "the special
needs of the least-developed country Members in respect of maximum
flexibility in the domestic implementation of laws and regulations in order to
enable them to create a sound and viable technological base."' '
Similarly, the commons concept that has been used widely in the free
software, open source, free culture, and access to knowledge movements
resembles the "common heritage of humankind" concept, which was advanced
decades ago in part to "compensat[e] for colonial exploitation. 4 14 That
concept has been used in the past few decades to push for the protection of

410. U.S. Chamber of Commerce, IntellectualProperty,httpJ/www.uschamber.con/issues/index/ip/
default (last visited Feb. 22, 2009).
411. Menescal, supra note 129, at 761.
412. See Roffe & Vea, supra note 14, at 107 (stating "[rieferences to issues such as technology
transfer, capacity building, flexibilities based on countries' levels of development, access to knowledge, the
preservation of the public domain, and access to new technologies (such as information and communication
technology) are reminders of past events").
413. TRIPs Agreement, supra note 2, pmbl. recital 6.
414. Galal, supra note 181, at 201.
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cultural property,4 5 an equitable disposal of materials found in outer space,4t 6
the joint ownership of seabed resources under the United Nations Convention
on the Law of the Sea,4 7 the mutually beneficial exploration and development
of Antarctica,4 1 8 and the conservation of plant genetic resources.4" 9
In sum, commentators are right to point out the strong resemblances
between the Old and New Agendas.4 20 As Debora Halbert reminded us, "the
contemporary debates about access to knowledge, traditional knowledge and
a development round are in no way new debates. These concerns have been
present from WIPO' s inception, but thirty-seven years of work have yet to see
these issues resolved. ' 4 2' According to her, "one of the most depressing
realizations of reviewing the debates surrounding WIPO's creation is just how
little has changed since 1967. ''422 Likewise, Professor Okediji found
remarkable resemblances between NIEO and the WIPO Development Agenda:
Like the NIEO, the Development Agenda is framed as a regime of
special and differential . . . treatment for [developing and least

developed countries]. Initiated by developing countries, with Brazil
again at the lead, the proposal for a WIPO Development Agenda
challenges the passive orthodoxy that positive welfare gains are
inexorably a byproduct of IP protection. Like the Brazil-initiated
resolution almost half a century ago, the various proposals focus
squarely on the core IP treaties administered by WIPO and the
absence of any explicit identification of how IP rights can and will

415. See Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Conflict of May
14, 1954, 249 U.N.T.S. 240 (stating that cultural artifacts are the "cultural heritage of all mankind").
416. See Agreement Governing the Activities of States on the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies art.
11, Dec. 5, 1979, G.A. Res. 34/68, U.N. GAOR, 34th Sess., Supp. No. 46, U.N. Doc. A/34/664 (entered
into force July 11, 1984) ("The moon and its natural resources are the common heritage of mankind.").
417. See United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea art. 136, Dec. 10, 1982, 1833 U.N.T.S.
3 (entered into force Nov. 16, 1994) (stipulating that "[t]he Area and its resources are the common heritage
of mankind").
418. See Antarctic Treaty, pmbl. 1 1, Dec. 1, 1959, 12 U.S.T. 794 ("[rlecognizing that it is in the
interest of all mankind that Antarctica shall continue for ever to be used exclusively for peaceful purposes
and shall not become the scene or object of international discord"). For an in-depth discussion of whether
the concept should apply to Antarctica, see generallyCHRISTOPHER C. JOYNER, GOVERNING THE FROZEN
COMMONS: THE ANTARCrIC REGIME AND ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECION (1998).

419. See International Undertaking, supra note 376, art. I (stating "the universally accepted principle
that plant genetic resources are a heritage of mankind and consequently should be available without
restriction").
420. See Halbert, supra note 119, at 262; Menescal, supra note 129, at 793; see also Roffe & Vea,
supranote 14, at 99 (noting "[a] remarkable parallel ... between th[e] consensual, international declaration
[of the WIPO Ad Hoc Group of Governmental Experts in December 1977] and the developing-country
claims made almost 30 years later in the context of the WIPO Development Agenda").
421. Halbert, supra note 119, at 254.
422. Id. at 262.
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complement the objectives of other international regimes or foster the
goals of the global public order with respect to improving the lives of
millions around the world. Finally, the WIPO Development Agenda
challenges the constitutional context of WIPO's institutional
isolationism, requiring the Organization to meaningfully integrate the
objectives of IP protection with the rights which serve as means to
those ends.423
In light of the strong resemblances between the Old and New
Development Agendas, this Part compares the two agendas in terms of their
players, fora, and issues as well as the political environment surrounding their
development, the level of public awareness of intellectual property issues, and
the use of ideas, concepts, and rhetorical frames as a support for these
agendas. Such comparison is important for three reasons.
First, it provides insight into the sustainability and future success of the
New Agenda. If the agenda simply repeats its failed predecessor without
making significant adjustments, this agenda is unlikely to succeed. As Andr6a
Menescal argued through a comparison of the Old and New Development
Agendas:
The fact that the 2004 proposal reiterates the need "to foster the
transfer of technology through foreign direct investment and
licensing" for developing countries is evidence that the initiatives
from the 1960s onwards brought home less to developing countries
than the propagandistic efforts of the AIPPI's and the ICC's experts
made the world believe. That such a proposal as the 2004 one was
presented at all implies that the 1961 Brazilian Resolution failed and
that the influence of private-interest experts linked to the AIPPI and
the ICC continued unabashed even after the WIPO became a United
Nations specialized agency in 1974.424
Thus, if the New Agenda is to be successful, drawing lessons or insights
from the Old Agenda is essential. Because the two agendas share many
common features, "the latter should be understood in the context of the former's
failure.,, 4' A study of the Old Agenda will also provide helpful lessons and
direction for the future development of the New Agenda.4 26 As Menescal
continued: "A historical perspective can help the new 'countermovement' to
measure its opponents and prepare itself for the long and difficult process of

423. Okediji, History Lessons, supra note 194, at 152.
424. Menescal, supra note 129, at 793.
425. Id. at 762.
426. See Roffe & Tesfachew, supra note 57, at 400 ("A number of lessons could be drawn from past
and recent attempts to deal with the issue of the transfer of technology at the multilateral level.").
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changing the rules on IP law and policy. Research and teaching will play a
'
decisive role in this process that may well take decades."427
Likewise, Surendra
Patel, Pedro Roffe, and Abdulqawi Yusuf wrote:
Although the Code of Conduct negotiations never resulted in a final
agreement, and failed to materialize in a concrete legal instrument,
they continued to inform, inspire and influence the issues addressed
by these later instruments, as well as their approach and content,
particularly as regards the positions adopted by developing countries
in the course of their elaboration.2
Second, a better understanding of the Old Agenda will promote a greater
appreciation and understanding of the political dynamics involved in the
negotiation process and the hard policy choices confronting the participating
members and international institutions. Indeed, the self-interests of and concerns about marginalization may have made it more difficult for WIPO and
other international organizations to fully embrace a development agenda.429
Some senior WIPO staff may still have vivid, and perhaps bitter, memories of
the shift of the intellectual property standard-setting activities from their organization to the GATT/WTO in the mid- 1980s. As Keith Maskus noted colorfully,
43 Similar
"WIPO has been hit by a train since TRIPS was concluded.""
developments have also marginalized UNCTAD and UNESCO,43 ' both of which have
been highly supportive of the efforts by less developed countries to recalibrate
the balance of the international intellectual property system.
In fact, since the creation of the TRIPs Agreement, WIPO seems to have
undertaken "a sustained campaign ... to return the organization to the center
of global intellectual property policy making., 432 As Graeme Dinwoodie
observed:

427. Menescal, supra note 129, at 762.
428. Surendra J. Patel et al., Introductionto INTERNATIONAL TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER, supra note
57, at xxiii, xxiv.
429. See MAY, supra note 16, at 95 (arguing that "we should recognize that the organization's
directors and staff have focussed on the task of ensuring the WIPO would not decline in importance, nor
become marginalized as some other specialized agencies of the United Nations have become").
430. Keith E. Maskus, The WIPO Development Agenda: A CautionaryNote, in DEVELOPMENT
AGENDA, supra note 14, at 163, 164.
431. See MUSUNGU & DuTELD, supra note 120, at 19-20.
432. MAY, supra note 16, at 66; see also G. BRUCE DOERN, GLOBAL CHANGE AND INTELLECTuAL
PROPERTY AGENCIES: AN INSTITIONAL PERSPECTIVE 58 (1999) (stating that the desire for an intellectual

property agency to move into the role of generating and distributing value-added intellectual propertyrelated information "is undoubtedly accompanied by a concern that the agency... concerned might not
survive or would lose influence unless it could take on such new aggressive service-oriented roles");
Okediji, History Lessons, supra note 194, at 157 (noting that "the Development Agenda could be viewed
as an explicit expansion of WIPO's mandate necessary for ensuring that the Organization remains relevant
in the future").
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[T]he sudden emergence of the WTO as part of the international
intellectual property lawmaking process seemed to energize WIPO,
resulting in the conclusion of several new treaties in copyright, patent
and trademark law, as well as the reorganization... designed to make
WIPO fit for the twenty-first century.433
Such reemergence provides a more complete picture of the full operation of
an international organization. To be certain, WIPO, as a member-driven
organization, cannot ignore the mandate given by its membership. However,
it may be able to take action in areas when no clear mandate exists. Moreover,
as Professor May pointed out, "WIPO does not merely operate on the basis of
the clearly articulated interest of a majority of its members," citing the
development of the WIPO Internet Domain Name Process.4 34 According to
him:
WIPO has moved beyond the passive secretariat model in international organizations, to one that is much more proactive ...
Although the international secretariat of the WIPO would.., like to
deny the claim, the WIPO is a highly politicized organization, and
cannot be regarded merely as an agency providing technical services,
as the debates around the WIPO Development Agenda have clearly
revealed.435

433. Graeme B. Dinwoodie, The Architecture of the InternationalIntellectual PropertySystem, 77
CHI.-KENT L. REv. 993, 1005 (2002) (footnotes omitted); see also GERVAIS, supra note 260, at 82
(suggesting that "WIPO [may] continue to be the primary forum for major norm-setting efforts and those
efforts will then serve as a basis for future changes to the [TRIPsI Agreement"). Likewise, as Sisule
Musungu and Graham Dutfield pointed out:
For WIPO itself, the advent of TRIPS created a significant strategic dilemma. The
organisation had to share its hitherto 'exclusive competence' on intellectual property matters
with the WTO.... In a move aimed at preserving its relevance in the new scenario, WIPO
quickly adopted a resolution in 1994 mandating the International Bureau to provide
technical assistance to WIPO members on TRIPS-related issues. This was followed by a
second resolution in 1995 to enter into a cooperation Agreement with the WTO for WIPO
to provide technical assistance to developing country members of the WTO irrespective of
their membership in WIPO.
MUSUNGU & DuTFIELD, supranote 120, at 11.
434. MAY, supra note 16, at 59; see also Frederick M. Abbott, DistributedGovernanceat the WTOWIPO: An Evolving Model for Open-Architecture Integrated Governance, 3 J. INT'L ECON. L. 63, 72
(2000) (noting that "[tihe WIPO Domain Name Process is the leading example of a multilateral secretariatbased rule-making process which breaks from the traditional model of the passive secretariat"); Dinwoodie,
supranote 433, at 1001 ("WlPO acted at the request of a single member state (the United States) to produce
a report that, by virtue of delegation of de facto control of the domain name registration process from that
single government, could be implemented by ICANN as substantive law without the usual airings found
in the intergovemmental lawmaking process of which WIPO is a part" (footnote omitted)).
435. MAY, supra note 16, at 57, 98.
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Moreover, the WSIS process and the subsequent development of the
Internet Governance Forum have shown the ongoing rivalry among the various
international institutions that are involved in standard-setting activities
concerning the Internet and the new digital environment. Organizations from
the 1TU to UNESCO have expressed their interest in being considered as the
primary forum for developing these new standards.436 Even more challenging,
the development of new technology has ushered in new forms of organizations
that have been of growing importance to the international intellectual property
regime. The Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers
("ICANN"), which is now charged with responsibilities for the day-to-day
management of the domain name systems and the oversight of the operation
of the authoritative root server system, is a private not-for-profit corporation
in California that has entered into a contractual arrangement with the U.S.
Department of Commerce.43 7
Finally, by underscoring the differences between the two Development
Agendas, and the promising developments concerning greater intellectual
property activities in other fora and the growing public awareness of the
issues, this Part provides hope for the New Agenda. Such a note of optimism
helps generate the grassroots support needed to counter the push for stronger
intellectual property protection by powerful countries and their equally
powerful industries. The additional support also enables less developed
countries and their supporters to work together to develop new negotiation and
implementation strategies, to restore the balance in the international
intellectual property system, and to develop more balanced concepts of
protection and enforcement.
A. Players
Compared to the New Agenda, the Old Agenda was heavily statecentered-in part due to the fact that the international legal system
"historically deferred to states as the guardians of domestic welfare, with the
assumption that the appropriate exercise of sovereign power for domestic
public interest would inure inevitably to the benefit of the global

436. Nevertheless, Sisule Musungu has praised the inclusive approach taken by the ITU when it
organized the WSIS process:
The UN General Assembly gave the ITU the lead on this process and the ITU has taken it
forward in broad inclusive fashion requiring the contribution of all relevant UN agencies
and attracting attention from various levels of policy-making. Clearly, given the multiplicity
of actors, interests and the scope of the impacts of these policies and the UN entities
involved, this may ultimately be the way to proceed.
MUSUNGU, supra note 210, at 20.

437. See Peter IC Yu, The Origins ofccTLD Policymaking, 12 CARDOZO J. INT'L & COMP. L.387,
396-97 (2004).
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community. ' To the extent non-state actors are involved in the Old Agenda,
their interests are usually reflected through those state actors that represent
them.
For example, the revision of the Berne and Paris Conventions was a
process dominated heavily by state actors. Although the publishing industries
have played important roles in the Conventions' development-in particular,
its attempt to defeat the Stockholm Protocol and Brazil's 1961 draft
resolution 4 39 -their interests were largely represented by their corresponding
governments. Likewise, during the negotiation of the International Code of
Conduct, government officials, rather than corporate executives, were heavily
involved in the negotiation process, even though "efforts at finalizing work on
the Code have been thwarted by countries with the greatest vested interests in
the activities of transnational corporations."""4 To many less developed
countries at that time, corporations were mere "agents of transfer" of
technology."
In the past few decades, however, private corporations have become more
actively involved. Although they still express their views through their
national governments, they also have been more aggressive in lobbying the
governments in Brussels, Geneva, Tokyo, Washington, and other policy
fora." 3 For example, Professor Sell has shown how private corporations were
the main proponents behind the push for stronger international intellectual

438. OKEDtI, INTERNATIONAL COPYRIGHT SYSTEM, supra note 99, at ix.
439. See MAY, supranote 16, at 22-23 ("The subsequent series of conferences and reports, involving
the International Chamber of Commerce and the Association for the Protection of Intellectual Property,
alongside the BIRPI, effectively stifled the intent of the resolution, leaving the issues to re-emerge some 40
years later.").
440. Moses T. Adebanjo, Economic Co-operationAmong Developing Countries:A Component of
InternationalDevelopment Strategy,in UNCTAD AND THE SOUTH-NORTH DIALOGUE: THE FIRST TWENTY
YEARS 175, 184 (Michael Zammit Cutajar ed., 1985).
441. SELL, POWER AND IDEAS, supra note 164, at 4.
442. See Peter Drahos, Securing the Futureof Intellectual Property: IntellectualPropertyOwners
and Their Nodally Coordinated Enforcement Pyramid, 36 CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L. 53, 65-74 (2004)
(discussing how the U.S. Trade Representative collects information from industries through the Section 301
process).
443. See MAY, supra note 16, at 99 ("[C]orporations and their representatives are very effective
national lobbyists, and may well manipulate the make-up of delegations to the WIPO, shaping the
arguments and debates before they are initiated in Geneva."); SELL, PRIVATE POWER, supra note 261, at
106 (noting that the Intellectual Property Committee "succeeded in forgoing an industry consensus with
its Japanese [Keidanren] and European industry counterparts [UNICE (Union of Industrial and Employers'
Confederations of Europe)], who agreed to work on it and pledged to present these views to their respective
governments in time for the launching of the Uruguay Round"). For the joint TRIPs proposal from the
Intellectual Property Committee, Keidanren, and UNICE, see INTELLECTUAL PROP. CoMM., KEIDANREN
& UNICE, BASIC FRAMEWORK OF GATT PROVISIONS ON INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY: STATEMENT OF VIEWS

OF THE EUROPEAN, JAPANESE AND UNITED STATES BUSINESS CoMMuNmEs (1988).
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property protection in the TRIPs Agreement.4" As she pointed out: "What is
new in [the TRIPs] case is that industry identified a trade problem, devised a
solution, and reduced it to a concrete proposal that it then advanced to
governments.... In effect, twelve corporations made public law for the
world."" 5 Their active involvement and their role in driving the development
of the TRIPs Agreement therefore have made "[s]tate-centric accounts of the
Uruguay Round... at best incomplete, and at worst misleading." 446
The ability of multinational corporations to influence governments is in
part derived from their mastery of technical details concerning intellectual
property protection and enforcement and partly due to the resources they have
vis-A-vis less developed countries. 447 Many of these countries "lack the
resources... to send delegates to [international] fora and thus have resorted to
using nongovernmental organizations... to represent their interests."" 8 In one
instance, the Foundation for International Environmental Law and Development,
a London-based environmental NGO, negotiated a deal to represent Sierra
Leone before the WTO Committee on Trade and Environment." 9
Although international NGOs that dominated the international
intellectual property standard-setting process in the past were primarily
corporations and industry groups, civil society organizations have been more
active in recent years. As Andr6a Menescal observed, "[t]he most welcome
news to emerge from the 2004 [WIPO Development Agenda] debate is that
developing countries' governments are no longer alone in opposing an even
further strengthening of the IP holders' rights and the prevalence of private
interests in the IP field. ' 45 ° Likewise, Sisule Musungu and Graham Dutfield

444. See generally SELL, PRIVATE POWER, supra note 261.
445. Id. at 96.
446. Id. at 8; see also Gunther Teubner & Andreas Fischer-Lescano, CannibalizingEpistemes: Will
Modern Law Protect TraditionalCultural Expressions, in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND TRADMONAL
CULTURAL EXPRESSIONS, supranote 37, at 17, 28 ("In the fields of cultural protection and biopiracy ....
the key actors are not states but private entities, such as universities, museums, and business
corporations.").
447. See SELL, PRIVATE POWER, supra note 261, at 98.
448. John 0. McGinnis & Mark L. Movsesian, The World Trade Constitution, 114 HARv. L. REV.
511, 557 n.256 (2000).
449. Gregory C. Shaffer, The World Trade OrganizationUnder Challenge:Democracy andthe Law
andPolitics of the WTO's Treatment of Trade and Environment Matters,25 HARv. ENVTL. L. REv. 1, 6263 (2001).
450. Menescal, supranote 129, at 794; see also DEERE, supranote 210, at 114 ("A key result of postTRIPS tensions was the deepening complexity of the global IP system. The range of non-state actors
involved in global IP debates become broader and many NGOs, industry groups, international organizations
(lOs) and academic experts deepened their degree of engagement."); SELL, PRrVATE POWER, supra note
261, at 140 ("[Wlhat is new is the mobilization of [grassroots activists, farmers' groups, environmental
groups, development groups, human rights groups, and consumer groups] to oppose an increasingly
aggressive approach to intellectual property by US corporations.").
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549

consider "[c]ivil society groups... the single most important factor in raising
the issue of the impact of the international intellectual property standards,
especially TRIPS
standards, on development issues such as health, food and
45
agriculture.,
To be certain, the participation of NGOs in the international debate was
not a new phenomenon. Nevertheless, there have been some differences in the
nature and degree of their participation in recent years. As Richard Dogson
and Kelly Lee wrote in the public health context: "[N]on-state actors have
long played an important role in health governance. The difference here lies
in the degree, and nature, of that involvement.... [T]here are examples of
health governance emerging that incorporate non-state actors more intimately
and numerously within processes of decision-making. '45 2 Indeed, many NGOs
found themselves "woken up" by the harsh realities brought by the one-sided
TRIPs Agreement and the public health crises it has created in the less
developed world.453 Meanwhile, others remain frustrated by the fact that they
had been largely excluded from the WTO process.454 According to Adronico
Adede, their exclusion "may explain why they subsequently became so
uncompromising towards the WTO, as shown when they helped to paralyse
the 1999 Seattle Ministerial Conference,
where it was expected that a
455
Millennium Round would be launched.,
During the Fifth WTO Ministerial Conference in Canctin in 2003, "highprofile NGOs, such as Greenpeace, Oxfam, and Public Citizen, explicitly
backed the developing countries' stand and heavily criticized developed

451. MUSUNGU & DuTFIELD, supra note 120, at 22 (footnote omitted).
452. Richard Dogson & Kelly Lee, Global Health Governance: A Conceptual Review, in GLOBAL
GOVERNANCE, supra note 407, at 92, 100.
453. As Professor Sell wrote: "When I asked some public-regarding copyright activists 'where they
had been' during TRIPS, they told me they had been 'sleeping' but that because of TRIPS they had 'woken
up." SELL, PRIVATE POWER, supra note 261, at 181; see also Maskus, supra note 430, at 164
("Policymakers, non-governmental organizations, the media, and even many legal scholars have awakened
to the fact that IP regulations have rather fundamental implications for the processes of economic
development.").
454. As Adronico Adede explained:
Given the negotiating system followed by the Uruguay Round, which even developing
country sovereign states complained about, it is easily apparent that the non-governmental
organizations and civil society had next to no opportunities for influencing the negotiations
of the TRIPS Agreement during the conference processes between 1990 and 1994. They
may, however, have had opportunities for organizing informal workshops and seminars to
discuss TRIPS-related issues, but these were completely outside the official GATT
negotiating procedures.
Adronico 0. Adede, Origins and History of the TRIPS Negotiations, in TRADING IN KNOWLEDGE:
DEVELOPMENT PERSPECTIVES ON TRIPS, TRADE AND SUSTAINABaLrTY 23, 29-30 (Christophe Bellmarm
et al. eds., 2003).
455. Id. at 30.
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countries, in particular the US and the EU, for a lack of consideration for their
poorer trading partners."4 56 Likewise, they have increasingly demanded voices
and roles in international organizations and processes through the submission
of amici curiae briefs to the WTO dispute settlement panels as third parties.457
Although NGOs do not have any right to submit these briefs, and the dispute
settlement panels do not have any obligation to consider them, the Appellate
Body of the Dispute Settlement Body stated clearly that a dispute settlement
panel "has the discretionary authority either to accept and consider or to reject
and advice submitted to it, whether requested by a panel or
information
458
not.

Similar developments occurred at WIPO. Shortly before the adoption of
the WIPO Development Agenda Proposal, civil society organizations put
together the Geneva Declaration on the Future of the World Intellectual
Property Organization ("Geneva Declaration") to highlight the needs and
demands of less developed countries. 459 The declaration, which was circulated
over the Internet and signed by more than 600 academics, researchers,
inventors, public libraries, nonprofit organizations, and individuals, called for
WlPO to undertake the following reforms:
* Express a more balanced view of the relative benefits of
harmonization and diversity, and seek to impose global
conformity only when it truly benefits all humanity;
" Reject a "one size fits all" system that "leads to unjust and
burdensome outcomes for countries that are struggling to meet
the most basic needs of their citizens";
" Establish a development round to openly discuss these issues;

456. Sungjoon Cho, A Bridge Too Far: The Fallof the Fifth WTO MinisterialConference in Cancdn
and the Future of Trade Constitution, 7 J. INT'L ECON. L. 219, 235 (2004).
457. See generallySteve Charnovitz, Opening the WTO to NongovernmentalInterests, 24 FORDHAM
INT'L L.J. 173 (2000) (examining the role that nongovernmental organizations do and should play in the
WTO dispute resolution process, including the submission of amici curiaebriefs); Jacqueline Peel, Giving
the Public a Voice in the Protection of the Global Environment: Avenues for Participationby NGOs in
Dispute Resolution at the European Courtof Justice and World Trade Organization, 12 COLO. J. INT'L
ENvTL. L. &POL'Y 47 (2001) (discussing the opportunity that the WTO dispute resolution process provides
to nongovernmental organizations for participating in environmental cases); Andrea Kupfer Schneider,
Unfriendly Actions: The Amicus BriefBattle at the WTO, 7 WIDENERL. SYMP.J. 87 (2001) (exploring the
arguments supporting and criticizing the increased judicialization of WTO dispute resolution, with
particular emphasis on the battle over amicus briefs).
458. Appellate Body Report, United States-Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp
Products,WT/DS58/AB/R 108 (Oct. 12, 1998).
459. Geneva Declaration on the Future of the World Intellectual Property Organization (Oct. 4, 2004)
[hereinafter Geneva Declaration], availableathttp://www.cptech.org/ip/wipo/futureofwipodeclaration.pdf.
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Support the mandate from the 1974 U.N./WIPO agreement that
WIPO "promote creative intellectual activity and facilitate the
transfer of technology related to industrial property";
Create "a moratorium on new treaties and harmonization of
standards that expand and strengthen monopolies and further
restrict access to knowledge";
Create standing committees on technology transfer and
development issues;
Support a Treaty on Access to Knowledge and Technology;
Reform the technical assistance programs and provide
developing countries with the ability to implement the Doha
Declaration on TRIPs and Public Health. 46°

As the Geneva Declaration reminds us:
The proposal for a development agenda has created the first real
opportunity to debate the future of WIPO. It is not only an agenda for
developing countries. It is an agenda for everyone, North and South.
It must move forward. All nations46and
people must join and expand
1
the debate on the future of WIPO.
A year later, the Royal Society for the Encouragement of Arts,
Manufactures and Commerce convened an international committee to draft the
Adelphi Charter on Creativity, Innovation and Intellectual Property, which
sets out eight new principles for the development of intellectual property
rights and calls on governments and international community to focus on the
public interest. 2 In its first principle, the Charter states that "[liaws
regulating intellectual property must serve as means of achieving creative,
social and economic ends and not as ends in themselves." 3 As the Charter
continues: "The public interest requires a balance between the public domain
and private rights... [and] a balance between the free competition that is
essential for economic vitality and the monopoly rights granted by intellectual

460. Halbert, supra note 119, at 274-75.
461. Geneva Declaration, supra note 459. Likewise, Andr6a Menescal wrote:
[B]oth the "WIPO Development Agenda" and the public interest concerns on IP are no
longer an issue only for developing countries, activists and NGOs calling for the prevalence
of social and health issues over trade and profit with IP rights. Rather, they are of
significant concern to an international network of public-interest NGOs, academics and
consumers from both developing and developed countries.
Menescal, supra note 129, at 786.
462. Adelphi Charter on Creativity, Innovation, and Intellectual Property (Oct. 13, 2005),
http://www.thersa.org/--data/assets/pdf-file/0008/126539/adelphi-charter.pdf.
463. Id. 11.
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property laws."'
The Charter calls on governments to "facilitate a wide
range of policies to stimulate access and innovation, including non-proprietary
models such as open source software licensing and open access to scientific
literature" 5 and to take into account "developing countries' social and
economic circumstances." 466
The growing participation of NGOs, academics, policy experts, and the
media is significant for a number of reasons. First, they help advance the
cause of less developed countries by serving as allies within the domestic
political contexts. 7 As Gregory Shaffer pointed out, less developed countries
can "enhance the prospects of their success if other US and European
constituencies offset the pharmaceutical industry's pressure on US and
European trade authorities to aggressively advance industry interests." 8
Second, as in the case of academics and policy experts, they help identify
policy choices and negotiating strategies that help less developed countries
enhance their development potential. According to Andr6a Menescal, "the
support of intellectuals, especially legal scholars, is just as crucial as their
previous support for an IP system that secured the protection of patentholders' rights." 9
Finally, these players, in particular the mass media, help reframe the public
debate that makes it more favorable to the cause of less developed countries.4 70
As John Braithwaite and Peter Drahos wrote in the public health context: "Had
TRIPS been framed as a public health issue, the anxiety of mass publics in the
US and other Western states might have become a factor in destabilizing the
consensus that US business elites had built around TRIPS." 47' Likewise,

464. Id. 3.
465. Id. 7.
466. Id. 8.
467. See Gregory Shaffer, Recognizing Public Goods in WTO Dispute Settlement: Who Participates?
Who Decides? The Case of TRIPS and PharmaceuticalPatent Protection,7 J. INT'L ECON. L. 459, 479
(2004) [hereinafter Shaffer, Recognizing Public Goods]; see also Antonio Ortiz Mena L.N., Getting to
"No:" DefendingAgainstDemands inNAFTA Energy Negotiations,in NEGOTIATING TRADE: DEVELOPING
COUNTRmS INTHE WTO AND NAFTA 177, 212 (John S. Odell ed., 2006) [hereinafter NEGOTIATING
TRADE] (noting the need to "[e]xploit opportunities offered by [the negotiating] partner's political system
to monitor and change its negotiating positions"); J.P. Singh, The Evolution of National Interests: New
Issues and North-South NegotiationsDuringthe UruguayRound, in NEGOTIATING TRADE, supra,at 41,
47 (noting that "divisions in the ranks of the domestic constituencies of the North can be exploited by
developing countries to their benefit or can make effective agenda-setting and coalition-building difficult
for the North").
468. Shaffer, Recognizing Public Goods, supra note 467, at 480.
469. Menescal, supra note 129, at 762.
470. See John S. Odell & Susan K. Sell, Refrainingthe Issue: The WTO Coalitionon Intellectual
Propertyand Public Health, 2001, in NEGOTIATING TRADE, supra note 467, at 85, 87.
471. BRArrHWAITE &DRAHOS, supranote 146, at 576; accordDEERE, supranote 210, at 173 ("The
effort by NGOs to shift international media coverage on compulsory licensing away from a frame
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Professor Sell reminded us that "grants talk" is preferable to "rights talk" from
the standpoint of international development, because it "highlights the fact that
what may be granted may be taken away when such grants conflict with other
important goals" and is likely to discourage policymakers from focusing on the
entitlement of the rights holders.472
Acknowledging the growing importance of NGOs and other stakeholders,
the IPR Commission contended that "WIPO would benefit from drawing a
wider group of constituencies with an interest in the IP system into its policymaking process, such as consumer organisations. ' 473 As the Commission
reasoned:
WIPO has always been responsive to the needs of the industrial
sectors which make intensive use of IP. We are less persuaded that
it is as responsive to the interests of consumers or users of IP-protected products. It is of crucial importance in this respect that WIPO
is not perceived as being receptive primarily to those organisations
which have an interest in stronger IP protection.474
The Commission's recommendation makes great sense in light of the changing
political dynamics in the international intellectual property regime. Although
state-centric internationalgovernance dominated the past, there has emerged
a new form of global governance in which both state and nonstate actors play
important roles. As Professor May explained:
The contemporary idea of global governance seeks to capture something more than the multilateral co-ordination of state activities
through the membership of issue-specific organizations. Rather,
global governance identifies the emergence and development of
political leadership by these organizations, moving beyond their mere
enacting of state governmental instructions and interests. Although
no international organization has complete autonomy from, and power

dominated by the suggestion that IP is critical to innovation to a human rights frame, was critical to their
success in prompting governments to address the relationship between TRIPS and public health."). As Amy
Kapczynski explained:

[f]rames affect what the players understand to be their interests, whom they believe to be
their allies, and how they justify the change they seek. These frames direct as well as reflect
material circumstances, and as a result, the domain of the political cannot be mathematically

reduced to the domain of the material.
Kapczynski, A2K Mobilization, supranote 400, at 809.
472. SELL, PRIVATE POWER, supranote 261, at 146.

473. IPR COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 202, at 159.
474. Id.; see also MAY, supranote 16, at 84 (criticizing WIPO for effectively excluding "other UN
agencies with significant interests in IPRs, from UNESCO to the UNDP, . . .from the policy deliberations
at the WIPO in the last decade").
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over, its members, few international organizations remain only agents
of state power.475
B. Fora
When the Old Agenda was being negotiated, the intellectual property
regime was the main forum for negotiation. As less developed countries
emerged out of decolonization, pro-development agencies, such as UNCTAD
and UNIDO, came into existence and began to participate in the intellectual
property debate. Nevertheless, the interests of each forum remained narrowly
defined, and there was limited overlap between the different interests. 76
Although countries had been able to "shop" for a forum that would best
promote and protect their interests, international forum-shifting activities were
the exception rather than the norm. 477 The textbook example of a successful
forum shift is the shift of intellectual property negotiations from WIPO to
GATT/WTO by developed countries. Other notable examples include the use
of UNCTAD by less developed countries to promote their interests through
the development of NIEO and the International Code of Conduct as well as
UNESCO's development of the U.C.C. as an alternative to then Euro-centric
Berne Convention.4 78
In the New Agenda, however, there have been a much greater amount of
forum-shifting activities. 79 In fact, these shifts are no longer limited to those
regimes that concern international trade, intellectual property, and
development. Many new fora that are traditionally not considered part of the
intellectual property regime have become affected. As I described in an
earlier article, there has now emerged an "international intellectual property
regime complex" that includes areas such as public health, human rights,

475. MAY, supra note 16, at 55; Craig N. Murphy, Foreword: Why Pay Attention to Global
Governance?, in GLOBAL GOVERNANCE, supra note 407, at xi-xii. As Professor Murphy stated:
[Als a consequence of neoliberal marketisation, the services once provided by public intergovernmental organisations are now contracted to private, non-governmental, often 'social
movement'-style, organisations. Today it is ... NGOs who run the refugee camps, provide
disaster relief, design and carry-out development projects, monitor and attempt to contain
the international spread of disease, and try to clean up an ever more polluted environment.
id.
476. See MUSUNGU & DuTFEL., supra note 120, at 20 ("[A]lthough UNDP and UNIDO continue
to carry out important work on human and industrial development and intellectual property, they do not
generally participate in WIPO meetings nor are their recommendations directly communicated to WIPO for
action.").
477. See BRATHWAITE & DRAHOs, supra note 146, at 564 ("International forum-shifting was not an
important strategy prior to the Second World War, when the number of international fora was so small as
to afford little choice.").
478. See Yu, Currents and Crosscurrents, supra note 3, at 409.
479. See id. at 408-16.
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biological diversity, food and agriculture, and information and communications.48 ° It is for this reason the previous Part defines the Development
Agenda broadly to cover important developments in these other regimes.
In addition, in the past couple of years, there has been an active push for
the establishment of the Anti-counterfeiting Trade Agreement. As Professor
Sell pointed out, "[the] new anti-counterfeiting and enforcement initiatives [in
this area] are just the latest mechanisms to achieve the maximalists' abiding
goal of ratcheting up IP protection and enforcement worldwide. '4 ' Although
developed countries and their "allies" have discussed the agreement in secret,
with the support of their industries, its lack of transparency in the negotiation
process thus far has attracted an immense amount of criticisms in not only the
less developed world, but also the developed world.482 Its harm to less
developed countries has also raised significant concerns. As Professor Sell
reminded us, "[tihe opportunity costs of switching scarce resources for border
enforcement of IP 'crimes' is huge... [and t]here surely are more pressing
in developing countries than ensuring profits
problems for law enforcement
483
for OECD-based firmS.
While forum-shifting activities are important, Professor May suggested
that a bigger issue-and a direct cause of these activities-is the continuous
proliferation of international fora that can be used to discuss intellectual
property matters.484 He therefore considers forum proliferation a more
significant concern than forum shifting. Regardless of which development is
more alarming, however, the greater use of these fora is likely to result in
significant changes in the international intellectual property system that can
help or hurt less developed countries. 8 5
On the one hand, the greater complexity in the international intellectual
property regime will raise the transaction costs for policy negotiation and
coordination. These costs are particularly problematic for countries with very
limited resources and technical capacity. As Eyal Benvenisti and George

480. See Yu, InternationalEnclosure, supra note 203, at 13-21.
481.

SUsAN K. SELL, THE GLOBAL IP UPWARD RATCHET, ANTI-COUNTERFEITING AND PIRACY

ENFORCEMENT EFFORTS: THE STATE OF PLAY 4 (IQsensato, Occasional Papers No. 1, 2008),
http://www.iqsensato.orglwp-content/uploads/SellUPEnforcement-State-f-Play-OPs1-June-2008.pdf
[hereinafter SELL, GLOBAL IP UPWARD RATCHET].
482. See Monika Ermert, No ACTA Deal Yet as EU Parliament Seeks Narrower Scope, More
Transparency,INTELL. PROP. WATCH, http://www.ip-watch.orgtweblogl2008/12/20/no-acta-deal-yet-as-euparliament-seeks-narrower-scope-more-transparency/ (Dec. 20, 2008).
483. SELL, GLOBAL IP UPWARD RATCHET, supra note 481.

484. See MAY, supra note 16, at 66 (discussing forum proliferation); see also IPR COMMISSION
REPORT, supra note 202, at 157 (noting that "[tihere are several international institutions involved in

standard setting for intellectual property").
485. See MAY, supra note 16, at 97 (noting that "forum proliferation introduces both risks and
opportunities into the global governance of intellectual property").
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Downs pointed out, the growing proliferation of international regulatory
institutions with overlapping jurisdictions and ambiguous boundaries will
ultimately
help powerful states preserve their dominance in the international
486
arena.
On the other hand, the forum proliferation phenomenon and growing
forum-shifting activities will help create "a 'safe space' in which [governments for both developed and less developed countries can] analyze and
critique those aspects of TRIPS that they find to be problematic. 48 7 This
space, in turn, will help "generate the political groundwork necessary' 48for new
rounds of intellectual property lawmaking in the WTO and WIIPO.
The existence of alternative fora will also help less developed countries
generate "counterregime norms"4 89 to advance their interests in fora that have
yet to be dominated by developed countries or that will ensure success for less
developed countries. 4" These norms may eventually be incorporated into the
international intellectual property regime as "revisionist norms., 49' A case in
point is the growing intellectual property norms that are being shaped in the
areas of human rights and biological diversity. Such norms have been used
to justify reforms in the international intellectual property system. 492 Had it
not been for increasing action by less developed countries in these other
regimes, these countries might not have been successful in pushing for
favorable language in the Doha Declaration.
The potential for forum shifts by developed and less developed countries
may also result in greater rivalry and competition among institutions.493 Such
486. See Eyal Benvenisti & George W. Downs, The Empire'sNew Clothes: PoliticalEconomy and
the Fragmentationof InternationalLaw, 60 STAN. L. REv. 595 (2007).
487. Heifer, Regime Shifting, supranote 265, at 58.
488. Id. at 59.
489. See id. at 14 (defining "counter-regime norms" as "binding treaty rules and nonbinding soft law
standards that seek to alter the prevailing legal landscape"); Donald J. Puchala & Raymond F. Hopkins,
InternationalRegimes: Lessonsfrom InductiveAnalysis, in INTERNATIONAL REGIMES 61, 66 (Stephen D.
Krasner ed., 1983) (defining "counterregime norms" as norms that "either circulate in the realm of rhetoric
or lie dormant as long as those who dominate the existing regime preserve their power and their consequent
ability to reward compliance and punish deviance").
490. See Heifer, Regime Shifting, supra note 265, at 55 (noting that "[riegime shifting allows state
and nonstate actors, particularly those that have been ignored or marginalized in other international regimes,
to experiment with alternative ways to achieve desired policy outcomes").
491. Laurence R. Helfer, MediatingInteractionsin an ExpandingInternationalIntellectualProperty
Regime, 36 CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L. 123, 127 (2004) [hereinafter Heifer, MediatingInteractions].
492. See Yu, Currentsand Crosscurrents,supranote 3, at 414-15.
493. See Heifer, Mediating Interactions, supranote 491, at 134 (noting the "competition between
the organizations for primacy over a shared policy space" in the biodiversity area); Heifer, Regime Shifting,
supra note 265, at 34 (describing how the CBD contracting parties "are attempting to influence the terms
of the debate by setting agendas, convening meetings, suggesting topics for further study, proposing a
memorandum of understanding with WIPO, and directing the CBD's Executive Secretary to seek observer
status with the TRIPs Council").
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competition helps force these institutions to be more conscious of their goals
and missions and to innovate in a way that would help them remain at the
forefront of the international debate. As Bernt Hugenholtz and Ruth Okediji
pointed out, "using multiple international institutions for the development of
[a] new multilateral framework... [may promote] norm competition across
different fora as well as ...inter-agency competition and collaboration."4' 94
Professor May also noted that the establishment of the development agenda
may help make WIPO more relevant to its less developed member states:
Some of the members of the WIPO have recognized that there are
clear developmental issues that need to be (re)introduced into the debates around the international protection of IPRs.... The advantage
for developed country members of the WIPO, in continuing policy
deliberation there rather than at the WTO, is that they can take the
process forward even if significant resistance is articulated within the
organization itself. But, equally for the supporters of the Development Agenda, there interests can also be moved forward while some
members of the WIPO continue to argue that development should be
kept out of the organization's central remit.
Therefore we can conclude that the WIPO has benefited from
forum proliferation, and has fought hard to retain its position at the
center of the global governance of intellectual property.495
C. Issues
Related directly to forum proliferation or increased forum-shifting
activities is the increasing expansion and blurring of boundaries between the
issue areas that are implicated by intellectual property protection. Indeed, the
expansion of intellectual property rights and the creation of new rights were
partly the cause of both forum proliferation and the growing overlap between
traditionally distinct issue areas. As the Appellate Body suggested in United
States-StandardsforReformulatedand ConventionalGasoline,WTO agreements such as the TRIPs Agreement cannot be "read in clinical isolation from
'
public international law."496
Likewise, the WTO panel in India-Patent
Protection for Pharmaceutical and Agricultural Chemical Products

494. HUGENHOLTZ & OKEDMI, supra note 307, at 41.
495. MAY, supra note 16, at 104.
496. Appellate Body Report, United States-Standards for Reformulated and Conventional
Gasoline, pt. IILB, WT/DS2/AB/R (Apr. 29, 1996); see also Joost Pauwelyn, The Role of Public
InternationalLaw in the WTO: How FarCan We Go?, 95 AM. J. INT'LL. 535,577 (2001) ("[A] defendant
should be allowed to invoke non-WTO rules as a justification for breach of WTO rules, even if the WTO
treaty itself does not offer such justification (say, with respect to human rights).").
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'
recognized the TRIPs Agreement as "an integral part of the WTO system."497
In fact, one could view the WlPO Development Agenda "as a call for the
development of a global IP policy that coheres more meaningfully with other
international '' 499
law regimes" 498-a call to end "WIPO's institutional

isolationism.

In the Old Agenda, there were two main issues. First, greater intellectual
property protection might not be appropriate for less developed countries.
Special and differential treatment therefore was warranted for enabling these
countries to promote internal economic, social, cultural and technological
development and to facilitate efforts to catch up with countries in the
developed world. Second, as revealed in the negotiation of the International
Code of Conduct, the transfer of technology is important, and the use of
intellectual property rights can be abused. Norms therefore are needed to be
established to reduce this abuse and to ensure the balance in the intellectual
property system.
By contrast, the issues involved in the New Agenda are more diverse.
First, the New Agenda is filled with many internal inconsistencies that can
hardly be resolved at a doctrinal level. On the one hand, the development
agenda calls for greater respect of sovereignty and autonomy other countries
need to develop their intellectual property system. Similar to those advocating
the Old Agenda, the proponents of the New Agenda demanded greater
calibration and reduced protection within the international intellectual
property regime-partly in response to the vastly different local conditions of
less developed countries. The underlying premise is that countries need wide
policy space and flexibilities to develop an innovation system that is tailored
to their local conditions.
On the other hand, the New Agenda seeks to create new forms of
protection for those in less developed countries and facilitate greater
harmonization or universalization in areas that benefit those countries, such
as the protection of traditional knowledge and cultural expressions. Like the
agenda advanced by both the TRIPs Agreement and the TRIPs-plus bilateral
and regional trade agreements, less developed countries are now advancing
their own version of the TRIPs-plus agenda that focus on their needs, goals,
and interests. 5°°

497. Panel Report, India-Patent Protectionfor Pharmaceutical and Agricultural Chemical
Productsj 7.19, WT/DS50/R (Sept. 5, 1997); see also Marrakesh Agreement, supra note 2, art. 1(2)
(stipulating that "[t]he agreements and associated legal instruments included in Annexes 1, 2 and 3 ... are
integral parts of this Agreement, binding on all Members").
498. Okediji, History Lessons, supra note 194, at 158.
499. Id. at 152.
500. See Yu, The InternationalEnclosureMovement, supranote 236, at 907.
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Article 29bis, for example, can be seen, from the standpoint of developed
countries, as a TRIPs-plus provision that requires developed countries to offer
protection based on the interests of less developed countries. To be fair to the
latter, if given a choice between lower intellectual property standards and a
lack of protection for traditional knowledge, these countries are likely to pick
the former. One may even suggest that their desperation over ever-expanding
intellectual property rights has driven them to demand intellectual property
protection of its own-or the protection of what Michael Finger and Philip
Schuler have termed "poor people's knowledge."' ' However, from a
doctrinal standpoint, it is hard to reconcile this proposal with the other
demands of less developed countries for greater autonomy, policy space, and
flexibilities.
Second, because of the significant gap between the rich and the poor and
the fact that countries can be less developed, yet technologically proficient," 2
many middle-income developing countries-most notably, Brazil, China, and
India-have interests that conflict significantly with each other. As I pointed
out in the past, these countries now have developed "schizophrenic"
nationwide intellectual property polices.50 3 While they may want stronger
protection for their fast-growing industries and highly economically developed
regions, they want weaker protection in the remaining areas. The economies
of these countries, indeed, are highly complex, and the profound sub-regional
disparities in socio-economic conditions and technological capabilities have
made it very difficult to implement nation-based intellectual property
standards.
Third, the positions taken by developed and less developed countries
remain in flux. As the technological capacity of less developed countries
increases, their positions and support for the New Agenda may change. As
Professor May observed:
[A]s the balance of technical leadership starts to move, perhaps
accelerated by the impact of the recession on research and innovation
in the most-developed countries (the US, Europe, and Japan), it is not
clear that those states that previously argued for robust protection of
IPRs will necessarily find themselves so advantaged by the current
settlement.... [In fact, i]f the global downturn does consolidate and
accelerate the shift in technological leadership in the global system,
we are likely to see national negotiating teams from the most

501. POOR PEOPLE'S KNOWLEDGE: PROMOTING INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN DEVELOPING
COUNTRIES (J. Michael Finger & Philip Schuler eds., 2004).
502. See Basheer & Primi, supranote 264.
503. See Yu, InternationalEnclosure, supra note 203, at 21-33.
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developed countries at WIPO being less all-encompassing in their
support for the global intellectual property system. °4
With new issues comes the formation of new allies.5 5 For example, the
proposals for stronger protection of traditional knowledge and cultural
expressions may attract the unanticipated support of corporate rights holders,
who have a strong "need to establish clear lines of ownership and reduce the
risks of unenforceable contracts with suppliers of creative outputs, rather than
any recognition of the rights of indigenous creators and innovators." 5 °
Likewise, as Professor Okediji pointed out:
[i]n a digital era, the interests of developing countries ironically
overlap with those of consumers in developed countries. Consequently, one of the notable paradigm shifts in the negotiation of
international copyright agreements has been the tremendous rise in
non-governmental organizations, private corporations and other nonstate entities which have participated in alliance-building with
developing countries to curtail the aggressive expansion of
proprietary interests in information works and other copyrighted
objects. 7
Thus, although development issues are generally considered issues of
importance to less developed countries, "the social and economic costs of an
even greater protection of intellectual property rights ... have been felt in
developing and developed countries alike, and have come to be viewed as a
50 8
question of human development in general, no matter of North or South.
As Andr6a Menescal observed:
Public-interest issues now include the free flow of information in
research and the promotion of innovation and creativity world-wide.
The increasing tendency of the "capitalization of knowledge" or the
"commercialization of science" has been regarded with apprehension
by many academics, especially publicly financed researchers. This
tendency refers both to the patenting of research results by academics
themselves and to the (private) appropriation of public scientific

504. Christopher May, Afterword to IMPLEMENTING WIPO's DEVELOPMENT AGENDA, supra note

207.
505. See Yu, Access to Medicines, supra note 207, at 375-78 (discussing the potential for
collaboration between players in developed and less developed countries).
506.
507.

MAY, supra note 16, at 100.
OKEDIJI, INTERNATIONAL COPYRIGHT SYSTEM, supra note 99, at 6.

508. Menescal, supra note 129, at 788.
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information and knowledge
by industry at the expense of commons
5 °9
and of science itself.
D. PoliticalEnvironment
The political environments surrounding the two development agendas are
very different. When the Old Agenda was being negotiated, many less
developed BIRPI members only emerged out of decolonization. The cold war
also loomed heavily in the background, making non-political discussion very
difficult. As Sam Ricketson and Jane Ginsburg recounted, the "highly
charged" atmosphere and the "considerable mutual mistrust" among the
participants during the time in the run-up to the Stockholm Conference "was
simply a reflection of what had been happening in other international forums
for a number of years."5 '
For example, while Western countries pushed aggressively for the
recognition of private property in, say, the human rights area, the Eastern bloc
expressed their concern about "strengthening the protection of private
property and the potential interference with 'government control over science
and art, and scientists and artists."''" As a result, many of the existing
international human rights treaties were originally negotiated along cold war
fault lines. While the West supported the ICCPR, the Socialist countries
preferred the ICESCR. 12 Even more interestingly, socialist countries seemed
to be more concerned about the potential objections to whether governments
could control science and art than about whether such protection would hurt
development in their countries.
Likewise, during the negotiation of the International Code of Conduct,
Turkey was grouped with the Group B developed countries by virtue of its
membership in the NATO Alliance, even though the country was a less
developed country.5" 3 The negotiations were further colored by the 1973

509. Id. at 788-89.
510.

RICKErSON & GINSBURG, supra note 18, at 900.

511. Yu, ReconceptualizingIntellectualPropertyInterests, supranote 335, 1067-68 (quoting Maria
Green, Int'l Anti-Poverty L. Ctr., Drafting History of the Article 15(l)(c) of the International Covenant 142,
U.N. Doc. E/C.12/2000/15 (Oct. 9, 2000), available at http://www.unhchr.ch/tbs/doc.nsf/0/872a8f
7775c9823cc I256999005c3088/$FI.G0044899.doc).
512. See Green, supranote 511, 1 43 (noting that "[the final vote [on article 15(l)(c) of the ICESCR]
was straight down cold war faultlines").
513. See Homer 0. Blair, TransnationalTechnology Transfer: CurrentProblems and Solutionsfor
the CorporatePractitioner,14 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 301, 302 (1981) (noting that "Turkey is not part
of the Group of 77 where it logically should be, but is in Group B because of its NATO affiliation").
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Arab-Israeli War5" 4 and the oil crisis, which helped precipitate the
development of NEO15
Indeed, such development was as much about political change as it was
about economic change." 6 In the early 1970s, less developed countries were
increasingly frustrated by the extant international economic system, under
which they remained economically and technologically backward." 7
Although they had tried import substitution-by producing domestically those
products they traditionally imported-they "felt they had exhausted the
possibilities of [such an industrialization] strategy. '18 As a result, they began
to "adopt[] the view that significant government intervention was required to
'
As Chantal Thomas
ensure autonomous domestic economic growth."519
explained:

514. As Essam Galal stated:
We were fully aware of the political tensions during this period of the cold war, the
Arab-Israeli War in 1973 being one example, as well as the economic tension as a result of
the oil embargo, the oil crisis and the obligatory recycling of its funds to the supposed
victims of the crisis.
Galal, supra note 181, at 200; see Ringer, Role of the United States, supra note 39, at 1070 (noting that
the problems in the Stockholm Conference were "exacerbated by the intense political atmosphere generated
by the Arab-Israeli War").
515. For discussions of UNCTAD and the New International Economic Order, see generally
MOHAMMED BEDAJOUI, TOWARDS A NEW INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC ORDER (1979); NEW
INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC ORDER: ATHIRD WORLD PERSPECTIVE (Pradip K. Ghosh ed., 1984); THENEW
INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC ORDER: THE NORTH-SouTH DEBATE (Jagdish N. Bhagwati ed., 1977)
[hereinafter NEW INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC ORDER]; ROBERT L. ROTHSTEIN, GLOBAL BARGAINING:
UNCTAD AND THE QUEST FOR ANEW INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC ORDER (1979); JYOT SHANKAR SINGH,
ANEW INTERNATIONALECONOMIC ORDER: TOWARD AFAIR REDISTRIBUTION OFTHE WORLD'S RESOURCES
(1977).
516. See NIGEL HARRIS, THE END OF THE THIRD WORLD: NEWLY INDUSTRIALIZING COUNTRIES AND
THE DECLINE OF AN IDEOLOGY 18 (1986) (stating that the Third World "identified not just a group of new
states (joined later by the older states of Latin America), nor the majority of the world's poor, but a political
alternative other than that presented by Washington and Moscow"); SELL, POWER AND IDEAS, supra note
164, at 58 (noting that the Third World "became a focal point, a rallying device, and a basis for coalitional
politics pressing a radical critique of the order of world political and economic power").
517. As Surendra Patel observed:
The success of decolonization in overcoming the long domination of imperial powers did
not result in economic transformation which required technology as the basic component.
The newly independent countries had major expectations for their rapid economic and social
development which would bridge the vast gap in relation to the enormous advances of the
rich countries within the last 150 years. Their hopes were high as to the availability of
advanced science, and particularly modem technologies, to overcome poverty and rapidly
eliminate the extreme suffering they had experienced for a long time under the domination
of the industrialized nations.
Surendra J. Patel, From Santiagode Chile (1972) to the Dawn of the ThirdMillennium,in INTERNATIONAL
TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER, supra note 57, at 179, 191.
518. SELL, POWER AND IDEAS, supra note 164, at 10.
519. Patel, supra note 517, at 179, 191.
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The origins of [the momentum to establish NIEO] lay in three
changes to the international order in the postwar era: first, the
"massive expansion of international organization for cooperative
purposes"; second, the "growing importance of states representing
non-Western civilizations" in the wake of decolonization and
independence movements; and third, "the growing gap between the
economically developed and the economically less developed
52
countries.""
To complicate matters, NIEO was developed at a time when some less
developed countries had developed much more quickly than the others. As
Fred Bergsten elaborated:
The calls for [NIEO] derive from two contemporary developments.
One is the continued poverty of the countries of the Fourth World,
which comprises mainly South Asia and most of Sub-Saharan Africa
....

The explicit or implicit purpose of most of the policy proposals

has been to help the poorest countries. Thus the bulk of the analysis
and suggestions for change have been economic. .

.

.

But the

emergence of the NIEO as a serious international issue derives
primarily from the rapidly growing strength of the countries of the
Third World, which comprises virtually all of Latin America and the
Middle East and most of East and Southeast Asia. Their interests in
seeking a NIEO are at least as much political as economic. The Third
World wants a greater participatory role in managing the world
economy, both for reasons of status and because it believes that only
through such a larger decision-making role can its interests be
protected on an ongoing basis. It is demonstrably willing to link its
rising economic power to political objectives to promote its
demands.52 '
Unfortunately, the interests of these so-called Third World and Fourth
World countries-or in WTO's parlance, developing and least developed
countries-did not coincide with each other. While the Third World countries
"focus[ed] largely on acquiring new economic opportunities: access to the

520. Thomas, supra note 189, at 2105 (quoting WOLFGANG G. FRIEDMANN, ET AL., CASES AND
MATERIALS ON INTERNATIONAL LAW 9-10 (1969)).

521.

C. Fred Bergsten, Panel Discussion on the New International Economic Order, in NEW

INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC ORDER, supra note 515, at 347, 347; see also Roffe &Tesfachew, supra note

57, at 400 ("The reformist agenda of the 1970s focused mainly on the aspirations of the developing
countries to improve their standing in the international system with emphasis on 'equal opportunities for
all countries' and 'the need for developed countries to grant special treatment to the developing countries
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markets of the industrialized countries for their exports of manufactured
goods, access to international capital markets, access to modem technology,"
the Fourth World countries "continue[d] to stress its need for resource
transfers through the traditional medium of foreign aid. '522 Moreover, with
the failure of the Latin American economies (and therefore greater reliance on
developed countries for debt assistance and reduced leverage in demanding
adjustment to the international economic system) in the 1980s, many less
developed countries "set out to liberalize their economic policies"--often as
a condition for debt relief.123 NIEO failed as a result.
Today, however, the cold war has ended, and the dynamics of the
negotiations have changed significantly. As one commentator observed, "[i]n
the contemporary post-Cold War world the assumptions underlying the
Charter of Economic Rights, as well as those of the draft Code, are bound to
appear outdated. '524 Although the United States and the European
Communities remain powerful, there have emerged a growing number of
middle-income developing countries, such as Brazil, China, and India. 525 It
remains to be seen what role these countries will play and whether they can
set up by the European
work together to rival the trilateral alliance
526
States.
United
the
and
Japan
Communities,
After all, less developed countries are more divided than is beneficial to
them. Historically, they have had very limited success in using coalitionbuilding efforts to increase their bargaining leverage. As Professor Abbott
reminded us:
Over the past 50 years, there have been a number of efforts to achieve
solidarity or common positions among developing countries in
international forums. At the broad multilateral level there was (and
are) the Group of 77, and the movement for a New International
Economic Order. At the regional level, the Andean Pact in the early
1970s developed a rather sophisticated common plan to address
technology and IP issues (ie Decisions 84 and 85). Yet these efforts
were largely unsuccessful in shifting the balance of negotiating
leverage away from developed countries. In fact, developing country
common efforts to reform the Paris Convention in the late 1970s and

522. Bergsten, supranote 521, at 347.
523. Thomas, supra note 189, at 2108.
524. Julio Faundez, The Code and Globalization-ContemporaryRelevance, in INTERNATIONAL
TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER, supra note 57, at 281, 282.

525. See Yu, Access to Medicines, supra note 207, at 358-70.
526. See id. at 356-57.
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early 1980s are routinely cited as the triggering event for movement
of intellectual property negotiations to the GATTI. 7
Even today, "the 'big five' non-members of OECD (Russia, China, Brazil,
India and Indonesia) do not always act in concert;52 8the least developed
countries themselves do not present a common front.
E. PublicAwareness
When the Old Agenda was developed, intellectual property was not
considered a major issue. In fact, intellectual property issues, in the past, were
considered arcane, obscure, complex, and highly technical. Professor Sell, for
example, has analogized intellectual property issues to "the Catholic Church
when the Bible was in Latin. 52 9 As she elaborated: "IP lawyers are
privileged purveyors of expertise as was the Latin-trained clergy. IP law is
highly technical and complex, obscure even to most general attorneys....
[The US IP lobby's] possession of technical and juristic knowledge was an
important source of its private authority. 5 30 Likewise, the Gowers Review of
Intellectual Properly ("Gowers Review") states: "For many citizens,
Intellectual Property... is an obscure and distant domain-its laws shrouded
in jargon and technical mystery, its applications relevant only to a specialist
audience."531
Today, however, the intellectual property debate is no longer as isolated
as it was in the past. From Mickey Mouse to Barbie® Dolls to software
patents, the intellectual property issues have reached the consciousness of the
public at large. The dot-com boom (and its subsequent crash) and the
adoption of digital lifestyle have also made intellectual property issues
increasingly relevant to everyday life. It is, indeed, not unusual to find the
mass media reporting about intellectual property matters.
As Peter Drahos and John Braithwaite reminded us, many of intellectual
property-related developments and existing standards are not new. The Berne
and Paris Conventions, for example, date back to the 1880s, around the time
when colonial powers explored how they could further divide Africa during

527. Frederick Abbott, The Future of IPRs in the Multilateral Trading System, in TRADING IN
KNOWLEDGE: DEVELOPMENT PERSPECrIVES ON TRIPS, TRADE AND SUSTAINABIUTY 36, 42 (Christophe
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supranote 57, at 287, 288.
529. SELL, PRIVATE POWER, supra note 261, at 99.
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their infamous "Scramble for Africa. 5 32 However, with greater use of
technology-based products, intellectual property standards and their
continuous expansion begin to "affect basic goods such as seeds, services and
information flows in a global trading economy that their full costs to citizens
and business in general are coming to be appreciated., 533 Indeed, as Andr6a
Menescal pointed out:
[Bloth the "WIPO Development Agenda" and the public interest
concerns on IP are no longer an issue only for developing countries,
activists and NGOs calling for the prevalence of social and health
issues over trade and profit with IP rights. Rather, they are of
significant concern to an international network of public-interest
NGOs, academics and consumers from both developing and
developed countries.534
Moreover, the anti-globalization protests in Seattle, Washington, Prague,
Quebec, Genoa, and other major cities have helped provide the needed
background and momentum to the push for reforms in the international
intellectual property system. 535 The growing activism through civil society
organizations has also helped raise the consciousness of intellectual property
developments. As Amy Kapczynski recently wrote:
Who would have thought, a decade or two ago, that college students
would speak of the need to change copyright law with "something
like the reverence that earlier generations displayed in talking about
social or racial equality"? Or that advocates of "farmers' rights"
could mobilize hundreds of thousands of people to protest seed
patents and an IP treaty? Or that AIDS activists would engage in civil
Or that
disobedience to challenge patents on medicines?
programmers would descend upon the European Parliament to protest
software patents?536
In sum, the growing awareness of intellectual property issues may make
the outcome of the New Agenda somewhat different from that of the Old
Agenda. As Professor Halbert observed, what is new and promising about the
New Agenda, as compared to the Old Agenda, "is the increased attention and

532. See generally THOMAS PAKENHAM, THE SCRAMBLE FOR AFRICA (1992).

533. DRAHOS & BRArrHwArrIE, supra note 138, at ix-x.
534. Menescal, supra note 129, at 786.
535. See Peter K. Yu, World Trade, Intellectual Property,and the Global Elites: An Introduction,
10 CARDOZO J. INT'L & COMP. L. 1, 3 (2002).

536. Amy Kapczynski, The Access to Knowledge Mobilizationand the New Politicsof Intellectual
Property, 117 YALE L.J. POCKET PART 262, 263 (2008), httpJ/thepocketpart.orgt2008/06/01/
kapczynski.html [Kapczynski, A2K and New Politics](footnotes omitted).
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resistance by the general public to these issues and the development of civil
society organizations intent upon seeing the problems associated
with the
'537
protection of intellectual property at the global level addressed.
Finally, some developed countries have become increasingly concerned
about the plight of less developed countries. Most notably, the IPR
Commission took the unusual position that stronger intellectual property
protection may not sit well with economic development in less developed
countries-a position that is particularly unusual in light of the positions
British delegations have taken in past international intellectual property
negotiations. As the Commission stated in its final report:
Analysis of the available evidence on the impact of IPR regimes on
developing, or developed countries, is a complex task.... [W]e do
not wish to focus on IPRs as an end in themselves, but on how they
can contribute to development and the reduction of poverty. We
believe that a prerequisite for sustainable development in any country
is the development of an indigenous scientific and technological
capacity. This is necessary to allow countries to develop their own
process of technological innovation, and to enable them to absorb
effectively technologies developed abroad. It is obvious that the
development of such capacity is dependent on a large number of
elements. It requires an effective education system, particularly at the
tertiary level, and a network of supporting institutions and legal
structures. It also requires the availability of financial resources, both
public and private, to pursue technological development. There are
many other factors that contribute to what are often known as
"national systems of innovation".538
Likewise, the recently-published Gowers Review advanced many helpful
recommendations that sought to recalibrate the balance in the existing
intellectual property system. 539 These recommendations are currently being
explored and evaluated by many countries, especially those in the British
Commonwealth.5 4 In light of these developments, one has to wonder whether
there are internal developments at the private sector within this country that
have helped transform the intellectual property debate.
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F. Rhetoric
In international intellectual property negotiations, rhetoric and principles
are always important. As John Braithwaite and Peter Drahos reminded us,
"[r]hetoric, 'the art of persuasive communication', has a place in international
negotiations and lobbying affecting business regulation."'" Thus far, developed
countries, rights holders, and industry groups have deployed rhetorical strategies
in two directions.
First, by linking intellectual property protection to such issues as
economic growth, increased trade, and an influx of foreign direct investment,
they managed to make intellectual property protection attractive while at the
same time increasing the priority of such protection on the national policy
agenda. As Daniel Gervais recounted, developed countries and the lobbies
that pushed for stronger intellectual property protection believed that "TRIPS
was a difficult but essential measure to jumpstart global economic
'
development."542
Less developed countries therefore "were told to overlook
the distasteful aspects of introducing or increasing intellectual property
protection and enforcement in exchange for longer-term economic health. 543
Second, the proponents of strong intellectual property rights have used
words such as "theft," "piracy," and "free riding" to condemn those countries
that have failed to offer strong intellectual property protection. 5 44 James Boyle
compared their condemnation efforts to the writing of a morality play, which
can be summarized as follows:
For a long time, the evil pirates of the East and South have been
freeloading on the original genius of Western inventors and authors.
Finally, tired of seeing pirated copies of PresumedInnocent or Lotus
1-2-3, and infuriated by the appropriation of Mickey Mouse to sell
shoddy Chinese toys, the Western countries-led by the United
States-have decided to take a stand. What's more, . . . the United
States is standing up for more than just filthy lucre. It is standing up
for the rights of creators, a cause that has attracted passionate
advocates as diverse as Charles Dickens and Steven Spielberg, Edison
and Jefferson, Balzac and Victor Hugo.545

541. BRAITHWArrE & DRAHos, supra note 146, at 528 (citation omitted).
542. Daniel J. Gervais, The TRIPS Agreement and the Doha Round: History and Impact on
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ed., 2007); see also Edmund W. Kitch, The PatentPolicy ofDeveloping Countries, 13 UCLA PAC. BASIN
L.J. 166 (1994) (arguing that less developed countries agreed to stronger intellectual property protection
during the TRIPs negotiations because they found such protection in their self-interests).
543. Gervais, supra note 542, at 43.
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By "implying that infringers should be thought of like the pirates, slave traders
and torturers of the past .... [the use of the term allows advocates of strong
intellectual property rights] to establish the parallel with more violent assaults
on human rights." 5"
In recent years, rights holders, industry groups, and policymakers have
added "security" to provide rhetorical effect. The use of this new rhetorical
frame plays unfortunately to the widespread sentiments developed in the wake
of the September 11 tragedies. Government officials, for example, have
repeatedly described how terrorists have used piracy and counterfeiting to
fund their operations.547 As Professor Sell explained, "[i]ntroducing a security
frame for IP has allowed these IP maximalists to enlist new actors, law
enforcement agencies, in their cause. Law enforcement agencies have become
'
eager recruits to the IP maximalists' network."548
Although less developed countries turned their attention to development,
fairness, moral assistance, and common ownership in the past, their strategies
have been more diverse in recent years. Together with civil society organizations, critics of intellectual property rights have problematized those terms
used by rights holders and industry groups. For example, Richard Stallman,
the founder of the Free Software movement and a leading critic of the term
"intellectual property," considers the term an "unwise generalization" that is
biased and confusing. 4 9 By bringing together different sets of rights that
originated differently, protect different subject matter, and raise different
policy questions, the term, he argued, encourages simplistic thinking that
ignores the different characteristics and limitations of copyrights, patents,
trademarks, trade secrets, and other forms of intellectual property rights.
Moreover, by including the word "property," the term "intellectual
property" glosses over the difference between abstract ideas and physical
objects, thereby perpetuating the misunderstanding that one can develop
property entitlements in ideas and information. As Mark Lemley warned us,
the property label may tempt courts, lawyers, and commentators to continue

("Thus when it came to intellectual property Asian states were not merely copyists but 'pirates',
'bootleggers' and 'counterfeiters'.").
546. MAY, supra note 16, at 50.
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on the Judiciary, 108th Cong. (2003); TIM PHILLIPS, KNOCKOFF: THE DEADLY TRADE IN COUNTERFEIT
GOODS 137-44 (2005); Maureen Walterbach, Comment, InternationalIllicit Convergence: The Growing
Problem of Transnational Organized Crime Groups' Involvement in Intellectual Property Rights
Violations, 34 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 591 (2007).
548. SELL, GLOBAL IP UPWARD RATCHET, supra note 481, at 4.
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the trend of treating intellectual property just like real property.55 ° By
underscoring the property aspects of intellectual property rights, judges in
civil law countries may also become worried that limiting intellectual property
rights would raise difficult constitutional questions concerning government
551
takings of private property.
Critics have also pointed out how the word "piracy" has been repeatedly
misused by rights holders and industry groups to cover all forms of
unauthorized copying. As Peter Drahos and John Braithwaite wrote:
Piracy remains a powerful evaluative word. To be called an
intellectual property pirate is to be condemned. In a world where
attention spans are divided by the media into ten-second sound bites
it is the perfect word to use on TV, videocassettes, newspaper
headlines and the radio. The received folk memory of "pyrates and
rovers" on the sea does the rest.5 2
To make things worse, the word piracy has now been used widely
regardless of whether limitations and exceptions exist in the intellectual
property system. For example, even though some sound recordings have
fallen into the public domain in Europe, the U.S. recording industry insists
that those recordings would be considered pirated if they appear on the U.S.
market. Likewise, as Kevin Outterson and Ryan Smith pointed out, "counterfeit" drugs as defined by the pharmaceutical industry have included not only
fake or counterfeit products, but also "safe and effective drugs from
Canada"!...
Interestingly, the increased awareness of intellectual property issues in
recent years has allowed these critics to take new approaches to respond to the
rhetorical moves taken by developed countries, industry groups, and rights
holders. First, as Professor Kapczynski pointed out, the advocates in the free
software, open source, free culture, and access to knowledge movements have
"generate[d] new theories of their shared interests (in, say, the 'information
commons' and 'access to knowledge') and new challenges to the legitimacy
of exclusive rights in information." '
These new concepts, theories,
terminologies, and collective frames, in turn, have allowed different groups
to "theorize their interests, build alliances, mobilize support, and discredit
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their opponents," and explore a common agenda.555 As Professor Kapczynski
described:
Access-to-medicines campaigners could use the human rights frame
to create connections with human rights organizations and institutions
in Geneva and New York. Farmers' rights campaigners' arguments
about sustainable development linked them to environmental groups.
Claims for protection of traditional knowledge were framed in a way
that drew connections to indigenous rights claims. Thus, each of
these groups mobilized frames that made certain alliances and
political arguments possible. 6
The development of these concepts, theories, terminologies, and
collective frames is important. As Professor Boyle reminded us:
[A] successful political movement needs a set of (popularizable)
analytical tools which reveal common interests around which political
coalitions can be built. Just as "the environment" literally disappeared as a concept in the analytical structure of private property
claims, simplistic "cause and effect" science, and markets
characterized by negative externalities, so too the "public domain" is
disappearing, both conceptually and literally, in an intellectual
property system built around the interests of the current stakeholders
and the notion of the original author. In one very real sense, the
environmental movement invented the environment so that farmers,
consumers, hunters and birdwatchers could all discover themselves as
in
environmentalists. Perhaps we need to invent the public 5 domain
57
order to call into being the coalition that might protect it.
Moreover, some critics of intellectual property rights have managed to
redefine those terms or get us to rethink their usage. As Peter Jaszi aptly
observed, "[o]ne might say that one nation's 'piracy,' [sic] is another man's
'technology transfer."' 558 Piracy, after all, is in the eyes of the beholder.
Similarly, activists have developed a "rhetoric of resistance" as a counterpoint
to the rhetoric used by rights holders and intellectual property industries.559
Critics of intellectual property rights have also managed to turn the term
on its head-as exemplified by the coinage of the term "biopiracy." As
555. Kapczynski, A2K Mobilization, supra note 400, at 809.
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Professor Sell described, "[b]iopiracy is seen as a new form of Western
imperialism in which global seed and pharmaceutical corporations plunder the
biodiversity and traditional knowledge of the developing world. Biopiracy is
the unauthorized and uncompensated expropriation of genetic resources and
traditional knowledge.""s Carrying the baggage of the word "piracy," the
term biopiracy brings with it the massive energy industry groups and rights
holders have built over the years. As Philippine activist Roberto Verzola
lamented:
If it is a sin for the poor to steal from the rich, it must be a much
bigger sin for the rich to steal from the poor. Don't rich countries
pirate poor countries' best scientists, engineers, doctors, nurses and
programmers? When global corporations come to operate in the
Philippines, don't they pirate the best people from local firms? If it
is bad for poor countries like ours to pirate the intellectual property
of rich countries, isn't it a lot worse for rich countries like the US to
pirate our intellectuals?
In fact, we are benign enough to take only a copy, leaving the
original behind; rich countries are56so greedy that they take away the
originals, leaving nothing behind. '
In the context of the lack of protection for indigenous heritage, Suzan
Harjo, former head of the National Congress of American Indians, has also
made a similarly poignant remark: "[tihey have stolen our land, water, our
dead relatives, the stuff we are buried with, our culture, even our shoes.
There's little left that's tangible. Now they're taking what's intangible."562
It is therefore understandable why commentators and policy experts,
especially those who live in, work for, or are sympathetic to less developed
countries, have actively documented the problems of biopiracy.5 63 Using this
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trope, less developed countries and their supporters have pushed actively for
the protection of traditional knowledge and cultural expressions.
V. CONCLUSION

The Old and New Development Agendas are similar to each other, but
they are also different in many respects. Through their comparison, this
Article highlights the risks and challenges of the present agenda. It also shows
that the agenda provides many strategic opportunities, which are further
enhanced by the momentum less developed countries have built since the
establishment of the Doha Round. Whether the present agenda will succeed
will depend on whether less developed countries and their supporting
governments and NGOs can mobilize in time before they lose the momentum.
Although it is too early to assess the present agenda, it is important to
remember that this agenda is unlikely to be the last set of agendas the
international intellectual property regime will ever see. Commentators have
reminded us how the TRIPs Agreement should not be treated "as a crowning
point of international intellectual property regulation. 5 6 The same is true for
this present agenda, which should not be seen as the pinnacle of the prodevelopment movement in the intellectual property field.
In the near future, a new set of development agendas is likely to be
established.565 Under this scenario, one could only hope that the present
agenda will provide the needed foundations to ensure even greater success.
If the present agenda could pave the way for the future agendas, it would be
"a far, far better thing ...than [it has] ever done.
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